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ABSTRACT 
 
DAVID SEHAT: The American Moral Establishment: Religion and Liberalism in the 
Nineteenth Century 
(Under the direction of John F. Kasson) 
 
 The relationship of religion to political governance is one of the most vexed 
questions in the modern world, but it is a central tenet of the American myth that the 
United States has solved the problem with the advent of modern religious liberty.   In 
fact the United States maintained an established or state-supported religion through 
much of its history.  The moral establishment moved through the proxy of laws 
designed, in the explanation of its proponents, to uphold public morals and good order.  
But the moral establishment often upheld a religiously derived morality, so although the 
establishment was not forthrightly a religious establishment, religious ideals still 
possessed the coercive power of law.  Law in the nineteenth century became a way of 
advancing a regulatory regime that held a relative view of individual rights, rigidly 
subordinated to what courts thought was the good of the whole, and it was the moral 
establishment that prescribed the duties that citizens owed to one another and to the 
state.  Part of that prescribed moral obligation entailed the limitation, the situational 
qualification, or even the flat denial of individual rights to women, Afro-Americans, and 
religious minorities including Catholics, Mormons, and free thinkers.  Yet the paradox 
of the moral establishment was that as it increased its reach and attained a more-fully 
elaborated symbolic repertory and a finer-grained articulation of the limits of moral 
behavior, its proponents felt increasingly uneasy.  Its growing intermediate range, 
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neither forthrightly supporting Christianity nor effecting a complete separation of 
religion and government, left some proponents worried that it was a house built on sand, 
whose uncertain stability resulted from a lack of clear connection to what they took to be 
the rock bed of Christianity.  Historians have typically taken religious rhetoric on face 
value, assuming that the decline in religious power was real, but ultimately the religious 
rhetoric of decline served to further consolidate the establishment’s support.  By the end 
of the nineteenth century the moral establishment was more firmly entrenched than it 
had been at the beginning, and religious hold on the levers of public life was tighter than 
ever. 
 iv
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
This dissertation was made possible by a 2005-2007 Liebmann Fellowship from 
the Dolores Zohrab Liebmann Foundation, a 2005 Summer Research Fellowship from the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) History Department, a 2005 Summer 
Stipend from the UNC Center for the Study of the American South, and a 2005 George 
Mowry Dissertation Research Grant from the UNC History Department.  Portions of this 
work appeared previously under the title “The Civilizing Mission of Booker T. 
Washington,” Journal of Southern History 73 (May 2007): 323-362, and are reprinted by 
permission of the Journal of Southern History.   
My committee has helped me in numerous ways.  My advisor, John F. Kasson, 
showed me what history can be through his books, allowed me enough space to pursue an 
unusual project, and helped keep me on track in the process.  Grant Wacker provided the 
original idea and impetus for the dissertation, though it has changed significantly in the 
interim.  W. Fitzhugh Brundage suggested that I consider the activities and attitudes of 
Booker T. Washington and brought out the liberal narrative that I was implicitly 
addressing.  Michael Lienesch provided a helpful note of skepticism, and pointed out my 
own tendency to follow a Hartzian narrative at a very early stage.  Finally, Peter Filene 
reminded me to keep it readable and accessible for non-specialists.   
In addition to the committee, several other people read various portions of the 
work at various times, to the manuscript’s great improvement.  For their criticism and 
intellectual exchange I am indebted (in alphabetical order) to David L. Davis, D.G. Hart, 
 v
Kathryn Loftin, Laurie F. Maffly-Kipp, Pauline Maier, Genna Rae McNeil, Phillip Luke 
Sinitiere, Benjamin E. Wise, and Ann K. Ziker.  Surpassing everyone in providing 
criticism, help, and care was my wife, Connie Moon Sehat.   
 
 vi
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MYTH.................................... 1 
CHAPTER ONE.  THE BEGINNING OF THE MORAL ESTABLISHMENT............. 30 
The Tangle of Religious Liberty........................................................................... 33 
The Relationship of Religion and Morals............................................................. 41 
Religion, Morals and Disestablishment ................................................................ 46 
The Creation of the Moral Establishment............................................................. 61 
CHAPTER TWO.  WOMEN AND THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUALISM ............... 88 
Legal Coverture and the Divine Subordination of Women .................................. 92 
Equal Rights and the Question of Religious Authority ........................................ 98 
Individualism, Citizenship, and Social Freedom ................................................ 114 
Religious Standards and the Tightening of Family Law .................................... 133 
Woman’s Rights and Women’s Moral Responsibility ....................................... 142 
CHAPTER THREE.  THE CIVILIZING MISSION AND CIVIL RIGHTS................. 157 
Slave Christianity and Slave Control.................................................................. 160 
Reconstruction and the Civilizing Mission......................................................... 168 
Booker T. Washington: Colonized and Colonizer.............................................. 181 
Christianity, Segregation, and White Man’s Burden .......................................... 198 
CHAPTER FOUR.  THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY ................................... 218 
Challenges to the Moral Establishment .............................................................. 221 
The Specter of Robert G. Ingersoll ..................................................................... 232 
 vii
Conservative Religious Response: Between Persuasion and Coercion.............. 238 
The Meaning of Robert Ingersoll........................................................................ 253 
APPENDIX: STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND RELIGION ........................................ 266 
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................... 287 
 viii
  
 
INTRODUCTION: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MYTH 
In 1834 the great American historian George Bancroft published the first volume 
of his magisterial series, History of the United States.  Bancroft’s work would establish 
the major themes of American history that have come down to the present, emphasizing 
the genius of the American political system, the austere intellectual rigor of the nation’s 
Founders, and the virtue and promise of the American people.  The United States, 
Bancroft explained, occupied a unique position in the history of the world due to its 
peerless political system.  The American form of government was “necessarily identified 
with the interests of the people,” because the principle of freedom was its guiding light.  
So strong was that principle that even enemies of the state had “liberty to express their 
opinions undisturbed.”  Instead of silencing opponents American political thought 
enshrined “reason” and mutual discourse so that political enemies could be “safely 
tolerated.”  Most importantly, in a world in which religion and the state were often tightly 
connected so that political and religious enemies were one and the same, Bancroft touted 
the principle of religious freedom that existed in the United States where religion was 
“neither persecuted nor paid by the state.”  He was quick to suggest that the lack of public 
funding did not mean that religion was unimportant.  “The regard for public morals and 
the convictions of an enlightened faith” maintained a land of vigorous belief and order, 
he claimed, and the American arrangement created a system of laws that made the United 
States a beacon of liberty to the world, offering “an asylum to the virtuous, the 
unfortunate, and the oppressed of every nation.”1
Bancroft’s account established the essential myth of the United States, a myth that 
is hard to reconcile with many parts of the American past.  Consider, for example, the 
story of Charles B. Reynolds.  In New Jersey in 1886, Reynolds, a one-time Methodist 
minister turned freethinker, began holding freethought meetings in a tent.  On the first 
day of the meeting in Boonton a mob entered the tent while Reynolds was speaking, 
accosting him with rotten eggs and vegetables before cutting the guy-ropes and slashing 
the canvas.  Reynolds fled from Boonton to Morristown with the intention of distributing 
freethought pamphlets there, but the group from Boonton followed him, demanding that 
he be indicted.  The local authorities responded swiftly, and Reynolds was indicted on 
two counts of blasphemy, for his activities in both Morristown and Boonton, and placed 
in jail.  The solution to the controversy was both orderly and legal.  He was tried before a 
jury, convicted on two counts of blasphemy, and released with a hefty fine.  Shortly after 
Reynolds’s conviction, the New York Times went on record in support of the decision.  “It 
is well that there should be some means of suppressing a noisy and offensive blackguard 
like Reynolds,” declared the paper, “and whether he was suppressed as a blasphemer or 
merely as a blackguard is a matter of minor consequence.”2
 Reynolds’s trial, which took place not fifty, or seventy, but one hundred and ten 
years after the American Revolution, runs counter to the myth of American religious 
liberty, a narrative deeply marked by congratulatory self-celebration and nationalist self-
                                                 
1 George Bancroft, History of the United States (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1844), 1:2 
(first through fourth quotations), 3 (fifth through seventh quotations). 
 
2 New York Times, May 21, 1887, 4.  For the extended story of Charles B. Reynolds, see Orvin Larson, 
American Infidel: Robert G. Ingersoll (New York: The Citadel Press, 1962), 214-217.   
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promotion.  Like many powerful myths, the American myth has its origins in a core of 
fact.  Bancroft rightly claimed in 1834, when his book was first published, that American 
religious institutions were not paid by the state.  This was an innovation.  The idea that 
religion could be safely detached from the financial support of the state without risking 
ruinous social consequences entailed the broad acceptance of liberal political thought first 
put forward by John Locke.  State after state following the Revolution disentangled 
religious institutions from state control by withdrawing financial support for churches.  
The removal of state support also corresponded with a radical proliferation of religious 
adherence and belief in the Second Great Awakening.  The rapid expansion of church 
membership, growing steadily from 17 percent of the population in 1776 to 34 percent in 
1850 and on to 62 percent in 2000, began in earnest after states stopped paying churches.  
That very startling expansion makes it fair to say, in support of Bancroft, that 
disentangling of religious institutions from state control, in the limited sense of requiring 
their financial independence, resulted in the promotion of religious liberty and religious 
heterogeneity.  Financially separating church from state allowed for the proliferation of 
religious institutions to correspond to the many kinds of religious belief.3   
                                                 
3 A flourishing literature has formed around this core idea.  Sometimes designated as rational choice theory 
applied to religion or, alternately, the theory of religious economy, the argument suggests that after 
institutional disestablishment religious markets were free and unregulated, which resulted in a thriving 
religious marketplace as religious firms (churches) met consumer (parishioner) demands.  For historical 
and sociological proponents of the theory, see R. Stephen Warner, Church of Our Own: Disestablishment 
and Diversity in American Religion (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005); Roger Finke and 
Rodney Stark, The Churching of America, 1776-2005: Winners and Losers in Our Religious Economy, 2nd 
ed. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2005); Frank Lambert, The Founding Fathers and the 
Place of Religion in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Ted Jelen, Sacred Markets, 
Sacred Canopies: Essays on Religious Markets and Religious Pluralism (New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2002); Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Darren E. Sherkat and Christopher G. Ellison, "Recent 
Developments and Current Controversies in the Sociology of Religion," Annual Review of Sociology 25, 
no. 1 (1999): 363-394; Lawrence A. Young, ed., Rational Choice Theory and Religion: Summary and 
Assessment (New York: Routledge, 1997); Laurence R. Iannaccone, "Why Strict Churches are Strong," 
American Journal of Sociology 99 (March 1994): 1180-1211; Laurence R. Iannaccone, "Religious Practice: 
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But it is equally important to see the limits, which were profound.  The 
overwhelming scholarly focus on religious disestablishment—the removal of financial 
support from churches—has supported a general myth that the removal of state-financial 
support established a secular state, in which religion remained separate from law and 
governance to maintain a society of extravagantly free religious expression.  Peter 
Berger, one of the sociological architects of the theory of secularization, explained the 
role of religion in the United States that succinctly demonstrates the jump from church 
disestablishment to the creation of secular governing structures, while simultaneously 
gesturing to the exceptional quality of the American arrangement.  “If India is the most 
religious country in the world,” Berger claimed, “and Sweden the least, then the United 
States is a nation of Indians ruled by Swedes.”  Yet as Reynolds’s blasphemy trial 
manifestly shows, the United States was not merely a religious nation (“a country of 
Indians”) governed in an entirely secular manner (“ruled by Swedes”), and even a cursory 
look at the American past demonstrates the very tight historical connection between 
religion, laws, and political governance.  That connection destabilizes the narrative of 
religious freedom put forward by Bancroft—in which the removal of state financial 
support created a society of untrammeled liberty—and requires a new narrative based not 
on the themes liberty and heterogeneity (though they retain a core of truth), but rather on 
the connection of religious groups to the institutions of power and the resulting structures 
of coercion by law.  Assuming that Reynolds’s blasphemy trial was not aberrant—which 
it was not, at least in its stated rationale of maintaining high moral order—then we need a 
new narrative in which his trial makes sense.  Sketching the thematic concepts and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
A Human Capital Approach," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 29 (September 1990): 297-314.  
For a critique, see Steve Bruce, Choice and Religion: A Critique of Rational Choice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
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historiographical challenges of that new narrative is the goal of this dissertation, and that 
goal requires substantial rethinking of the American myth and what many have taken to 
be core components of the American church-state arrangement.4
Put simply, the United States had a state-supported or established religion for 
much of its history.  Many historians have missed this religious establishment because 
their concept of a state-supported religion is too narrow.  The religious establishment in 
the United States was three-fold: institutional, ceremonial, and moral.  The institutional 
establishment, which consisted of state monetary support for institutional churches, came 
to an end, as Bancroft claimed, over the fifty-year period following the American 
Revolution.  Yet the end of institutional establishment did not mean that the state simply 
separated itself from religion, because the withdrawal of monetary support, or 
institutional disestablishment, left in place the other two components of state-support.  
The ceremonial establishment, or the public recognition of God as a ritualized aspect of 
national services, remains in place to this day, so that the United States Congress has a 
chaplain, oaths of office often end with “So help me God,” U.S. presidents and state 
governors occasionally call for days of prayer and fasting, and it is customary, though not 
obligatory, to take the oath of office on a Christian Bible.  The ceremonial establishment 
is more symbolic than coercive.  More importantly, institutional disestablishment either 
left in place or added a moral establishment that upheld the moral ideals of Christianity 
while professing concern for the public good, which was the essential rationale for 
Reynolds’s blasphemy trial.  The moral establishment moved through the proxy of laws 
designed to uphold, in the explanation of its proponents, public morals and the public 
                                                 
4 Berger quoted by Stephen Prothero, "A Nation of Religious Illiterates," Christian Science Monitor, 
January 20, 2005.   
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order.  Many states prior to the Civil War, for example, had constitutional provisions that 
required elected officials to believe in both God and the existence of an afterlife or 
affirmed that religion was necessary for the maintenance of morality.  To pick one 
instance among many, the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 contained the 
declaration: “Morality and piety, rightly grounded on evangelical principles, will give the 
. . . best security to the government, and will lay in the hearts of men the strongest 
obligations to due subjection.”  This clause remained in the New Hampshire Constitution 
after the state terminated its institutional establishment.  Likewise in the South, the 
Mississippi Constitution of 1817, which never had an institutional establishment, 
promised the “exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,” but 
simultaneously proclaimed, “Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good 
government . . . shall forever be encouraged in this State.”  As one religious partisan 
explained in 1838, everyone granted that there was no legitimate connection between 
“ecclesiastical Christianity” and the state, in other words, no legitimate foundation for an 
institutional establishment.  But by contrast “ethical Christianity” and “the moral aspect 
of the gospel” was so important to the preservation of the state that, in the writer’s 
estimation, Christian morality was rightly connected to “the concurrent agency of 
statesmen and politicians.”5
                                                 
5 New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, part I, art. I, sec. 6; Mississippi Constitution of 1817, art. I, secs. 3 
and 16; An Inquiry into the Moral and Religious Character of the American Government (New York: 
Wiley & Putnam, 1838), 198 (fourth and fifth quotations), 185 (sixth and seventh quotations).  The three-
fold categories of the institutional, ceremonial, and moral establishment come from John Witte, Jr., 
although he applies them only to the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.  See John Witte, Jr., "'A Most 
Mild and Equitable Establishment of Religion.' John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment," in 
Religion in the New Republic: Faith in the Founding of America, ed. James Hutson (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 19.  On the use of religious language in public life, which I am calling the 
ceremonial establishment, see Richard K. Fenn, Liturgies and Trials: The Secularization of Religious 
Language (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1982).   Several readers have wondered the relationship is between 
the moral establishment and Robert N. Bellah’s concept of civil religion, but because the concept has such 
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Alongside the formal, legal establishment, many historical commentators on 
American religious life took note of the informal mechanisms and extra-legal coercions 
that resulted from religiously derived moral ideals, which the late-nineteenth century 
woman’s rights reformer Victoria Woodhull called “society-despotism.”  Foreign 
observers of the United States, in particular, were keen to point out that a religiously 
derived, moral coercion seemed an endemic part of American society.  Alexis de 
                                                                                                                                                 
indeterminate meaning, it is hard to say.  In Bellah’s original 1967 essay, the term functioned analogously 
to John Dewey’s ideal of a common faith, Walter Lippmann’s concept of a shared public philosophy, and 
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.’s notion of the vital center: a call to reaffirm common American values.  
Subsequent commentators took the concept in multiple directions, much to Bellah’s dismay.  Following his 
1980 book with Phillip E. Hammond, Varieties of Civil Religion, which sought to introduce some clarity 
into what Bellah complained was an often “sterile” debate over the term’s meaning, he apparently 
concluded that the term was no longer worthwhile and ceased using it.  In 1992, twenty-five years after the 
original 1967 essay in which he proposed the idea, Bellah admitting that the idea was compromised from 
the beginning because it was not an analytic concept but rather a call to arms to combat what he saw as the 
contemporary drift of late-60s liberalism.  Still the term continues to circulate in often wildly contradictory 
ways.  Bellah has complained in particular of the tendency to use the term as a synonym for “the idolatrous 
worship of the state,” which is exactly how Harry S. Stout uses the term in his recent book, Upon the Altar 
of the Nation.  Others have gone in the opposite direction. The sociologist of religion John Murray Cuddihy 
in No Offense: Civil Religion and Protestant Taste looks at the corrosive effects of diversity and modernity 
on religious certitude and coherent religious identities.  Civil religion, in his reading, is tamed religion—
religion that has learned to be civil.  But it has nothing to do with the state except insofar as civil religion is 
made possible by the state leaving religion alone, and it has nothing much to do with a common societal 
inheritance that Bellah was promoting.  More recently Jon Meacham has construed civil religion as “public 
religion,” claiming that, “the Founders came to believe that religion, for all its faults, was an essential 
foundation for a people’s moral conduct and for American ideas about justice, decency, duty, and 
responsibility.”  At turns, Meacham identifies civil religion and public religion with what I am calling the 
ceremonial establishment, and at other times he seems to use civil religion or public religion to identify 
what I would call the moral establishment.  Likewise Richard John Neuhaus references civil religion in 
support of his idea of “political religion” and “public religion,” in which he claims that religion and 
religious ideals form, or ought to form, a sacred canopy over the public square. Neuhaus reveals the 
advocacy quality of the term, claiming that he is, like Bellah, “politically devoted to what used to be, and 
may be again, the ‘vital center’ of liberal democracy.”  Because the term is so imprecise and so tightly 
connected to advocacy rather than analysis, I prefer the twin concepts of a ceremonial and moral 
establishment, leaving it up to the reader to match those terms with his or her definition of civil religion.  
Robert N. Bellah and Phillip E. Hammond, Varieties of Civil Religion (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 
1980), vii (first quotation); Robert N. Bellah, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in Time of 
Trial, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), ix (second quotation); Harry S. Stout, Upon 
the Altar of the Nation: A Moral History of the American Civil War (New York: Viking, 2006); John 
Murray Cuddihy, No Offense: Civil Religion and Protestant Taste (New York: Seabury Press, 1978); Jon 
Meacham, American Gospel: God, the Founding Fathers, and the Making of a Nation (New York: Random 
House, 2006), 27 (third and fourth quotations); Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion 
and Democracy in America (Grand Rapids: Eerdman's, 1984), viii (fifth and sixth quotations), 20 (seventh 
quotation).  Bellah’s original essay is: Robert N. Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," in Beyond Belief: 
Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 168-192.  For his 
admission that the civil religion was not a properly analytic concept, and was even sectarian in its major 
thrust, see Bellah, The Broken Covenant, x-xiii. 
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Tocqueville, the distinguished French visitor and a contemporary of Bancroft, claimed 
that religious coercion was fundamental to the structure of American government.  The 
very idea of majority rule implied a kind of social tyranny, because “the moral empire of 
the majority” operated with an “irresistible force” upon individuals.  In Tocqueville’s 
analysis, religion was an essential part of the empire of the majority, and although he 
thought that it remained outside of formal politics, Tocqueville claimed that religion 
nonetheless sought to direct morals, which eventually worked “to regulate the state.”  The 
American morality-minded “public” then existed as a sort of quasi-mind that did not 
persuade but instead imposed beliefs on individuals “by a sort of immense pressure of the 
minds of all on the intellect of each. In the United States, the majority takes charge of 
furnishing individuals with a host of ready-made opinions, and it thus relieves them of 
the obligation to form their own.”  As a result, Tocqueville claimed, an intellectual 
insipidness presided over the United States, in which the doctrines and moral ideals of 
Christianity exercised a controlling influence over individuals who lacked any particular 
religious autonomy.  Likewise John Stuart Mill, the British philosopher and liberal 
theorist, claimed of the United States that “in no country does there exist less 
independence of thought.”  Mill was puzzled by the seeming contradiction of the United 
States, where “the rejection of authority, and the assertion of the right of private 
judgment” were central aspects of what he took to be the American national character, 
but personal autonomy and intellectual independence did not extend to “the fundamental 
doctrines of Christianity and Christian ethics.”6
                                                 
6 Victoria C. Woodhull, A Speech on the Principles of Social Freedom (New York: Woodhull, Claflin & 
Co, 1871), facsimile reproduction in Victoria Woodhull, The Victoria Woodhull Reader, ed. Madeleine 
Stern (Weston, Mass.: M & S Press, 1974), 3; Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey 
C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 236 (first quotation), 
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Tocqueville’s claim that religion worked first to regulate morals and thereby the 
state was particularly acute.  Proponents of the moral establishment claimed that religion 
was necessary in order to shore up the moral fabric of the people, which was in turn 
necessary for the health and preservation of the state.  But in practice it was never 
religion in general that was charged with upholding the health of the state, and New 
Hampshire’s specification of “evangelical principles” as the correct grounding for 
“morality and piety” was the de facto norm, even if it was not usually spelled out quite so 
baldly.  Religion usually meant Protestant Christianity, with Catholics, Jews, and 
freethinkers facing an often-active legal and social discrimination.  Because public 
morality came from private, religious norms, the conflating of public and private in the 
hands of religious proponents worked to ensure both the continued prominence of 
Christianity in American life and the suppression of those who challenged that 
dominance.  Because select religious proponents set the social, political, and cultural 
parameters of public discourse for much of the nation’s history, the oft-heralded 
innovation of religious freedom in American political theory has obscured that, in actual 
practice, Christian moral and religious ideas pervaded American law and society to form 
critical boundaries to that freedom.  The point is not that religion formed a consensual 
basis for American society, though the proponents of the moral establishment certainly 
thought so, viewing the nation as a moral community to be protected through law.  
American society was not structured completely by religious standards, though partisans 
did use religious norms to gird laws governing public morality, which were supposed to 
                                                                                                                                                 
241 (second quotation), 278 (third quotation), 409 (fourth and fifth quotations); John Stuart Mill, “De 
Tocqueville on Democracy in America [I],” London Review 1 (October 1835), 85-129, reprinted in John 
Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. J.M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1977), 18:178 (all three quotations). 
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uphold the common good.  Instead, on an ongoing basis religious partisans assumed 
control of law and governance to coerce dissenters based on their religiously derived 
moral convictions.  This is a persistent phenomenon in American religious and political 
history.7   
 
To talk in this way about the American religious past can strike many people as 
peculiar, if not perverse.  It runs against the grain of so many conceptions of the United 
States as a land of liberty born with religious freedom as its stated goal.  That response 
underscores the tenacity of the American myth, and the stakes for the preservation of the 
myth are very high at the moment.  Given the polarized religious and political conflict of 
the last forty years, it is difficult to claim that any conclusion about the public role of 
religion in the American past reflects only the determinations of disinterested scholarship.  
Simply raising the issue in this contentious political climate invites condemnation from 
all sides, and Tocqueville’s rumination on the difficulties of writing on democracy in the 
shadow of the French Revolution remain true of religion and public life today.  As 
Tocqueville confessed to his reader (and I confess now), “I know that here I am walking 
on ground that is afire.  Each word of this chapter must offend on some points the 
different parties that divide my country.”8   
It is not my intention to contribute to the shrill partisanship that has dominated the 
debate about religion in public life, but instead to point out the way that politicized 
                                                 
7 I am indebted to D.G. Hart for this point about the conflation of public morality and private norms. 
 
8 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 187.  Jon Butler originally made this point about the problem of 
religious scholarship in a polarized political context.  See Jon Butler, "Why Revolutionary America Wasn’t 
a Christian Nation," in Religion and the New Republic: Faith in the Founding of America, ed. James 
Hutson (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 188-189. 
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scholarship has left us unable to understand the politics of the present and tacitly 
beholden to a liberal narrative that has been politicized by all sides.  The sources of 
politicization are many.  They begin with the penchant for originalism in American 
jurisprudence that looks to the past to explain the logic of the American legal apparatus 
created by the Constitutional framers, which is then applicable today.  Within the legal 
debate, there are (broadly speaking) two schools of thought.  Non-preferentialists argue 
that the doctrine of religious liberty created by the Constitution and at work in the 
American past did not create a strict disjunction between the church and state.  The 
constitutional framers, in the estimation of non-preferentialists, designed religious 
freedom to prohibit any constricting interference by the state into religious communities.  
Because the doctrine of religious liberty was supposed to promote rather than inhibit 
religious expression and belief, the federal constitution then allows and possibly even 
encourages the state to provide monetary, legal, or other accommodation for religion on a 
non-preferential basis.  Religion is protected from the state, according to non-
preferentialists, but not the other way around.  In contrast, strict separationists argue that 
the separation of church and state doctrine, originally formulated by Thomas Jefferson 
and James Madison, provided the essential rationale for religious disestablishment.  The 
constitutional framers, according to strict separationists, created a high wall between 
church and state so that the state could not interfere in the life of religious communities 
and, conversely, religious communities could not, at least directly, interfere with or 
control the state.9
                                                 
9 For non-preferentialist arguments see Ellis Sandoz, Republicanism, Religion, and the Soul of America 
(Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 2006); John Witte, Jr., Religion and the American 
Constitutional Experiment, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2005); Ellis Sandoz, A Government of Laws: 
Political Theory, Religion, and the American Founding (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 
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As twin statements of a complicated legal debate, these two positions are polar 
opposites and fiercely defended, but both are inadequate conceptual frameworks in which 
to view the past.  The strict separationists are often purposely selective in their 
descriptive historical analysis.  In his book The Establishment Clause, which is in many 
ways a model work of legal scholarship, the legal historian with strict separationist 
inclinations Leonard W. Levy goes to great lengths to excavate the logic of the 
constitutional framers in order to refute the non-preferentialists’ jurisprudence.  But his 
analysis never touches the realm of actual practice.  After spending one hundred and 
forty-five pages on the federal- and state-level debates at the time of the Founding, he 
jumps in three quick pages through the Fourteenth Amendment, the attempted Blaine 
Amendment in 1875, and then on to the 1940s.  In the process Levy omits much of the 
historical material that would suggest that the mid-twentieth-century decisions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court—which operated from the Jeffersonian principle of church-state 
separation—were in any way a departure from the practice of the past (which they were).  
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So too many non-preferentialists perform elisions of their own, unwilling to acknowledge 
that the interaction between church and state did, in fact, provide preferential support to 
Christian proponents in a way that is not, and cannot be, reconciled with their professed 
normative position.  In a curious sense the disagreement resembles that between 
Protestants and Roman Catholics, in which “Protestants” (that is, strict separationists) 
look back at the founding moment to decry the historical corruption of the Framers’ 
intention and to claim that the mid-twentieth-century Supreme Court restored the country 
to the Framers’ original vision of separation.  The “Catholics” (that is, non-
preferentialists) point to the actual historical development of jurisprudence from the 
founding moment in order to claim that the development through history is the strongest 
way to understand the Framers’ purpose, which worked fine until a few malcontents in 
black robes subverted tradition.  The result on both sides is a normative jurisprudence 
that raids different parts of the past to find support for the position of each, while 
simultaneously producing the usual sectarian bitterness.10
Sectarian bitterness is not limited to legal scholars either, because the friction 
between descriptive analysis and normative claims likewise affects cultural and political 
historians of the United States.  By virtue of their pursuit of knowledge and 
professionalization into a community of inquiry, many historians are dedicated to the 
ideals of the Enlightenment.  That commitment sometimes contains the Enlightenment’s 
critique of religion, which, due to the strident efforts of Daniel C. Dennett, Sam Harris, 
Richard Dawkins, and others, has recently gained a lot of press exposure. To many 
                                                 
10 Levy, The Establishment Clause, 147-149.  Levy’s elision is particularly striking, given his statement 
that “non-preferentialists seem to have no historical memory.”  Levy, Establishment Clause, 144.  For an 
example of a non-preferentialist treatment that elides the state’s historically preferential support for the 
Christian religion, see Bradley, Church-State Relationships in America. 
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knowledge workers, the desire that faith-based, anti-intellectual religion should decline 
with the expansion of education and knowledge has set up blinders when studying 
religion, because to acknowledge the very public role of religion in the American past 
would mean admitting the failure of a central component of the Enlightenment dream.  
On an anecdotal level, I have had many conversations with scholars who frankly confess 
their lack of interest in investigating religion even when it impinges upon the subject of 
their own study.  They find religion distasteful, tedious, and off-putting.  For that reason, 
though the study of American religion has flourished in the last thirty years as its own 
subdiscipline, it has yet to penetrate broad subdisciplines of American history, even in 
those areas where its influence was particularly profound.  As a result, many religious 
historians acknowledge the prominent role of religion in American public life (though 
they often still maintain that it remains separate from the formal institutions of law and 
governance), while many historians that do not specialize in religion unwittingly (or 
perhaps wittingly) support the myth of religious liberty put forward by Bancroft by 
avoiding the subject of religion altogether.11
 
The real problem in writing about religion and public life is the all too common 
belief that the solution to present legal and political disputes lies in the past.  By narrating 
the past to affirm or deny a specific role for religion, writing on the subject has often 
become an extension of the politics of the present.  In such a context the power of history 
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to adjudicate this dispute remains limited, often arbitrarily, to the political categories of 
contemporary partisanship.  It does have a certain role there.  To acknowledge that the 
Christian religion maintained a controlling influence over the provisions of American law 
and society does undercut the claim that the politics of the last forty years is somehow 
aberrant and out of the step with American practice.  Yet to concede that the proponents 
of the moral establishment used the institutions of law in order to coerce what they 
considered moral behavior out of dissenters also undercuts the claim of religious 
conservatives that they are simply defending their religious freedom or their prerogatives 
as the so-called moral majority from the secularizing efforts of a few malcontents.  A 
sober look into the past tends to undermine both sides of a polarized debate. 
Looked at through fresh lenses the remarkable characteristic of the current 
conflict is not its singularity but its regularity, its extreme repetitiveness.  To read the 
writings of Timothy Dwight, the president of Yale immediately after the American 
Revolution; Lyman Beecher, the architect of American cultural campaigns in the early-
nineteenth century; Josiah Strong, the late nineteenth-century social gospeler and early 
nativist; or Anthony Comstock, the powerful late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
vice-reformer, is to encounter language that is eerily familiar.  It is the idiom of Robert 
Bork, the rejected U.S. Supreme Court nominee, in Slouching toward Gomorrah and The 
Tempting of America, along with William Bennett, the Secretary of Education under 
Reagan and the Drug Czar under the elder Bush, in his books The De-Valuing of America 
and The Death of Outrage.  It is, in fact, the idiom of many in the contemporary 
Religious Right.12   
                                                 
12 Timothy Dwight, The Nature and Danger of Infidel Philosophy (New Haven: George Bunce, 1798); 
Lyman Beecher, A Reformation of Morals Practicable and Indispensable, 2nd ed. (Utica: Merrell & Camp, 
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This historical continuity should give us pause.  Those who consider themselves 
liberals (as I do) often have a tendency to dismiss this idiom as illegitimate and 
corrupting to the neutral operations of law, but as the philosopher Michael Walzer 
reminds us, the work of democratic citizenship requires the attempt to find some kind of 
workable cultural consensus or “moral minimalism.”  In Walzer’s explanation, moral 
ideas are ordinarily embedded in thickly contextualized moral outlooks that remain 
tightly connected to a person or group’s view of the world.  A Christian might believe 
that sex outside of marriage is wrong based on his or her reading of the New Testament, 
but this maximal moral code is connected to an entire set of ideas about divine 
governance of human affairs, the status of Jesus Christ as the redeemer of the world, 
Jesus’s authority to lay down moral precepts, and the formation of the body of writings 
through which Jesus’s maxims come to us in a scriptural tradition that is now called the 
New Testament.  Necessary though thick ideas are on a personal level, they cannot form 
an adequate moral framework for complex modern societies, because they are too fully 
elaborated, too maximally particular in their religious, political, and social perspectives.  
Yet minimal moral ideas, or moral ideas that have been separated from their particular 
context in order to converse with those not of that worldview, are absolutely necessary 
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for any functioning society, because those minimal ideas are the basic codes of conduct 
that we require of one another even when they are not in our group.  Minimal moral ideas 
are what enable a Catholic Latino migrant laborer, an atheist professor of religion at an 
Ivy League University, and a Hindu engineer living in the suburbs, though they may have 
radically different maximal moralities, to live together in a complex society without it 
degenerating into anarchy.  In that sense, the role of minimal moral ideas cannot be 
overemphasized.  “‘Minimalism,’” Walzer claims, “does not describe a morality that is 
substantively minor or emotionally shallow.  The opposite is more likely true: this is 
morality close to the bone. . . . The minimal demands that we make on one another are, 
when denied, repeated with passionate insistence.”13   
The distinction between minimal morality (which is publicly affirmed, and 
therefore publicly regulated) and maximal morality (which is privately believed and 
thereby privately maintained) still leaves plenty of room for disagreement about what 
ought to be considered minimal and what ought to be considered maximal moral 
obligations.  Those disagreements are the stuff of contemporary debate.  What I am 
taking pains to argue is that the debate is not aberrant, nor the result of a few disgruntled 
characters, but one that both is fundamental to American law and has been taking place 
for a long time, so it cannot be solved by appealing to history.  Instead, as the legal 
theorist Ronald Dworkin has argued, the fundamental ideas of American law, enshrined 
in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, are above all abstract statements of 
moral principles.  To talk about rights, or equality, or justice, or freedom is necessarily to 
employ moral language.  When judges, lawyers, politicians, or citizens debate how 
                                                 
13 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1994), 2 (first quotation), 6 (second quotation). 
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abstract rights apply in concrete cases, they must call up, in Dworkin’s phrase, “fresh 
moral judgments.” Not to acknowledge that these core disputes are disagreements not so 
much over procedure or jurisprudence in the abstract, but over contrasting moral visions, 
is to beg a whole host of questions about the nature of law and the role of legal 
deliberation that obscures the very political and moral reasoning that is fundamental to 
our national life.14
Because history cannot provide a minimum morality for us, given this long-
standing and fundamental pattern of disagreement, in raising the issue of the moral 
establishment I hope it is clear that I am not proposing it normatively in the present.  The 
moral establishment as it existed during the blasphemy trial of Charles B. Reynolds has 
crumbled as a coherent system of laws, first following the end of Victorianism in the 
1920s and then with the pluralization of ethical norms in the 1960s.  The contemporary 
defenders of the moral establishment (the Religious Right) are both carrying on a long 
tradition, which is why the language of the past seems so familiar, and responding as the 
now-defunct establishment’s disaffected heirs.  Conservative religious proponents want a 
return to that establishment.  Historical honesty requires an acknowledgment that it 
existed for a long time.  It also requires an acknowledgment that the moral establishment 
was contested then as now.  Both acknowledgments concede the long historical pedigree 
of the contemporary debate, and, in turn, the long pedigree makes clear the futility of 
seeking normative solutions from the past in order to solve present conflicts.  The origin 
of the problem lies in the past, but the remediation of current disputes can only be found 
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in the present.  Finding the dispute’s origin and tracing its development might result in a 
clarified debate, but not the debate’s solution. 
 
What we need, then, is a new narrative that neither obscures nor promotes past 
arrangements in order to clarify and trace the origins of contemporary conflict.  Before 
that new narrative can come into focus, the angle of vision needs a certain amount of 
modification. The first change is simply one of perspective (merely being a proponent or 
opponent of religion in public life will not do), while the second is a change in scope, 
broadening the field of vision to take in more than has been typically understood to be 
relevant to the subject of American religious history.  These two are actually very much 
related.  The story of American religious freedom, as I have said, is often centrally 
connected to the broader story of the American democratic experiment. The Whig 
characteristic of that narrative—in which the nation was founded in liberty and has come 
progressively over time to embody its fullest ideal—remains firmly in place.  As the 
sociologists Roger Finke and Rodney Stark have complained, “[t]he history of American 
religious ideas always turns into an historical account of the march toward liberalism.”  
In fact, the claim of religious liberty stands at the foundation of the Whig narrative.  
Having been freed from the entanglements with the state, so the argument goes, religion 
has flourished in the United States and become a central force for reform movements 
both in promoting the American project and, in the words of the religious scholars John 
H. Evans and Robert Wuthnow, “in strengthening and preserving civic life in America.”  
The Whig narrative is such a tenet of American orthodoxy that even those who strongly 
disagree on specific points still tend to laud the American religio-political arrangement, 
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as each understands it.  All claim a narrative of progress in asserting the triumph of 
religious liberty, in spite of the disagreement over its definition.  All see the development 
of religious liberty as a cornerstone in the development of American political thought, 
though they disagree on how religious and political thought are related.  All look to the 
American church-state arrangement to explain the powerful vitality of the American 
religious impulse, even if they disagree on the specifics of the model.  A belief in “the 
vigor and vitality of the American story of religious freedom,” in the words of the legal 
historian John Witte, Jr., remains true of nearly all parties.15   
Tightly connected to the story of religious freedom is the idea of American 
liberalism.  It is a historical commonplace to claim that the nineteenth century was the 
century devoted to equal and individual rights, characterized by rugged individualism, 
and defined by a laissez-faire economic arrangement that looked to the individual as the 
chief economic actor.  Following the publication of Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition 
in America in 1954, historians have consistently, though not uniformly, portrayed classic 
liberalism as the reigning orthodoxy of nineteenth century political and legal thought, 
with common law protections giving way to statutory and equity law to enshrine the 
primacy of contract, the rights of citizenship expanding almost inevitably to include 
greater proportions of the people, and the American ethos triumphantly marching on with 
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its focus on personal independence, sunny optimism, and rational calculation.  Although 
social historians have devoted the better part of the last forty years to revealing the many 
evasions, contradictions, and falsifications in that idea of liberal America, the history of 
the nineteenth century still remains an essentially progressive story, touched by moments 
of tragedy, but tending toward the general inclusion of all.  To quote but one example of 
this liberal narrative, in his Pulitzer-prize winning book The Radicalism of the American 
Revolution, Gordon Wood portrays the revolutionary rhetoric of individual rights and the 
equality of all men as the foundation “for all reform movements of the nineteenth 
century, and indeed for all subsequent modern liberal thinking.”  The egalitarian 
ideological core of the American Revolution had such hold on the American psyche, he 
continues, that “once invoked the idea of equality could not be stopped, and it tore 
through American society and culture with awesome power.”16
Because the broader American narrative maintains such a Whig cast, writing on 
the role of religion in preserving American civic life often takes on an emancipatory 
character as religious communities appeal to transcendent ideals to challenge unjust 
social orders.  It is through religious movements, so the narrative goes, that American 
liberalism expands.  This is especially true of writing on antebellum reform movements 
and the twentieth-century Civil Rights Movement.  Yet because of the generally 
progressive narrative of American religious history, historians have tended to overvalue 
religious sources of reform, while simultaneously underestimating the extent to which 
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religious sensibilities formed a critical part of the opposition to the reform impulse.  The 
issue of reform is itself tricky, because many would agree that, particularly in the 
nineteenth century, almost everyone claimed to be some kind of reformer.  Those who 
wanted to limit or eliminate the possibility for divorce in the 1880s called themselves 
divorce reformers, not to be confused with the other divorce reformers who wanted 
reform in the exact opposite direction by expanding divorce’s permissible conditions.17
But the liberal story does have a certain factual foundation, in a limited sense.  
Individualism and its corresponding idea of individual rights were important keywords, 
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circulating in the shared political vocabulary of the nineteenth century, but without 
shared definitions.  Some religious partisans fully agreed that the individual was the 
important unit of government in the modern American nation, but it was a carefully 
circumscribed individualism.  In 1885, Josiah Strong, pastor of the Vine Street 
Congregational Church of Cincinnati and the secretary of the Evangelical Alliance, 
published the bestseller, Our Country, with the American Missionary Association, which 
illustrated that the appeal to the individual did not always mean the kind of liberty that 
Wood and others have claimed.  Warning of “seven perils” facing the nation 
(immigration, Romanism, Mormonism, intemperance, socialism, wealth, and the city), 
Strong inspected what he regarded as cracks in the moral foundation of the United States.  
His proposed corrective was a reformation of individual character, because democracy to 
him rested on the possibility of individual self-restraint.  “Democracy,” he later 
elaborated, “is the best form for those who have sufficient intelligence and moral 
character to be capable of self-government.  Without such qualifications, for its 
enjoyment, liberty lapses into license and ends in anarchy.”  Strong readily conceded that 
the individual was the basic unit of government in a democratic society, but that 
individual needed to possess internalized moral sensibilities, sanctioned by the 
community, so that individual liberty did not threaten the whole.18   
Other religious partisans simply rejected the idea that the individual—much less 
the autonomous, rights-bearing individual—was the foundation of American democratic 
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government.  As the legal historian Rogers M. Smith has argued, “through most of U.S. 
history, lawmakers pervasively and unapologetically structured U.S. citizenship in terms 
of illiberal and undemocratic racial, ethnic, and gender hierarchies.”  Supporting those 
unequal hierarchies was, very often, the moral establishment.  That foundation did not 
escape the notice of John Stuart Mill, oft-portrayed as the quintessential nineteenth-
century political thinker, whose classical liberalism in the progressive narrative then 
becomes an expression of the reigning philosophy of the era.  In his rousing 1859 tract 
On Liberty, Mill claimed simply, “the individual is sovereign.”  Yet he feared what he 
characterized as “the engines of moral repression” that he saw gearing up in modern 
society.  In particular, “religion, the most powerful of the elements which have entered 
into the formation of moral feeling,” still strove to gain “control over every department in 
human conduct” or at least to minimize “divergence from the reigning opinion.”  Citing 
the requirement in Britain (similar to the United States) for witnesses to swear belief in 
the existence of God and a future state of rewards and punishments, the increasing 
prevalence of temperance legislation, the expansion of Sabbath laws, and the crusade 
against Mormonism, Mill claimed that it was “not difficult to show, by abundant 
instances, that to extend the bounds of what may be called the moral police, until it 
encroaches on the . . . liberty of the individual, is one of the most universal of all human 
propensities” and one of the most dangerous in the modern world.  In other words, 
though Mill was an absolutely devoted proponent of individual rights and a strong 
advocate of liberalism, his was the work not of someone who sat comfortably in a century 
that honored his social philosophy, but rather the work of someone critical of what he 
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saw as the nineteenth-century norm that downplayed the necessity of individual liberty to 
the obligations of the whole.19  
Because so many have looked to Mill as expression of the reigning orthodoxy of 
nineteenth-century political thought instead of recognizing him as one of its most cogent 
critics, they have misunderstood the century’s legal and political arrangement, 
particularly when it comes to religion.  Legal historians have often claimed that although 
colonial law equated criminality with sin, American law dropped its moral concern after 
the Revolution, which, as the legal history Kermit L. Hall has claimed, “unleashed 
powerful forces of market capitalism and individualism.”  Those forces, in the standard 
legal narrative, shifted the focus of law away from the maintenance of moral 
communities and moved property protection and personal security to the forefront of 
criminal law.  Law, in other words, becomes the mechanism to regulate autonomous 
individuals interacting in a free marketplace with a minimum level of interference.  
Religious historians, following the trajectory, have suggested that religious partisans 
accepted the de-moralization of law, both rejecting the coercion that law provided and 
looking instead to “moral suasion” as the means of promoting their social goals.  The 
nineteenth-century social movement, then, born out of religious ideals, becomes the 
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quotation), 287-290.  Others have questions whether exclusionary policies and practices are embedded in 
the ideal of liberalism itself, because throughout much of its history only certain people qualified as 
individuals.  See Uday S. Mehta, "Liberal Strategies of Exclusion," in Tensions of Empire: Colonial 
Cultures in a Bourgeois World, eds. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1997), 59-86; Linda Kerber, "Can a Woman Be an Individual? The Discourse of Self-
Reliance," in Toward an Intellectual History of Women (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1997), 200-223.  On Mill’s idea of individualism and individual liberty, see Kwame Anthony Appiah, 
"Liberalism, Individuality, and Identity," Critical Inquiry 27 (Winter 2001): 305-332. 
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ultimate means of moral suasion in the Whig narrative, whereby American liberalism 
expands to more perfectly include everyone and embody its own ideal.20
 Instead, as the legal historian William Novak has shown in his exhaustive study 
of nineteenth-century legal regulation, law in the nineteenth century became a way of 
advancing a regulatory regime that held a relative view of individual rights, which were 
rigidly subordinated to what courts thought was the good of the whole.  Fearing the 
liberty that might devolve into license and conclude with anarchy, to paraphrase Josiah 
Strong, what I am calling the American moral establishment prescribed mutual 
obligation, the duties that citizens owed to one another and to the state.  Those duties 
were paramount over the rights of individuals, and part of that prescribed mutual 
obligation entailed the limitation, the situational qualification, or even the flat denial of 
individual rights to women, Afro-Americans, and religious minorities including 
Catholics, Mormons, and free thinkers.  The determination of religious partisans to use 
law to enforce morality shows the extraordinary degree to which they were not 
committed solely to moral suasion, because, as Pierre Bourdieu has argued, the law is 
almost uniquely a text that produces its own effects.  It is inherently efficacious.  When a 
jurist declared that the United States was a Christian nation—a frequent utterance in the 
nineteenth century—his proclamation made it so.  Though the effect of that utterance 
                                                 
20 Kermit L. Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1989), 169.  For other examples of arguments that separate of morality and law after the American 
Revolution, see William E. Nelson, "Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: 
An Historical Perspective," New York University Law Review 42 (May 1967): 450-483; William E. Nelson, 
Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); David H. Flaherty, "Law and the Enforcement of 
Morals in Early America," in Law in American History, eds. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Boston: 
Little and Brown, 1971), 203-253.  For an example of the frequent claim that after disestablishment 
religious reformers used “moral suasion,” particularly prior to the Civil War, see Gaines M. Foster, Moral 
Reconstruction: Christian Lobbyists and the Federal Legislation of Morality, 1865-1920 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 9-26.  The classic claim that after disestablishment religious 
partisans rejected coercion in favor of persuasion comes from Sidney E. Mead, The Lively Experiment:  
The Shaping of Christianity in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 16-37.   
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might be in dispute, and other judges in other jurisdictions might disagree, where that 
utterance was binding it created its own effect, with persuasion being unnecessary.21   
Yet the paradox of the moral establishment was that as it increased its reach and 
attained a more-fully elaborated symbolic repertory and a finer-grained articulation of the 
limits of moral behavior, its proponents felt increasingly uneasy.  Its growing 
intermediate range in the nineteenth century, neither forthrightly supporting Christianity 
nor effecting a complete separation of religion and government, left some proponents like 
Josiah Strong worried that it was a house built on sand, whose uncertain stability resulted 
from a lack of clear connection to what they took to be the rock bed of Christianity.  But 
proponents were never able to make the connection more explicit, nor could opponents 
break the connection altogether.  Although religious partisans fretted over what they 
worried was an increasingly diffuse cultural authority, resisters and dissenters harbored 
no illusions about the extent and tenacity of conservative religious control.  Ultimately, 
the religious rhetoric of decline served to further consolidate the establishment’s support.  
Historians have typically taken religious rhetoric on face value, assuming that the decline 
was real.  But the moral establishment was more firmly entrenched at the end of the 
century than it was at the beginning, and religious hold on the levers of public life was 
tighter than ever.  Throughout the nineteenth century where the claim of individual rights 
ran up against the maximal imperatives of the moral establishment, individual rights 
often gave way. 
                                                 
 
21 William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 1; Pierre Bourdieu, "The Force of Law: Toward a 
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This, then, is a counter-narrative.  Rather than claiming the American genius in 
establishing religious liberty, I emphasize its many shortcomings, the frequent betrayal of 
principle, and the unstable ideas of religious freedom in American national life.  This is a 
story of religious authority, coercion, and law.  The moral establishment, advocated by 
religious partisans, acted as a proxy religious establishment.  It formed a continuous, if 
ever shifting, context for reform.  Religion figured centrally in prompting, resisting, and 
altering that reform impulse, sometimes at the same time. The result was a more or less 
continuous conflict over the scope, contour, substance, and foundation of the moral 
establishment, in which religious and secular proponents entered all sides of the debate to 
both reform or protect the status quo, empower or coerce dissenters, and assert or 
challenge religious authority in American public life. 
These are fundamental tensions in American law and society that have existed 
since the American Revolution and borne particularly strange fruit in the last forty years.  
The central issue in these disputes was how to adjudicate between diverse constituencies 
with competing knowledge and ethical claims within a moral framework that is accepted 
by all sides.  That issue goes vertiginously to the core of the present conflict.  Then as 
now, there were deep cleavages in American cultural life—highly contested moral 
categories and disagreements about core mutual obligations—that the debates failed to 
solve.  When moral conversation reached an impasse, all that remained was the legal and 
political struggle to coerce cultural conformity, the very phenomenon seen so often in the 
contemporary situation.  Rejecting the American myth makes clear the convoluted 
relationship of intellectual, religious, and political thought in American life, and helps to 
clarify the nature of the dispute.  Rather than a narrow quarrel over church and state, the 
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arguments turn on a pair of more profound questions that still remain to be answered: 
what minimal moral standards do we expect of one another and how do we maintain 
them in fairness to all? 
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CHAPTER ONE.  THE BEGINNING OF THE MORAL ESTABLISHMENT 
 
It is the tendency then of political atheism to prostrate our republican institutions . . . to stimulate 
and augment the powers of evil, and to suspend the restraining action of the divine government, 
until self-government becomes impossible, and revolution and anarchy follow, and a despotic 
government closes the scene.       
–Lyman Beecher1
 
The right of a society or government to interfere in matters of religion, will hardly be contested by 
any persons, who believe that piety, religion, and morality are intimately connected with the well 
being of the state, and indispensable to the administration of civil justice.   
 
—Joseph Story, U.S. Supreme Court Justice2
 
The invocation of religious liberty as a hallmark of American democracy is one of 
the most frequent occurrences of American political talk.  Raising the issue of religious 
liberty or using the language of liberty of conscience touches emotions, mobilizes 
political constituencies, and creates odd political alliances.  Yet beneath the surface 
agreement about the place of religious liberty in the American political tradition lie the 
deep waters of often-fierce disagreement, which the apparent concord about religious 
liberty has obscured.   
Those disagreements go back all the way to the birth of religious freedom in the 
United States.  Following the passage of Pennsylvania’s Constitution of 1776, Henry 
Muhlenberg, head of the German Lutherans of Pennsylvania, issued a call to arms to all 
Protestant congregations in order “to retain the priceless freedom of conscience,” because 
the state constitution, which excluded Jews and freethinkers from public office, had 
                                                 
1 Beecher, Lectures on Scepticism, 77-78. 
 
2 Joseph Story, A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States (1840; repr., Lake Bluff, Ill.: 
Regnery Gateway, 1986), 314. 
declined to endorse an official religion.  Freedom of conscience to Muhlenberg seemed to 
mean the ability to create a Christian Commonwealth.  He complained that after the 
passage of the Constitution, “you need believe in no Redeemer, no Spirit, no Word of 
God.  If you only acknowledge a Superior Being with the mouth, you may assist in the 
government. . . . If such incarnate spirits of elevated taste should succeed, there would 
very soon arise such grand, politic, free republics as flourished before the Flood in 
Sodom, and before the destruction of Jerusalem.”  In the same vein, following the 
passage of the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, Isaac Backus, the Reformed Baptist 
opposition leader to the Massachusetts establishment, still noted with approval, “No man 
can take a seat in our legislature till he solemnly declares, ‘I believe the Christian religion 
and have a firm persuasion of its truth.’”  The Constitution needed to go farther, in 
Backus’s estimation, in order to provide “equal Christian liberty,” but his telling phrase 
outlined the outer limits of the concept as far as he was concerned.  By contrast, John 
Leland, the radical and iconoclastic Baptist leader from Massachusetts and Virginia, 
explained that the Massachusetts Constitution was “as good a performance as could be 
expected in a state where religious bigotry and enthusiasm have been so predominant.”  
Leland wanted complete separation of church from the state so that “a Jew, a Turk, a 
Pagan, or a Christian of any denomination,” who was in good standing “as a citizen,” 
would have sufficient “confidence of the public” to permit him to hold office.3   
                                                 
3 Henry Muhlenberg quoted by J. Paul Selsam, The Pennsylvania Constitution: A Study in Revolutionary 
Democracy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936), 219.  For similar complaints about the 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, see Anne H. Wharton, "Thomas Wharton, Jr., First Governor of 
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(1881): 432-433.  Isaac Backus, “A Door Opened for Christian Liberty” (1783), reprinted in Isaac Backus, 
Isaac Backus on Church, State, and Calvinism: Pamphlets, 1754-1789, ed. William G. McLoughlin 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1968), 436; John Leland, “A Yankee Spy,” (1794), in John Leland, The 
Writings of John Leland, ed. L.F. Greene (1845; repr., New York: Arno Press, 1969).  
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As Muhlenberg, Backus, and Leland’s comments show, the ideal of religious 
liberty became an early point of orthodoxy in American political thought, but the appeal 
to religious liberty did not grow out of any fixed connection to the revolutionaries’ ideas 
of political freedom.  Its status as a point of orthodoxy made it a debater’s point, a key 
component of what the great political historian Richard Hofstadter called “the symbolic 
aspect of politics.”  All sides were eager to claim the symbolic high ground in the debate 
over religious liberty, so it became a rallying cry for those who wanted to create a 
Christian commonwealth, as equally for those who wanted to establish a secular state.  
But the invocation of religious liberty as a symbolic act should not be confused with the 
actual distribution of power and the formation of political institutions.  Religious liberty 
simply had no agreed upon meaning.  Because it suffered from an essential obscurity as 
an ideal, the appeal to religious liberty in the nation’s originative texts produced essential 
contradictions in religious liberty’s institutional forms.  To read those texts—which 
include the early state constitutions, Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 
Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against General Assessment, the First 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and the early state judicial decisions concerning 
church and state—is to encounter profound disagreement, ambivalence, and obfuscation 
that necessarily affected the political institutions that the documents helped create.4
Given the legal ambiguity and the often free-floating symbolism of religious 
liberty, Muhlenberg’s mention of Sodom and Gomorrah raised what would become the 
                                                 
 
4 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1967), viii.  The distinction between the symbolism of politics and the distribution of power and 
institutional formation also comes from Hofstadter.  He was particularly interested in pointing out that “the 
symbolic and myth-making aspects of the human mind” have an inescapable place in politics and in 
historical writing about politics.  Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, ix. In the case of the 
moral establishment, religious liberty as symbol and myth must first be understood as such, before the 
institutional forms and the contradictions of those forms can even be seen. 
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critical issue in the creation of the moral establishment.  Though nearly everyone would, 
in time, agree that the state should not finance religious institutions, many would still 
maintain that religion needed some binding connection to the state in order to insure 
moral vitality, which was necessary, they claimed, for the preservation of any 
government.  If moral vitality waned, then the mechanisms of the state would perish from 
internal decay or divine judgment.  The symbolic affirmation of religious liberty then 
entailed a simultaneous two-fold governmental and legal development.  The first was the 
dismantling of the institutional religious establishment—the withdrawal of state funds to 
support churches.  But moving parallel to institutional disestablishment, if not in concert, 
was the erection and fortification of a moral establishment, which looked to Christianity, 
and more often Protestant Christianity, to maintain the moral ideals that religious 
partisans thought necessary for the preservation of the state.  In other words, the legal 
ambiguity, rather than providing a clearly triumphant institutionalized form of religious 
liberty, permitted a legal framework in which religious partisans could use the levers of 
law and politics to create the moral establishment, while simultaneously claiming the 
mantle of religious freedom. 
The Tangle of Religious Liberty 
 The American Revolution and the beginning of American constitutionalism go 
hand in hand.  The peculiarity of the American desire to create constitutions, to declare 
fundamental law as an organic act of the people that would serve an architectonic 
function for the laws that follow it, is one of the more remarkable developments of the 
late-eighteenth century.  It meant a conscious legal disputation, an extended conversation 
by many people throughout American society, about the shape, contours, and ultimate 
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source of fundamental law.  Beginning in 1776, as statesmen gathered in statehouses 
across the thirteen colonies to draft new constitutions, the young nation was awash in 
political argument.  Yet the result was not always coherent, particularly when it came to 
the relationship of religious belief and political and civic rights.  Political theory, 
constitutionalism, and practical necessity combined in often unpredictable ways, and the 
constitutions that emerged from the state conventions were composite political 
documents, often bearing the visible marks of disagreement, debate, and compromise, if 
they were not outright self-contradicting.  At the core of the confusion over religious 
liberty was whether or how religious belief supported political stability and rights.  If 
they were connected, and nearly every state concluded that they were connected in some 
way, the question was how to support religious belief in order to promote social stability 
without violating religious liberty.  Because so many definitions circulated throughout the 
conversation, the resulting constitutions embodied a predictable amount of disorder, 
many of which overtly discriminated against Jews, Catholics, freethinkers.5   
The first issue facing states was whether or not to fund institutional churches.  
After 1776 five states—Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and 
Vermont—had constitutional provisions to levy public money in support of institutional 
churches, and Connecticut, which declined to pass a Constitution for thirty-three years, 
had a provision by statute to do the same.  The other states refused institutional 
establishments, but that did not mean that they left religion alone.  Pennsylvania’s 1776 
                                                 
5 On American constitutionalism more generally, see VanBurkleo, Hall, and Kaczorowski, eds., 
Constitutionalism and American Culture; Sotirios A. Barber and Robert P. George, eds., Constitutional 
Politics: Essays on Constitution Making, Maintenance, and Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001); Donald S. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
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Constitution, which received considerable scrutiny from other states because of its radical 
dedication to the newest democratic ideas, declared “[t]hat all men have a natural and 
unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own 
consciences and understanding.”   It solemnly proclaimed that the government was 
created for common protection, “not for the particular emolument or advantage of any 
single man, family, or sett [sic] of men.”  But it only promised civil rights to “any man, 
who acknowledges the being of a God.”  It also required that all office holders give the 
oath: “I do believe in one God, the creator and governor of the universe, the rewarder of 
the good and punisher of the wicked.  And I do acknowledge the Scriptures of the Old 
and New Testament to be given by Divine inspiration.”  Similarly the North Carolina 
Constitution of 1776 forbade an “establishment of any one religious church or 
denomination in this State, in preference to any other.”  Yet immediately preceding the 
Constitution’s disestablishment clause, the convention delegates inserted a provision that 
“no person, who shall deny the being of God or the truth of the Protestant religion, or the 
divine authority either of the Old or New Testaments, or who shall hold religious 
principles incompatible with the freedom and safety of the State, shall be capable of 
holding any office or place of trust or profit in the civil department within this State.”6   
Other states had variously similar arrangements, almost all of which levied civil 
liabilities on non-Protestants or, in some cases, non-Christians.  New Jersey construed its 
                                                 
6 Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, arts. II, V; Plan of Government, sec. 10.  
Benjamin Franklin, who had served as President of the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention and 
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freedom of conscience clause as a guarantee “[t]hat no person shall ever, within this 
Colony, be deprived of the inestimable privilege of worshipping Almighty God.”  It also 
promised “that no Protestant inhabitant” shall be denied the enjoyment of a civil right and 
that only Protestants could hold to public office.  Delaware promised freedom of 
conscience and the free exercise of religious worship, while simultaneously declaring 
only that “Persons professing the Christian Religion” would receive equal rights, and 
requiring office holders to swear, “I, A B, do profess faith in God the Father, and in Jesus 
Christ His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for evermore; and I do 
acknowledge the holy scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by divine 
inspiration.”  Maryland limited equal protection to “all persons, professing the Christian 
religion” and excluded Jews and atheists from office.  Vermont’s oath of office 
prohibited Jews, Catholics, and freethinkers.  Georgia required legislators to be “of the 
Protestant religion.”  South Carolina, which maintained a broad establishment of “the 
Christian Protestant religion,” limited toleration to “all persons and religious societies 
who acknowledge that there is one God, and a future state of rewards and punishments, 
and that God is publicly to be worshipped.”  It also forbade Jews, Catholics, and 
agnostics or atheists from holding office.   New Hampshire, which also had a religious 
establishment, likewise forbade Jews, Catholics, and agnostics or atheists from holding 
office without recourse to an oath, while simultaneously proclaiming that “the RIGHTS 
OF CONSCIENCE” were “in their very nature unalienable, because no equivalent can be 
given or received for them.”  Connecticut, which did not ratify a full constitution for 
thirty-three years, passed various Acts of Toleration to supplement its 1776 
Constitutional Ordinance, all of which excluded Jews.  Rhode Island, the bastion of 
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religious liberty, still placed Jews under civil and political disability until its 1842 
Constitution.7
 In the ongoing uncertainty over the extent and meaning of religious liberty, the 
three most important states were Virginia, New York, and Massachusetts, distinguished 
by their large populations, long history, and the importance of the political leaders that 
each brought to the debate.  On the surface they had radically different conceptions of 
religious liberty, with Virginia leading the way with the ideas that would culminate in the 
federal Constitution and the First Amendment’s freedom of exercise clause.  But they 
were actually more united in their ambivalence than the surface appearance might 
suggest.  Virginia, under the influence of Thomas Jefferson, was on the liberal end of the 
spectrum.  In section 16 of its Declaration of Rights, Virginia declared that because 
religion “can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence. . . all 
men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of 
conscience.”  But the provision was not entirely secular, because it defined religion as 
“the duty which we owe to our Creator,” and explained that all citizens still had “the 
mutual duty. . . to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.”  
The juxtaposition of free religious exercise with the duty of Christian virtue testified to 
the multiple hands and multiple definitions of religious liberty.  That ambivalence came 
to a head three years later when Jefferson tried to pass his Bill for Establishing Religious 
                                                 
7 New Jersey Constitution of 1776, arts. XVIII, XVIX; Delaware Declaration of Rights and Fundamental 
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Freedom, which sought to completely separate religious belief from civil rights.  
Jefferson controlled the early drafting of the legislation while it was in committee, but 
before it could reach the entire Assembly he was elected Governor, which effectively 
pulled his persuasive powers from the debate.  When the bill came before the full 
Assembly on June 12, 1779, its central provision was both succinct and sweeping.  
Because “our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions,” the bill 
explained, “all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain their opinions in 
matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their 
civil capacities.”  By separating civil rights and religious opinions, the bill struck at the 
heart of the ambivalent ideals of religious liberty that had produced such contradictory 
constitutional provisions in other states.  It met with controversy accordingly.  Before 
proponents could muster necessary support to pass the bill, the legislative session 
expired, and the Assembly postponed consideration of the bill until after the summer 
recess.  In the interim, the battle of the broadsides heated up, so that when the legislators 
returned they found numerous petitions on religious freedom, all but two of which were 
opposed to Jefferson’s bill.  Simultaneously other legislators took up a measure to modify 
section 16 of the Declaration of Rights, eroding the freedom of conscience by limiting the 
civil rights of non-Christians and creating a broadly Christian establishment in Virginia.  
The Assembly, unable to come to a decision on either bill by the end of the session, 
eventually did nothing, letting the ambivalence lie.8
                                                 
8 Virginia Constitution of 1776, Declaration of Rights, sec. 16 (first through third quotations); Thomas 
Jefferson, Bill For Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in Thomas Jefferson, The Papers of Thomas 
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 New York’s 1777 provision was seemingly much more straightforward, enacting 
what upon first blush might appear a complete separation.  Because “the benevolent 
principles of rational liberty” required the framers “to guard against spiritual oppression 
and intolerance wherewith the bigotry and ambition of weak and wicked priests and 
princes have scourged mankind,” the Constitution guaranteed that “the free exercise and 
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, 
shall forever hereafter be allowed, within this State, to all mankind.”   It qualified its 
guarantee, though, with the proviso “[t]hat the liberty of conscience, hereby granted, shall 
not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent 
with the peace or safety of this State,” which revealed a determined battle over the extent 
of religious liberty.  On the first reading of the Constitution, after it emerged from the 
drafting committee, John Jay, who would later co-author The Federalist and become the 
first Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, proposed that free religious exercise be 
limited with the provision “that nothing in this clause. . . shall be construed to extend the 
toleration of any sect or denomination of Christians, or others, by whatever name 
distinguished, who inculcate and hold for true doctrines, principles inconsistent with the 
safety of civil society.”  After a long debate, Jay withdrew his motion for a more specific 
limitation that revealed his real target.  Free religious exercise was a right of all, Jay 
proposed, 
Except the professors of the religion of the church of Rome, who ought not to 
hold lands in, or be admitted to a participation of the civil rights enjoyed by the 
members of this State, until such time as the said professors shall appear in the 
supreme court of this State, and there most solemnly swear, that they verily 
believe in their consciences, that no pope, priest or foreign authority on earth, hath 
power to absolve the subjects of this State from their allegiance to the same.  And 
further, that they renounce and believe to be false and wicked, the dangerous and 
damnable doctrine, that the pope, or any other earthly authority, have power to 
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absolve men from sins, described in, and prohibited by the Holy Gospel of Jesus 
Christ; and particularly, that no pope, priest or foreign authority on earth, hath 
power to absolve them from the obligation of this oath. 
 
After another lengthy battle, Jay’s motion was defeated nineteen votes to ten.  Finally, 
Jay proposed language very close to the final reading of the Constitution, which the 
convention passed and later modified to its final form with minimal controversy.  
Tellingly, Gouverneur Morris objected that Jay’s final amendment was “the same in 
substance” as Jay’s previous amendment that he had withdrawn, but the delegates 
overruled Morris’s objection.  When combined with the thinly veiled anti-Catholic 
assignation in the first part of the paragraph, which claimed that religious liberty was 
important to protect against the “spiritual oppression and intolerance wherewith the 
bigotry and ambition of weak and wicked priests and princes have scourged mankind,” 
Jay’s proviso insured that a Protestant sectarian definition infused New York’s guarantee 
of religious liberty, in spite of its apparent separation.9
 Given the controversies of Virginia and New York, the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780, which would become the bête noire of institutional establishment, 
was not so out of step from the rest. Led by John Adams, Massachusetts allowed that no 
person “shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for 
worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his 
conscience, or for his religious profession or sentiments.”  It limited equal protection to 
“every denomination of Christians, demeaning themselves peaceably,” required office 
holders to declare their belief in the Christian religion, but made room for Catholic 
                                                 
9 New York Constitution of 1777, art. XXXVIII.  For the debate and prior versions of the proviso, see 
Journals of the Provincial Congress, Provincial Convention, Committee of Safety and Council of Safety of 
the State of New York 1775-1777 (Albany: Thurlow Weed, 1842), 1:844 (fifth and sixth quotations), 845 
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officeholders, provided that they affirm, “no foreign prince, person, prelate, state, or 
potentate hath, or ought to have, any jurisdiction, superiority, preeminence, authority, 
dispensing or other power, in any matter, civil, ecclesiastical, or spiritual, within this 
commonwealth.”  The result was not quite the liberal arrangement of New York or 
Virginia, but not so far from what the minority wanted in even the most liberal state 
constitutional debates.10
The disagreement over the meaning of religious liberty testified to the very 
constrained regime of civil liberties that many non-Protestants labored under in the early 
national period.  Added to the constitutional prohibitions, many states declined to 
enfranchise Jews, Unitarians, and agnostics.  A person’s demurral from swearing or 
affirming his belief in God could limit his ability to testify in court, which would inhibit, 
in turn, his capacity to seek legal redress.  Law, with frequent prosecutions, enforced the 
Christian Sabbath.  Religious organizations ran the schools, in which religious practice 
was a frequent part of instruction.  Finally, non-theists could not hold or convey property 
in trust, and could not establish philanthropic organizations to propound their religious 
beliefs.  Whatever religious liberty meant at the time of the Revolution, its limits were 
very clear.  Straying from broadly Protestant or in some cases broadly Christian belief 
was a recipe for incurring civil disability of all kinds.11
The Relationship of Religion and Morals 
In spite of the ambivalence, political thought was changing rapidly.  Emerging 
within the disagreement was a core of consensus, but not quite the consensus that resulted 
                                                 
10 Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, part the first, arts. II, III; part the second, ch. II, sec. 1, art. II; ch. II, 
sec. 2, art. I; ch. VI, art. I. 
 
11 Levy, The Establishment Clause, 77-78. 
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in an unambiguous triumph of religious liberty.  Part of the mixed feelings about 
religious liberty came from widespread concern over the fate of public morality.  To 
many state constitutional framers, the establishment of a well-governed political system 
based on popular consent made the maintenance of public morality an imperative.  They 
worried that a warped public sensibility would result in unreliable representation, leading 
to destructively amoral governance and the downfall of the republic.  According to the 
conventional line of thought, religion supported morality, which in turn laid at the 
foundation of the American representative system.  In addition, religion was ostensibly 
useful in maintaining good order among the masses, functioning as a means of social 
control to contain social deviance and acting as a check against the worst excesses of 
democracy.  Even the most radical deist often supported religious belief among the lower 
sort, worrying that the broad acceptance of the advanced ideas of deism might promote 
social disorder.  Benjamin Franklin, who questioned sin, free will, personal immortality, 
and God’s providence in his youth before retreating into respectable moderation, still 
spoke for many of the educated classes when warned, “talking against religion is 
unchaining a tiger; the beast let loose may worry his liberator.”  Religion provided for 
control of the masses (the beast of Franklin’s quote), which needed the restraining force 
of religion to ensure social tranquility and good governance in a political system based on 
popular representation.12
                                                 
12 Franklin quoted by Merle Curtie, The Growth of American Thought, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 
1961), 104-108 (Franklin quotation on p. 107).  For other accounts of the widespread belief that religion 
upheld morality, see Jack N. Rakove, "Once More Into the Breach: Reflections on Jefferson, Madison, and 
the Religion Problem," in Making Good Citizens: Education and Civil Society, eds. Diane Ravitch and 
Joseph P. Viteritti (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 240-262; Diggins, Lost Soul of American 
Politics, 7-17; John G. West, Jr., The Politics of Revelation and Reason: Religion and Civic Life in the New 
Nation (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1996), 74-78, 117-134; James Hutson, Forgotten Features 
of the Founding: The Recovery of Religious Themes in the Early American Republic (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2003), 1-44.  On the prevailing republican view that virtue was necessary to sustain the 
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As the struggle over religious liberty intensified—first in Virginia with the  
passage of Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in 1786 and then in debate 
over the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1789—the issue increasingly turned 
on whether and how the state could withdraw its support for religion without endangering 
the nation’s moral foundations.  The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution had justified its 
institutional religious establishment with an appeal to moral standards.  “[T]he happiness 
of a people and the good order and preservation of civil government,” the constitution 
explained, “depend essentially upon piety, religion and morality.”  To that end the 
constitution provided monetary support for the maintenance of “bodies-politic or 
religious societies” that would, in turn, support the “public Protestant teachers of piety, 
religion and morality,” which were essential for the preservation of the state.  
Massachusetts was not alone in its arrangement.  In addition to state monetary support, 
religious bodies retained numerous privileges as a means of supporting public morality in 
many if not all states.  Because religious organizations were the near-universal creators of 
charitable foundations, and because educational institutions likewise were almost 
universally maintained by religious societies, the law made no distinction between them.  
The entire arrangement relied on a tightly imbricated series of propositions, in which 
religion supported morality and simultaneously prompted the kind of public-mindedness 
and devotion to the social whole that girded the creation and perpetuation of charitable 
and educational institutions.13   
                                                                                                                                                 
republic, see Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1969), 51-53. 
 
13 Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, part the first, art. III. 
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To disrupt religion and remove its legal protections, in the estimation of many 
state constitutions, would be to remove the subjective and organizational commitment to 
public virtue that many state-constitutional framers considered necessary for the 
maintenance of a republican society.  The tight connection of virtue, charity, and public-
mindedness with religious and educational societies could be seen in Section 45 of “The 
Plan or Frame of Government” in Pennsylvania’s 1776 Constitution:  
Laws for the encouragement of virtue, and prevention of vice and immorality, 
shall be made and constantly kept in force, and provision shall be made for their 
due execution; And all religious societies or bodies of men heretofore united or 
incorporated for the advancement of religion or learning, or for other pious and 
charitable purposes, shall be encouraged and protected in the enjoyment of the 
privileges, immunities and estates which they are accustomed to enjoy, or could 
of right have enjoyed, under the laws and former constitution of this state. 
 
The constitution blurred “religious societies and bodies of men,” “the advancement of 
religion or learning,” and “pious and charitable purposes,” because they were, if not 
interchangeable, then interrelated.  All tended, by implication, to promote “the 
encouragement of virtue.”  Vermont’s 1777 Constitution followed Pennsylvania almost 
to the letter, but added a provision to integrate governance into the formula.  “[N]o 
person, shall be capable of holding any civil office, in this State,” the constitution 
stipulated, “except he has acquired, and maintains a good moral character.”  New 
Hampshire’s 1784 Constitution put it all together.  “Morality and piety. . . will give the 
best and greatest security to government,” New Hampshire maintained, so much so that 
“knowledge of these [morality and piety], is most likely to be propagate through a society 
by the institution of public worship of the DEITY, and public instruction in morality and 
religion.”  To that end New Hampshire authorized “the several towns, parishes, bodies-
corporate, or religious societies,” again not distinguishing among them, “to make 
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adequate provision at their own expence, for the support and maintenance of public 
protestant teachers of piety, religion, and morality.”  In other words, both those states that 
had an institutional establishment, and those states that did not, still looked to religious 
societies and the educational and charitable institutions supported by them to maintain the 
moral standards of society, and they provided legal privileges and immunities to 
encourage religious proliferation so that they could do their work.14
Harnessing religion in the maintenance of public morality did have its problems, 
not least of which was that religion could also undermine established morality and be 
disruptive to the social order.  When the masses succumbed to various enthusiasms that 
sometimes swept the people at the hands of what the educated classes considered 
religious demagogues, then the state needed protection from religious zealotry.  
Maryland’s 1776 Declaration of Rights modified its freedom of conscience clause to 
exclude those cases in which “under colour of religion, any man shall disturb the good 
order, peace, or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality.”  Delaware 
(1776) allowed that all Christians would enjoy equal rights and privileges, “unless, under 
the Colour of Religion, any Man disturb the Peace, the Happiness or Safety of Society.”  
Georgia (1777) granted freedom of religious exercise, “provided it be not repugnant to 
the peace and safety of the State.”  New Hampshire (1784) promised freedom of 
conscience to each person, “provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or disturb 
others, in their religious worship.”  New York then was merely following an established 
form when it qualified its freedom of conscience clause with the stipulation “[t]hat the 
                                                 
14 Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, sec. 45; Vermont Constitution of 1776, secs. 28, 41; New Hampshire 
Constitution of 1784, part I, art. VI.  For the back history of this section and the role of Henry Muhlenberg, 
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liberty of conscience, hereby granted, shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of 
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.”15   
Religion, Morals and Disestablishment 
Institutional disestablishment went forward only as states began looking to 
alternative ways to shore up moral ideals and behavior, and the ambivalence of state 
constitutions about the connection of religion and morality raised several questions that 
would become important in the creation of the moral establishment.  Who was to decide 
when religion was properly supporting morality or when it turned disruptive, being used 
to justify “acts of licentiousness”?  What standards were to be used in identifying an act 
of licentiousness?  The state constitutional tensions highlighted that the state framers did 
not look to religion in general to support morality.  Not all religions were to be equal.  
Religion supported morality up to a point, but ultimately the state determined which 
religions supported morality, which did not, and where the limits were.  If religious 
partisans could gain control of the state political or judicial apparatus, they could set the 
moral standards to be enforceable by the state, thereby setting up a religious 
establishment under another name. 
Jefferson seems to have been cognizant of this possibility, offering up his Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom as a means of reinforcing morality without the threat of 
coercion.  One of the claims of Jefferson’s bill was that if another way existed apart from 
an institutional establishment that would guarantee religious belief—so that religion 
could fulfill its role in maintaining the morals of the people apart from the operations of 
                                                 
15 Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776, art. XXXIII; Delaware Declaration of Rights of 1776, Rule 2; 
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the state—then the institutional establishment could be safely dropped with its goal still 
firmly in place.  His solution was necessary, he claimed, because institutional religious 
establishments simply did not work.  An institutional establishment “tends also to corrupt 
the principles of that very religion it is meant to encourage,” the bill explained, “by 
bribing. . . those who will externally profess and conform to it” and creating hypocrisy 
rather than moral obedience.  Removing the institutional establishment would grant the 
individual citizen “the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular 
pastor whose morals he would make his pattern, and whose powers he feels most 
persuasive to righteousness,” thereby ensuring a more perfectly articulated connection 
between the people and the agents of moral reformation, which would then preserve the 
state without the threat of coercion.16   
The initial rejection of Jefferson’s bill demonstrated how unpersuasive his 
argument was to the Virginia legislators.  Its eventual passage in 1786 was a very 
important step in the symbolic endowment of religious liberty as a political ideal and a 
point of orthodoxy, which would then carry over into the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.  But it did not result in an unambiguous institutional form.  Many have 
looked to the Virginia debate in order to understand religious liberty, asserting that the 
presence and role of James Madison in passing the bill provided the normative meaning 
of American religious freedom.  After the Virginia debates, Madison would become the 
architect of the U.S. Constitution and one of its chief defenders during ratification.  The 
separation of different branches of government and the balance of their powers 
established by the Constitution largely followed the political ideas that Madison 
                                                 
16 Jefferson, Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, Jefferson, Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 2:546 (first 
quotation), 545 (second quotation).  
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presented to the U.S. Constitutional Convention in what he called the Virginia Plan.  He 
was also substantially responsible for the Bill of Rights, especially the First Amendment.  
Looking at the Virginia debate about religious liberty and its continuation three years 
later during the drafting of the Bill of Rights does reveal the meaning or meanings of 
religious liberty and the institutional forms that resulted from them.  But because those 
institutional forms were significantly less clear than many have claimed, it is worth going 
slowly to see that the arguments over religious liberty, first in Virginia and then in the 
construction of the First Amendment, which showcased many of the major claims that 
would recur in the repeated disputations over the moral establishment to come.  
The realization that institutional disestablishment could go forward without 
endangering its moral counterpart did not come without a struggle. After the General 
Assembly rejected Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in 1779, the 
concern of establishment partisans churned below the surface for a time.  Established 
clergy and their lay supporters saw Jefferson’s attempt to remove state monetary support 
as a blow to the cause of religion, which they believed would allow a wave of 
licentiousness to break upon Virginia.  The Assembly had, for each year since 1776, 
suspended payments for the established clergy, without ever being able permanently to 
do away with the idea of an establishment.   Without state monetary support some 
legislators worried that the cause of religion was suffering, and with it the cause of 
morals, which, according to the logic, would wreck ruin upon the state.  In 1784 
establishment proponents gained enough support for another attempt by arguing that 
publicly financed Christianity could provide a stopgap for what they predicted was going 
to be a rapid deterioration of virtue.  Patrick Henry led the establishment faction by 
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calling for a general assessment on all property holders to support teachers of the 
Christian religion.17   
Because the opposition was weak and unorganized, it initially appeared that the 
measure would pass.  Jefferson was out of the country serving as the ambassador of the 
United States to France.  Many of his one-time supporters had moved on or changed 
sides. Stepping into the leadership void was the young political theorist and wily 
parliamentary tactician, James Madison, but Madison initially did not take the bill as 
seriously as he should have.  During the autumn of 1784 while the General Assembly was 
on recess, Madison traveled on the Potomac, taking his leisure and allowing the matter to 
lay fallow.  When he returned he found a well-organized caucus in favor of the broad 
establishment, with the other side successfully wooing Madison’s supporters.  Richard 
Henry Lee, an intrepid liberal confidant who usually opposed Patrick Henry, thought 
Madison unreasonable in his opposition to the establishment, explaining that although 
“refiners may weave as fine a web as they please . . . the experience of all times shows 
Religion to be the guardian of morals—and he must be a very inattentive observer in our 
Country, who does not see that avarice is accomplishing the destruction of religion.”  Put 
on the defensive rather than conducting the carefully planned parliamentary attack that he 
was used to, Madison had to settle for oratory and a few parliamentary moves that 
allowed him to regroup.  After sending the Bill through two readings, he used a 
                                                 
17 For specifics on the bill, see James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, January 9, 1785, James Madison, The 
Papers of James Madison, eds. Robert A. Rutland et al. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 8: 
299.   
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Christmas Eve vote to postpone the third reading until the next legislative session, which 
gave him the space to gather his supporters in order to launch a counterattack.18
The break was fortuitous, and Madison used the opportunity to take intellectual 
stock of the subject of religious liberty as a whole, crafting an anonymous petition to be 
delivered to the Assembly at the next legislative session.  The result was his famous 
Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, which has been frequently 
heralded as one of the two signal statements of religious liberty in the United States (the 
other being Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom).  The Memorial’s central 
contention was, in fact, quite radical.  Religion, Madison argued, formed a fundamental 
duty for humans that was logically and temporally prior to their membership in civil 
society.  Because the legislature was the chief mechanism for regulating the affairs of 
civil society, it had no authority whatsoever to regulate an individual’s religious life.  
Instead, religious adherence constituted an “unalienable right” because it had precedent in 
both “time and degree of obligation” to that of civil society.  The General Assessment 
Bill had overstepped this inalienable right by looking to religion as “an Engine of Civil 
policy,” which Madison characterized as “an unhallowed perversion of the means of 
salvation.”  Rather than falsely buttressing religious belief in order to shore up 
dilapidated civil authority, Madison suggested a reconfigured relationship between 
religion and the state.  A “just Government,” he explained, whose goal was to perpetuate 
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“public liberty,” would “be best supported by protecting every Citizen in the enjoyment 
of his Religion.”19   
The significance of Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance went beyond the 
disestablishment battle in Virginia, because it signaled a watershed in political thought 
and established the conception of rights that many dissenters from the moral 
establishment would draw upon in their agitation.  In much of the eighteenth-century 
when political theorists talked about the protection of rights, they usually referenced the 
rights of the people at large and sought to protect the people from the abuse of 
government.  In practice, that meant the people as a whole had to have access to the 
machinery of governance, because the preservation of electoral mechanisms, when 
combined with a morally virtuous populace, would ensure that the government acted at 
the behest of the people.  In arguing against establishment, Madison reconfigured not just 
the relationship of church and state, but also the relationship of rights and government.  
He saw through the establishment controversy that majorities could use their access to 
government, which was the end-goal of much eighteenth century political theory, in order 
to suppress and tyrannize minorities.  To guard against majority tyranny, Madison 
contended that the rights of the minority had to be protected from the will of the 
majority—in essence, that the rights of minority had to be protected from the tyranny of 
the people—an idea that made no sense when rights were vested in the people at large.  
Madison shifted the locus of rights away from the people, abstractly conceived, to the 
individual citizen, arguing that the individual’s religious belief was “wholly exempt” 
from consideration of civil authority because it was a natural and inalienable right, 
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irrespective of the rights of the people.  Because the people, speaking through the 
majority, could not use the machinery of governance to transgress the inalienable right of 
even one person, the idea of an inalienable right cordoned off an individual’s religion 
from the regulatory power of government completely.  It was, if not the beginning, then 
one of the earliest and most important instances of modern American rights talk.20
The brilliance of this intellectual leap can obscure that the Memorial was also—
even primarily—a political document, which Madison carefully calibrated to attract the 
widest number of signers, including many Virginia evangelicals who did not want a 
broad establishment but also did not want the complete separation that Madison 
envisioned.  Throughout the Memorial Madison yoked two disparate arguments, claiming 
simultaneously that state support for religion violated an inalienable right and that it 
created a form of hypocritical Christianity displeasing to the Creator.   The bill was 
“adverse to the diffusion of the light of Christianity,” he claimed, because it “discourages 
those who are strangers to the light of revelation” from immigrating to where they might 
come under Christianity’s influence.  To appeal to the widest possible audience the 
Memorial also contained a number of evasions, avoiding in particular the issue of 
religion’s role in supporting morality.  Though Madison seemed to support the idea that 
the health of religion was important for state preservation, he did not address what would 
happen if someone’s religious views (or lack thereof) prompted a moral position that 
others thought dangerous to the state.  Madison’s own view was very much outside the 
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mainstream.  The historian Irving Brant notes that when Madison described the 
establishment debate in public, he opposed “establishment” to “toleration,” claiming that 
religious establishments bred intolerance.  When Madison described his own views in 
private, by contrast, he consistently opposed “establishment” to “the rights of 
conscience,” which suggested his desire for radical personal freedom, capacious 
individual right, and extreme pluralism in matters of religion.  He seemed to cast a rather 
sardonic eye on the claim that religion propped up morals.  In his celebrated Federalist 
no. 10, penned three years later to defend the Constitution, Madison dismissed both 
“moral” and “religious motives” as an “adequate control” against the factional 
management of government, suggesting instead that the greater the variety of parties, 
interests, and factions, the more likely opposing viewpoints would counter-balance one 
another, thereby preventing any one group from gaining majority to suppress the 
minority.  To say it another way, he was unconcerned with whether or not religion 
promoted morality, looking instead to radical religious heterogeneity to produce 
sufficient conflict that the excessively narrow ideals supported by different parties would 
cancel out one another.21
Given his cynical view of religion and morality, it would be a mistake to claim 
that all the signers of his Memorial shared his vision of stark separation.  The legal 
historian Philip Hamburger has recently shown that in debates over religious 
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establishment, supporters of an institutional establishment often accused their opponents 
of trying to separate church and state, which invariably produced a sharp disavowal of 
strict separation from people who still sought to remove state financial support for 
churches.  Isaac Backus, for example, the Reformed Baptist opponent of the 
Massachusetts establishment, condemned the radical idea of individual rights and the 
radical separation of church and state that Madison had articulated, though not 
necessarily referring specifically to Madison.  “Those who now speak great swelling 
words about liberty, while they despise government,” Backus complained, “are 
themselves servants of corruption.  What a dangerous error, yea, what a root of all evil 
then must it be, for men to imagine that there is anything in the nature of true government 
that interferes with true and full liberty!”  Evangelicals like Backus could give their 
assent to the idea that removing state financial support for religion allowed it to flourish 
in order to preserve the state, but they drew a line at the issue of complete separation 
precisely because they thought the individual must always consider, or be made to 
consider, the social whole in his actions.  “The importance of religion to civil society and 
government is great indeed,” Backus would later claim, even while he was pressing hard 
for an end to Massachusetts’s institutional establishment, “as it keeps alive the best sense 
of moral obligation.”  More than simply revealing the nuances of his support for 
institutional disestablishment, Backus’s argument showed that evangelicals who 
supported the institutional disestablishment actually shared a basic agreement with the 
old-line proponents of state-financing for churches, because both claimed that the state 
could not be totally separate from religion, particularly in its morality defining mission. 
This more basic agreement would, in time, reassert itself, while Madison’s (and 
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Jefferson’s) view of religious liberty would encounter the difficulties of a minority 
opinion.22
 Despite their differences, in the short term the Madisonian-evangelical 
cooperation proved a very effective political alliance.  When the 1785 legislative session 
opened, as Madison reported to Jefferson, “the table was loaded with petitions & 
remonstrances from all parts against the interposition of the Legislature in matters of 
Religion.”  Faced with an organized and vocal opposition, the proponents of a general 
assessment retreated, allowing the bill to go down in defeat.  Madison, sensing that the 
victory had “produced all the effect that could have been wished,” put forward 
Jefferson’s long neglected Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, but the debate over 
Jefferson’s bill caused the differences between Madison and evangelicals to emerge.  
Evangelicals switched sides to agree with the supporters of establishment, opposing the 
idea that the state could take no cognizance of religion.  The switch in allegiance meant 
that after mustering overwhelming support to reject assessment, Madison did not have 
enough votes to pass Jefferson’s bill and had to compromise by allowing several critical 
emendations, watering down the bill’s original intent.  Religious opposition focused on 
the preamble, in particular the Bill’s claim that “the opinions and belief of men depend 
not on their own will, but follow involuntarily the evidence proposed to their minds,” 
which might have sounded too rationalistic.  After several attempts to change the 
preamble to include section 16 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights—with its assertion 
that citizens have “the mutual duty. . . to practise Christian forbearance, love, and charity 
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towards each other”—they finally compromised by deleting most of the sentences.  The 
Assembly also deleted Jefferson’s declaration “that the opinions of men are not the object 
of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction,” a deletion that not only repudiated 
complete separation but also kept open the possibility of state regulation of certain kinds 
of belief.  Madison sought to minimize the changes in his account to Jefferson (who was 
still in France), explaining that the alterations “did not affect the substance” and that “the 
enacting clauses past [sic] without a single alteration.”  But the intellectual divide 
between Madison and his allies was showing.23   
That divide would resurface three years later after the passage of the U.S. 
Constitution in the debates over its Bill of Rights.  As Madison moved from the 
establishment battle in Virginia to the federal Constitutional Convention in 1787 and the 
fight over its subsequent amendments, his disagreement with his evangelical allies would 
further limit any clear provision for church and state on the federal level, even while it 
increased the symbolic import of religious liberty.  Madison, the architect of the federal 
Constitution, supported its prohibition of any religious test for office on the federal level 
and its complete omission of the concept of God.  But the omission of God was 
disturbing to many religious leaders, and at least part of the clamor for a Bill of Rights 
was a desire to guarantee religious liberty, as religious leaders understood it.  Madison’s 
view of factions, by contrast, made him wary of the idea of a Bill of Rights, which he 
described to Jefferson as mere “parchment barriers” whose efficacy had failed repeatedly 
in states where majorities simply disregarded them to do as they pleased.  He was 
especially concerned that “the rights of Conscience in particular, if submitted to public 
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definition would be narrowed much more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed 
power.”   Noting that “[o]ne of the objections in New England” was that the 
Constitution’s lack of religious tests for office “opened a door for Jews Turks & infidels 
[sic],” Madison explained that he preferred to leave the idea of religious liberty implied, 
rather than risk narrowing its scope in the legislative give-and-take with the religious 
partisans who were calling for the religious liberty amendment.  His wariness would be 
confirmed in the course of debate, because the passage of the First Amendment, with its 
“laconic brevity and consequent vagueness,” in the historian Sidney Mead’s words, failed 
to fully institute Madison’s vision, instead maintaining the disestablishment alliance at 
the expense of clarity.24   
The amendment suffered from confused purpose and conception throughout.  
Madison’s original form of the amendment, which he brought before the U.S. House of 
Representatives in the spring of 1789 and would have been inserted between the third and 
fourth clauses of article I, section 9 of the federal Constitution, was sweeping.  It read: 
“The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor 
shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience 
be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”  But by the time the amendment had 
emerged from the select committee on amendments, it had already been trimmed, simply 
stating, “no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience 
be infringed.”  Even the more modest version provoked complaint.  Peter Sylvester, 
representative from New York, fretted that some might misunderstand the point of the 
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amendment, reading it as an attempt “to abolish religion [from government?] altogether.”   
Elbridge Gerry, the representative from Massachusetts who had declined to sign the U.S 
Constitution in part because it did not contain a Bill of Rights, followed on the heels of 
Sylvester, worrying that the amendment as it stood could prohibit the rights of states to 
maintain a state religion (as Massachusetts did until 1833).  When Madison responded 
that he understood the words to prohibit Congress from establishing a “national religion,” 
Benjamin Huntington of Connecticut, which also had a religious establishment, noted his 
agreement with Sylvester and feared that “the words might be taken in such a latitude as 
to be extremely hurtful to the cause of religion.”  He wanted the language changed so that 
it would “secure the rights of conscience, and a free exercise of the rights of religion,” 
while not protecting “those who professed no religion at all.”  Huntington’s objection 
most clearly expressed the religious view of both the old-line religious groups supporting 
state-level religious establishments and the newer dissenting groups like Baptists and 
Methodists that wanted the amendment to guarantee their religious freedom.  Both agreed 
that the amendment should support religious expression but not add protection to the 
irreligious, which would tend to undermine social stability and the good order of 
government by removing the foundation for morality.  To appease the objections of the 
factions, the House changed the wording to “Congress shall make no law establishing 
religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience,” 
before sending the proposal to the Senate.25
Alongside his amendment to limit the power of Congress, Madison wanted 
another amendment inserted between the first and second clauses of article I, section 10, 
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to the effect that “No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, or the freedom of 
the press, or the trial by jury in criminal cases.”  This was a comprehensive plan to limit 
both the power of Congress and the power of the states to protect freedom of conscience 
and religious exercise.  But Madison again met resistance.  Thomas Tucker of South 
Carolina, which had an institutional establishment that Madison’s amendment might have 
prohibited, complained that the amendment, instead of limiting federal power, actually 
seemed to offer only an “alteration of the constitutions of particular States.”  Tucker 
preferred instead that the Constitution “leave the State Governments to themselves.”  In 
response Madison invoked the idea of an inalienable right that he drew upon in the 
Virginia debates, objecting that this was “the most valuable amendment in the whole list.  
If there was any reason to restrain the Government of the United States from infringing 
upon these essential rights, it was equally necessary that they should be secured against 
the State Governments.”  State governments were more likely, in Madison’s opinion, to 
abuse the rights of conscience, because majoritarian factions could more easily gain 
control in the smaller and more homogeneous state assemblies.  Madison’s defense on 
this occasion was successful, and the amendment went to the Senate substantially as he 
proposed it.26     
Had these two amendments passed, even in their limited form, it might have 
provided a comprehensive protection on both the state and the federal level to religious 
dissenters of all kinds, but Madison’s concerns about limiting religious liberty would 
prove especially prescient in the Senate debates.  The Senate was not at all friendly to 
Madison’s formulations, but because it met behind closed doors with no record of debate 
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until 1794, it is difficult to say exactly what objections they had.  When what would 
become the First Amendment emerged, it had been changed to “Congress shall make no 
laws establishing articles of faith, or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise 
of worship,” which on a narrow reading seemed to prohibit Congress from prescribing 
doctrine or worship, but would still allow it to pass legislation to support religion or even 
to create a broad establishment of religion.  The Senate also completely deleted 
Madison’s amendment prohibiting states from violating the rights of conscience.  
Unhappy with the changes, Madison successfully persuaded his House and Senate 
colleagues to accept what would become the final version of the First Amendment’s 
religion clauses: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  In doing so, he abandoned his desire for an explicit 
affirmation of “the full and equal rights of conscience” that was in his original version, 
which limited the overall effect just as he had feared.  The final version also added 
ambiguity.  The amendment that initially went to the Senate had simply prohibited 
Congress from passing a law “establishing religion.”  The new version prohibited 
Congress from making a law “respecting an establishment of religion.”  What did that 
mean?  Was there a difference?27
 Because the final version of the First Amendment was the result of contorted 
political compromise, it (and the entire Bill of Rights) had an uncertain meaning at best.  
“The indeterminacy of constitutional language,” in the legal historian Jack Rakove’s 
words, would allow plenty of room for debate about what specifically the Congress was 
permitted and not permitted to do.  Part of the problem was the spareness of the language.  
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Unlike the Declarations of Rights found in many state constitutions, which appealed to 
natural law and first principles as an explanation of and justification for the rights that 
they enumerated, the federal Bill of Rights presumed, in Rakove’s explanation, “that the 
people already knew what the moral purpose and ultimate sources of their rights were.”  
Although the debate in crafting the First Amendment—along with its predecessor debate 
in the Virginia Assembly—had established the symbolic import of religious liberty, the 
ambiguity of its meaning created an uncertain institutional arrangement, which still left 
plenty of room for debate and maneuvering.  Lost within that debate, or at least not 
sufficiently answered for the many religious partisans on both sides, was how to support 
religious liberty while simultaneously maintaining the moral foundation necessary to 
preserve the state.  Once that was settled, institutional disestablishment could go forward, 
with the moral establishment firmly in place.28   
The Creation of the Moral Establishment 
In the short term, the most significant legislative decision was the Senate’s 
rejection of Madison’s amendment to impose limits on the states.  That rejection set the 
stage for a proxy religious establishment on the state-level that used the police powers of 
the states—their ability to limit individual liberties to preserve the public good—in order 
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to maintain a religiously derived, public morality.  The creation of a moral establishment 
involved, like all issues related to religious liberty, a considerable amount of 
disagreement, intellectual evasion, and double-talk.  It was very clear that some kind of 
intellectual break had occurred with the passage of the First Amendment, because 
although six states still had state-level establishments—and some would keep them for 
several decades—the general trend would be a rejection of state monetary support for 
religious institutions.  Institutional disestablishment was an important development that 
required a significant legal disentanglement of religious institutions from the explicit 
protection and alliance with the state.  Yet it did not entail the complete separation of 
religion from the state or the creation of a secular state, though that was probably the 
hope of Madison and his like-minded compatriots.  In addition, although it is commonly 
acknowledged that the First Amendment created the space for what the historian R. 
Laurence Moore has called “the beginning of religious politics,” politics was not the only 
arena in which the moral establishment operated.  “Politics” suggests a struggle for power 
that operates within established political rules, but the moral establishment created the 
rules by defining the limits of dissent, the modes of religious expression that threatened 
the government, and the specific moral obligations—often quite maximal ones—that 
citizens owed to the state and to one another.29
Between 1789 and 1792, four states altered their constitutions to bring them more 
in line with the federal rule, and in the process began to show the basic contours of the 
moral establishment in their qualifications on religious freedom.  Georgia (1789) and 
South Carolina (1790) removed all civil and political disabilities for religious belief, 
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though South Carolina added that the freedom of conscience did not “excuse acts of 
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this State.”  
Pennsylvania’s 1790 Constitution dropped its Christian oath of office and deleted its 
limitation of equal protection to theists, but still maintained that office holders must 
acknowledge “the being of a God and a future state of rewards and punishments.”  
Delaware (1792) also dropped its requirement of a Trinitarian oath of office, but tellingly 
added a section to its free exercise and freedom of conscience clause that acknowledged 
that though citizens could not be coerced, it was still “the duty of all men frequently to 
assemble together for the public worship of the Author of the universe,” because worship 
promoted the “piety and morality, on which the prosperity of communities depends.”30   
These changes formed the beginning of the move toward a moral establishment, a 
move that eventually caused the remaining states to drop their institutional 
establishments, although it took forty years to come to completion with important limits 
in each case.  Vermont dropped both its institutional establishment and all civil 
disabilities for non-Protestants with its new constitution in 1793, but maintained the 
requirement of good moral character for holding public office.  Maryland did away with 
its institutional establishment by amendment in 1810, but left its prohibition against 
Jewish and atheist office holding.  In 1818 when Connecticut drafted a constitution—in 
part to remove its institutional establishment—the new constitution limited its lack of 
preference for religious groups only to “any Christian sect or mode of worship,” and 
curtailed its promise of “equal powers, rights, and privileges” to “every society or 
denomination of Christians.”  New Hampshire’s institutional disestablishment in 1819 
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left in place its declaration that “piety and morality, rightly grounded in evangelical 
principles” were essential to the security of government.  That amendment also left in 
place the constitution’s prohibitions against non-Protestants holding public office, which 
remained until 1877.  Massachusetts accomplished its institutional disestablishment by 
amendment in two steps, first in 1821 by removing the Christian oath of office, and then 
in 1833 by removing any state mechanism for collecting or distributing money for 
churches.  Crucially the amendment left in place the Constitution’s original claim that 
“the public worship of God and instructions in piety, religion and morality, promote the 
happiness and prosperity of a people and the security of a republican government.”  Even 
North Carolina, which had done away with its institutional establishment in 1776, 
amended its constitution in 1835 to admit Catholics to office, but it still prohibited Jews 
and atheists.31
The sinewy and slippery quality of state constitutional provisions continued in 
other states.  At the same time that old states were tortuously reconsidering their 
provisions for religious liberty, new states either copied provisions from the states from 
which the majority of the state’s framers had migrated (so Tennessee followed North 
Carolina, Kentucky followed Virginia, and so on), or they cobbled together provisions 
from several states with often contradictory results.  Ohio’s new 1802 Constitution 
promised free religious exercise and freedom of conscience, but simultaneously 
maintained that because “religion, morality, and knowledge” were “essentially necessary 
to the good government and the happiness of mankind,” the legislature would encourage 
schools and other means of instruction—again not distinguishing between religious and 
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educational organizations—with the proviso that the encouragement be “not inconsistent 
with the rights of conscience.”  Mississippi’s 1817 Constitution followed Ohio in 
proclaiming religion, morality, and knowledge necessary to good government, but 
simultaneously enacted what appeared a sweeping separation of civil rights and religious 
belief, proclaiming “[t]hat no person shall be molested for his opinions on any subject 
whatever, nor suffer any civil or political incapacity, or acquire any civil or political 
advantage.”  That provision did not stop Mississippi from requiring office holders to 
affirm “the being of God or a future state of rewards and punishments.”  In 1836, 
Arkansas followed North Carolina and Tennessee in promising that religion could not 
affect the “civil rights, privileges, or capacities of any citizen,” but still prohibited any 
person “who denies the being of God” from holding office.  It went one step farther, 
forbidding any non-theist from giving an oath in court, which could produce significant 
liability before the law.  In short, aside from doing away with the idea that the state 
needed to provide religion with monetary support, much of the early disagreement about 
the extent of religious liberty and the institutional mechanisms for its protection and 
propagation persisted in the early antebellum constitutions.32
Parallel to the movement toward institutional disestablishment was the dizzying 
religious transformation now called the Second Great Awakening, which laid the 
demographic foundation for the informal moral establishment that Tocqueville and others 
noted in the 1830s.  The historical sociologists Rodney Stark and Roger Finke report that 
in 1776 only 20 percent of people in New England had a religious affiliation.  Despite 
laws against fornication, from 1761 to 1800 one-third of all first births came before 
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couples had been married for nine months.  The comparison of these two statistics leads 
Stark and Finke to the arresting conclusion that “New England[ers] during the colonial 
period were more likely to be sexually active than to belong to a church.”  Clear in Finke 
and Stark’s statistics is the central fact of American religion at the time of the Revolution; 
very few people seemed to maintain any committed association with it.  If church 
adherence was low in New England, the land of the Puritans, it was even worse in the 
South, where the African slaves that made up 42 percent of the population had 
overwhelming rejected the few feeble attempts to proselytize them before the nineteenth 
century.  Scholars place colonial church adherence or attendance across the thirteen 
colonies at between 10 percent and 20 percent in 1776, meaning that at best 80 percent of 
all adults did not belonged to a church on the eve of the Revolution. By contrast, 62 
percent of adults belonged to a church in 2000.33
That change would further swirl the confused conceptions of religious liberty, and 
the demographic changes would produce a broad cultural shift.  Beginning in the 1790s, 
urban church construction exploded with the harbingers of a religious expansion, which 
intensified throughout the first half of the nineteenth century.  Following the 1801 Great 
Revival at Cane Ridge, Kentucky, itinerant preachers and enthusiasts poured throughout 
Appalachia, the Southeastern seaboard, Pennsylvania, New York, and the Deep South of 
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Alabama and Mississippi.  They brought with them a new brand of Christianity that 
stressed individual conversion as a response to God, the importance of religious feeling 
as the hallmark of piety, and the strict attention to a tightened moral code that prohibited 
dancing, drinking, and gaming.  Protestant evangelical expansion was rapid, broad, and 
generated intense social effects.  The number of church members as a percentage of the 
population doubled from 17 percent in 1776 to 34 percent in 1850.  The population itself 
grew from a little under 4 million people in 1790 to a little over 24 million people in 
1850, so that the 2.6 million Methodists of 1850 were nearly equal to the entire 
population of the nation in 1790.  Even more startling, according to Nathan O. Hatch 
between 1775 and 1845 the number of ministers grew at three times the rate of the 
population, which was itself six times larger in 1850 than it had been in 1790.  Put 
simply, in 1850 there were many more churches, with many more church members, and 
many more ministers, and each made up a much larger percentage of the population than 
they had in 1790.  Viewed from one angle, the revival impulse at the heart of Protestant 
expansion was an essentially schismatic one, creating innumerable religious 
organizations whose disagreement with one another relied on what to the outsider seem 
exceedingly arcane points of doctrine.  Less appreciated is that beneath the dizzying array 
of theological controversy remained a fundamental core of agreement.  The agreement is 
clear enough that even with all the division the groups that emerged from the revival 
shared a noticeable pattern of beliefs, worship style, and religious and moral ethos so that 
they fall, without much controversy, under the broad moniker of “evangelicals.”34
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The broad evangelical consensus upholding the centrality of the Bible in life and 
worship, the importance of missionary expansion to the life of the religious community, 
and the public relevance of evangelical moral ideals created a powerful cultural force that 
worked against Madison’s prediction in the Federalist no. 10.  When Tocqueville visited 
the United States in the 1830s, he noted that in spite of innumerable sects all parties 
supported the peculiar conception of moral responsibilities and social mores that 
dominated American culture.  In America, he concluded, “everything is certain and fixed 
in the moral world.”  Combined with the personal orientation of religious belief, the 
desire to project what could be called the evangelical ethos, with its coherent and highly 
stable moral system onto the larger society, prompted cultural, political, and legal 
campaigns that would become a hallmark of American life and culture for the next 
century.  When evangelicals called for the public influence of religion, they were careful 
to point out that they were advocating the public relevance of nonsectarian belief—which 
was actually Protestantism, if not evangelical Protestantism, under another name—as 
fundamentally necessary to the propagation of a moral society.  Led by evangelicals, the 
new organizational strength of the emergent mainline denominations in the nineteenth 
century—Congregationalists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Disciples of Christ, 
Lutherans, and the white branch of the Baptists and Methodists, known collectively as the 
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Seven Sisters—further confirmed the ideal of nonsectarianism, because on moral issues 
the mainline denominations tended to agree.  These denominations, along with the 
various voluntary associations and Protestant-controlled cultural and educational entities 
that they generated, formed a powerful interlocking network that mobilized majorities 
and provided the informal and formal structures of moral pressure and coercion.35
Protestant evangelical expansion also involved a rapprochement with the old-line 
proponents of an institutional establishment—a rapprochement necessary for the creation 
of the moral establishment—because both fundamentally agreed that religion supported 
morality, which was, in turn, necessary for the health of the state.  Once it was apparent 
that the battle over institutional establishment was lost, in the words of the establishment-
supporter-turned-peacemaker Lyman Beecher, “the occasion of animosity between us and 
the minor sects was removed, and infidels [Jefferson, Madison, and others] could no 
more make capital with them against us.”  Beecher would become an archetype of the 
new religious leader in the nineteenth century.  He was from the next generation who had 
neither served during the Revolution nor drafted the U.S Constitution, and he focused on 
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cultural reformation as much as the propagation of specifically religious tenets.  His 
descendants, including Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Catharine 
Beecher, a conservative domestic reformer and woman’s right advocate, and Henry Ward 
Beecher, the most famous preacher of the late-nineteenth century, followed his pattern of 
political and cultural reform.  Among his non-familial intellectual descendants, Beecher 
found great support for his condemnation of what he variously called “political atheism” 
or “moral atheism,” which he never explicitly identified with one figure but seemed to 
take in the liberal ideas of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.  In opposition to their 
formulations, Beecher maintained that because humans were “desperately wicked” they 
could not “be qualified for good membership in society without the influence of moral 
restraint.”  Government was not the result of the natural human tendency to cooperate for 
higher ends, as the early libertarian Thomas Paine had suggested, but was a necessary 
instrument “of self-defence against the violent evil propensities of man.”  Civil 
government joined a constellation of governing authorities that provided moral restraint 
to the individual, along with institutions of the family, the church, the practice of 
religious education, and the creation of voluntary societies, which insured cooperation 
among ministers and magistrates in the inculcation of a morally sound, social regime.  
Beecher’s rejection of political atheism entailed a large-scale religious mobilization, 
common throughout evangelicalism, through newly formed societies like the American 
Bible Society, the American Sunday School Union, and the American Board of Foreign 
Missions.  These national voluntary associations would act, Beecher predicted, as a “sort 
of disciplined moral militia” that would “repel every encroachment upon the liberties and 
morals of the state” and strengthen “the hand of the magistrate.”  As a result, voluntary 
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associations could uphold an evangelical biblical ethos that would pervade all aspects of 
society, though the formal institutions of church and state remained separate.36     
 “We have now, it seems a National Bible Society, to propagate King James’s 
Bible, through all Nations,” an aged John Adams reported to Jefferson in 1816. He 
observed with dismay the creation of voluntary organizations that Beecher and others 
touted, complaining that they were propagating what he considered the “Corruptions of 
Christianity. . .  in Europe Asia, Africa, and America!”  Jefferson, no less happy but more 
sanguine about the limits of Protestant evangelical influence in the United States, 
responded a month later that “[t]hese Incendiaries, finding the days of fire and faggot are 
over in the Atlantic hemisphere, are now preparing to put the torch to the Asiatic region.  
What would they say were the Pope to send annually to this country colonies of Jesuit 
priests with cargoes of their Missal and translations of their Vulgate, to be put gratis into 
the hands of every one who would accept them? And to act thus nationally on us as a 
nation?”  Jefferson’s observations on Catholicism displayed the ideal of non-sectarianism 
for the canard it was.  Because non-sectarianism served, in R. Laurence Moore’s 
explanation, as a “weasel word” that allowed Protestant control under a different name, 
the rhetoric did not match the reality, serving as a slight of hand to prevent Catholic and 
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other minority influence but still promoting Protestant sectarian control on the state, the 
very thing that John Adams feared.37   
While Protestants, led by evangelicals, were busy laying the foundation for the 
informal moral establishment, the courts were at work laying its formal basis that 
endorsed the persistence of a moral establishment in the place of an institutional one. 
State courts, in particular, tended to take the most conservative reading of state 
constitutions by elaborating Protestant social thought in all the issues that prompted 
nineteenth century church-state litigation: blasphemy trials, challenges to Sabbath laws, 
and the role of Christianity in public education.  The fact that state courts decided many 
of the cases did not limit their significance or impact.  At a time when the Supreme Court 
did not offer centralized guidance in American jurisprudence, state court judges had 
powerful influence on American law, and the opinions of the most important judges in 
the most important cases were widely received.  One of the best-known state court 
judges, perhaps second only to John Marshall in the development of antebellum 
jurisprudence, was the Chief Justice of the New York Supreme Court, James Kent, whose 
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Commentaries on the law, published between 1826 and 1830, established him as the first 
of the great law treatise writers of the nineteenth century.38   
It was James Kent that provided the guiding principle in church-state law in the 
1811 New York Supreme Court case, People v. Ruggles.  When a man named Ruggles 
shouted in a public square, “Jesus Christ was a bastard and his mother must be a whore,” 
he was immediately charged, convicted of blasphemy, and appealed his conviction to 
Kent’s court.  New York did not even have a blasphemy statute, so Ruggles argued that 
he could not be charged with having broken any law.  Even if it did have a statute, he 
claimed, the charge of blasphemy impaired his free exercise rights and violated the 
declaration of the New York Constitution that the state should not display a preference 
when it came to religion.  Kent, writing for a unanimous court composed of three 
Democrats and two Federalists, rejected all arguments completely.  He held that 
irrespective of the no preference clause in the New York Constitution and the lack of a 
blasphemy law in the civil statutes, Christianity was still a part of the common law of the 
state, and as such, blasphemy was punishable by New York law.  Christianity was a 
necessary part of the state’s legal apparatus and social cohesion, because it provided 
“moral discipline” and “those principles of virtue, which help to bind society together.”  
As for the defendant’s free exercise argument, Kent regarded it as misconceived indeed.  
“The free, equal, and undisturbed enjoyment of religious opinion,” Kent completely 
granted, but the abuse of that right, as in the case of blasphemy, “tends to corrupt the 
morals of the people, and to destroy good order. Such offenses have always been 
considered independent of any religious establishment or the rights of the Church. They 
                                                 
38  On James Kent and the role of the state court judges in nineteenth century jurisprudence, see G. Edward 
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are treated as affecting the essential interests of civil society.”  Although Kent conceded 
the no preference clause and the free exercise clause had established a regime of 
toleration, he was insistent that that toleration “never meant to withdraw religion in 
general, and with it the best sanctions of moral and social obligation from all 
consideration and notice of law,” because, Kent explained, “we are a christian people.”39
Kent’s decision contained a social and political philosophy that other courts 
elaborated, mainly because of his appeal to common law.  Common law was the evolving 
body of law, derived from England, based on custom, usage, and the decisions of legal 
courts and treatise writers, which held considerable sway among jurists in the early 
nineteenth century.  Common law would eventually be codified by legislative statute, but 
statutory law would never completely do away with the idea of what is now called case 
law, the body of precedent established by a court system.  Because the state Constitutions 
and the court systems were so new and because the common law had not been codified 
by the state legislatures, many of the early religious liberty cases were cases of first 
impression—meaning that such a case had never been heard before a court so there was 
no body of precedent—which then allowed Ruggles to offer a guide, though not one that 
was binding outside of New York.   
It was a precedent that other courts eagerly received.  In an indecency case four 
years after People v. Ruggles, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court began laying the basis for 
the moral establishment in that state.  Pointing out the courts’ crucial role as “guardians 
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of public morals,” the opinion argued that the preservation of morality was essential to 
state security.  As a concurring opinion in the same case elaborated, “The destruction of 
morality renders the power of the government invalid, for government is no more than 
public order. It weakens the bands by which society is kept together.”  For that reason 
any offense that could be “destructive of morality in general” was “punishable at 
common law,” even if it was an offense done in private, as it was in this case.  Breaking 
down any distinction between public and private meant that the state maintained a 
maximal morality even behind closed doors.  Two years later, the same court further 
enlarged its rationale in a Sabbath law case involving a Jew.  Citing the legislature’s 
prohibition of work on “the Lord’s Day, commonly called Sunday,” the Court pointed out 
that the Sabbath law was part of a larger section of laws created for “the prevention of 
vice and immorality,” which could not be overturned on what it characterized as  
“technical niceties” affecting free religious exercise.  Because the act construed the 
“breach of the sabbath as a crime injurious to society,” the Court found the defendant’s 
appeal to the free religious exercise and the freedom of conscience clause in the state 
constitution irrelevant to his conviction.  The point of the ruling was not a defense of 
Christian prerogatives, the Court explained, but rather only the preservation of morals.  
Because “laws cannot be administered in any civilized government unless the people are 
taught to revere the sanctity of an oath, and look to a future state of rewards and 
punishments for the deeds of this life,” the required observance of the Christian Sabbath 
permitted people to “be reminded of their religious duties at stated periods,” which 
formed the basis of moral obedience.  Seven years later in a blasphemy case, the Court 
completed the circle by acknowledging that their definition of morality came from 
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Christianity, citing Kent’s Ruggles opinion among others.  The defendant had claimed 
that the Christian Scriptures were “a mere fable,” which the court characterized as an 
“invective” so “shocking and insulting” that no one in a Christian land should have to 
hear it.  Christianity had always been part of the common law of Pennsylvania, but it was 
not Christianity, the Court was quick to assert, “founded on any particular religious 
tenets; not Christianity with an established church.”  Rather, it was nonsectarian 
Christianity that upheld public morals.  For that reason blasphemy against Christianity 
was protected as “the highest offence contra bonos mores [against good morals].”40      
What these cases showed was a labyrinthine, even contradictory legal rationale 
that protected Christianity and Christian prerogatives behind the veil of morality.  By 
warning of the dissolution of society without a religiously enforced moral consensus, 
Kent and the Pennsylvania jurists invoked what has been called the “bad tendency” test 
put forward originally by the famous English jurist, William Blackstone.  Specifically 
related to curtailing of free speech, Blackstone argued that speech could be punished if it 
tended to produce behavior prohibited by a statute or undermine general morals and the 
preservation of good order.  The courts maintained that blasphemy, indecency, and 
Sabbath breaking, by variously offending or criticizing the religious mechanisms of 
moral obedience, threatened the destruction of good order and the corruption of morals.  
It was the bad tendency of blasphemy, Sabbath breaking, and indecency that allowed the 
suppression, not the protection of Christianity for its own sake.41
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Justice Kent would have to answer for his opinion at the 1821 New York 
Constitutional Convention, and tempting though it may be to dismiss his ruling as an 
ideologically marginal position, the course of debate would reveal that Kent actually 
occupied a moderate position in New York, the state with the most liberal provision on 
church and state.  During the first reading of the new constitution, General Erastus Root, 
a freethinker who viewed Kent’s Ruggles decision as an outrage against the 1777 New 
York Constitution’s free religious exercise provisions, proposed additional language that 
“[t]he judiciary shall not declare any particular religion, to be the law of the land; nor 
exclude any witness on account of his religious faith.”  Professing a desire for true 
“freedom of conscience,” Root explained his proposal along the lines of Madison’s 
Memorial: that any attempt to falsely buttress religion through law would bring it “into 
abhorrence and contempt.”  Kent rose to quibble that he had not actually declared 
religion to be the law of the land in his Ruggles opinion, relying on the fine-grained 
distinction that he handed down the conviction “not because Christianity was established 
by law, but because Christianity was in fact the religion of this country, the rule of our 
faith and practice, and the basis of the public morals.”  “[T]he morals of the country,” 
Kent explained again, “rested on Christianity as the foundation,” so that Ruggles’ 
criticism of Christianity threatened morals and had to be suppressed accordingly.42   
Kent’s response showed just how easily proponents of the moral establishment 
could defeat their critics.  To better address the issues, Root split the provisions.  His new 
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amendment, which relied on the passive voice possibly to avoid offending the jurists at 
the convention, proclaimed, “It shall not be declared or adjudged that any particular 
religion is the law of the land.”  That amendment passed on a 62 to 26 vote, with Kent 
voting in favor.  Kent explained the apparent inconsistency of his affirmative vote for the 
amendment and his defense of his Ruggles opinion with an almost Machiavellian 
complacency.  Even had the newly passed provision been in effect when Ruggles stood 
before his court, Kent explained, his conviction of Ruggles for blasphemy would have 
been the same and would still have been in accordance with New York law, because by 
convicting Ruggles Kent did not thereby make Christianity the law of the land, which is 
what the new amendment forbade.  The convention also soundly rejected Root’s second 
amendment that “no witness shall be questioned as to his religious faith,” in a vote of 94 
to 8.  Kent weighed in again, affirming the reasonableness of New York’s requirement 
that witnesses swear belief in a supreme being and a future state of rewards and 
punishments.  He even wondered what the evidence provided by an unbeliever could be 
worth and agreed with the statement of another delegate that “the testimony of the atheist 
and infidel” was rightly excluded at law.43
Even as he seemed to be maintaining his position before the other convention 
delegates, Kent was in an ambivalent and potentially unstable position, quick to argue 
that the United States had no established religion, but equally quick to suggest that the 
dominant religion of Christianity required certain legal protections and legal prerogatives.  
During a final reading two days later, the new Chief Justice of the New York Supreme 
Court, Ambrose Spencer—Kent had become Chancellor of the State Court of Chancery 
in 1814—reopened the debate on Root’s successful provision, thereby clarifying the 
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different factions in the fight.  Chief Justice Spencer rose to reject flatly (though 
respectfully) Kent’s casuistic distinction that Christianity was not the law of the land but 
that its people, and thereby its morality, were Christian and therefore enforceable by law.  
For sake of consistency, Spencer claimed instead that the United States and the State of 
New York rightly and actually protected Christianity as the law of the land for its own 
sake, which was the real rationale behind prosecuting for blasphemy.  In response, Kent 
reiterated his middle position that Christianity could not be declared the legal religion of 
the state, “because that would be considering Christianity as the established religion, and 
make it a civil or political institution.”  Although he maintained that “the duties and the 
injunctions of the Christian religion” were “interwoven with the law of the land,” as well 
as “a part and parcel of the common law,” he insisted that Christianity was not thereby an 
establishment by law.  Whatever the subtleties of their disagreement, both agreed that 
Root’s amendment against making any particular religion the law of the land was 
undesirable.  Kent’s moderate position combined with Spencer’s more explicitly partisan 
position to sway the convention, which then reversed its prior decision, rejecting Root’s 
amendment 74 to 41.44
 Three years later Jefferson got involved, having changed his mind about the 
power of religious partisans and decrying the attempt by state courts to enforce 
Christianity.  In a long letter to John Cartwright that he subsequently published, Jefferson 
objected to “the judiciary usurpation of legislative powers” that had occurred through 
“their repeated decisions, [claiming] that Christianity is a part of the common law.”  
Because the common law began while the English were pagans, before they had “heard 
the name of Christ pronounced,” Jefferson claimed that the common law could not 
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possibly include Christianity.  “What a conspiracy this, between Church and State!” 
Jefferson exclaimed, “Sing Tantarara, rogues all, rogues all, Sing Tantarara, rogues all!”  
The rub was that Jefferson’s reasoning was not generally accepted among jurists, even 
among people of rather different faith commitments and across the political spectrum.  In 
Jefferson’s own party, Joseph Story, a devout Unitarian, associate justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, professor of law at Harvard, and, along with Kent, one of the architects 
of antebellum jurisprudence, explained in a letter to Edward Everett that it appeared 
“inconceivable how any man can doubt, that Christianity is part of the Common Law of 
England.”  If Christianity was not a part of the common law, Story asked in a subsequent 
article, “[w]hat becomes of her whole ecclesiastical establishment, and the legal rights 
growing out of it on any other supposition?”  Of course, the United States was not 
supposed to have an established religion, so the entire debate begged the question of how 
England’s common law, with its established religion, could be relevant to the United 
States without it similarly having an establishment.45   
As the legal opinions kept coming, the slippage between the proclamation of 
disestablishment and its continuation via another form became continuously clearer.  In 
1837 in Delaware, Thomas Chandler was convicted of blasphemy for his proclamation 
that “[t]he virgin Mary was a whore and Jesus Christ was a bastard.”  In Chandler’s case 
the conviction was based not on common law but on Delaware’s general criminal statutes 
of 1826, which provided penalties for blasphemy, murder, rape, perjury, sodomy, and 
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treason.  Chandler claimed that the law showed a preference for Christianity in violation 
of the Delaware Constitution, and tried to anticipate the objection that Christianity was 
part of the common law, quoting Jefferson’s letter to John Cartwright in which he 
criticized the idea.  In rejecting Chandler’s claim Chief Justice John M. Clayton, writing 
for a unanimous court, provided a two-fold argument.  First, he declared that it had “been 
long perfectly settled by the common law” that blasphemy was an indictable and 
punishable offense, extensively criticizing Jefferson’s letter to John Cartwright and citing 
People v. Ruggles and Updegraph v. Commonwealth among others to prove his point.  
Secondly, he quoted the Delaware Constitution, especially its provision that although 
worship could not be coerced it was still a general duty of all men because “piety and 
morality, on which the prosperity of communities depends are thereby promoted.”  
Reasoning from the wording of the Constitution, Justice Clayton claimed it was obvious 
that “the religion of the people of Delaware is Christian,” although that did not mean that 
Christianity was the state religion.  Instead, re-warming Kent’s formula Clayton claimed, 
“[t]he distinction is a sound one between a religion preferred by law, and a religion 
preferred by the people, without the coercion of law.”  So long as this distinction was 
honored, the people themselves “may claim the protection of law guarantied to them by 
the constitution itself,” in order to put down blasphemers against their beliefs.  This was 
double-talk, pure and simple, but it was legally binding double-talk, which resulted in ten 
days of solitary confinement and a four hundred dollar fine for Chandler.  In another 
famous blasphemy case in Massachusetts in 1838 (five years after Massachusetts’s 
official disestablishment), the Massachusetts Supreme Court continued the evasion by 
convicting the prominent antebellum freethinker Abner Kneeland for blasphemy.  A 
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central claim of the ruling was that Massachusetts’s 1782 statutory blasphemy law was 
still in effect even after institutional disestablishment, because the law did not prevent 
“the simple and sincere avowal of a disbelief in the existence and attributes of a supreme, 
intelligent being, upon suitable and proper occasions.”  Kneeland, who had printed his 
credo in his freethought newspaper, claimed that the blasphemy conviction was contrary 
to the Massachusetts Constitution.  The majority of the court actually seemed offended 
that Kneeland would call into question the validity of the blasphemy law, noting that it 
seemed “somewhat late to call in question the constitutionality of a law, which has been 
enacted more than half a century, which has been repeatedly enforced.”  The opinion 
recounted the constitutional provisions of New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, and New 
York, pointing out the similar limitations on free speech and religious expression when 
they offended “good morals and manners of society” or consisted of “acts of 
licentiousness.”  Blasphemy, according to the Court, was “not intended to prevent or 
restrain the formation of any opinions or the profession of any religious sentiments 
whatever, but to restrain and punish acts which have a tendency to disturb the public 
peace.”  For that reason blasphemy laws were perfectly in accord with the Constitution’s 
guarantee of free religious exercise, because, the Court argued, the Massachusetts 
Constitution coupled its provision that “no subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, 
in his person, liberty, or estate. . . for his religious profession or sentiments” with a 
proviso, similar to other states, that under the cover of religion no one could “disturb the 
public peace or obstruct others in their religious worship,” which was all that blasphemy 
clause was attempted to accomplish.  The Court upheld the conviction, and Kneeland 
served sixty days in prison.46
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The very fact that courts could rely on such casuistic distinctions tended to reveal 
just how flimsy and limited the institutional disestablishment was.  It was soon to reach 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  In 1844, the high court further affirmed the opinions of the state 
courts, ruling in Vidal v. Philadelphia that Christianity was part of the common law of 
the state of Pennsylvania (and by implication every other state that had not specifically 
rejected it by legislative statute) in the sense that “its divine origin and truth are admitted, 
and therefore it is not to be maliciously and openly reviled and blasphemed against, to the 
annoyance of believers or the injury of the public.”  The case itself was very complicated, 
involving a dispute over the terms of a will created by Stephen Girard, who founded a 
school for orphans to be administered by the city but required that no cleric, missionary, 
or minister could hold any position at the school or even step on its grounds.  His 
justification for their exclusion was that it would shield the young minds from theological 
disputes while teaching them the principles of morality, which was widely, and probably 
correctly, seen as an anticlerical position following Thomas Paine.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court heard the case rather than the Pennsylvania Supreme Court because one of the 
parties was a French foreign national.  The appellants, who consisted of several potential 
heirs that wanted the trust dissolved so that they could get the money, claimed that the 
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will was unchristian and therefore against the state’s law.  The defendants, consisting of 
the city of Philadelphia and some of Girard’s nieces, were represented by Daniel 
Webster, who claimed that the very concept and motivation of charity came solely from 
Christianity, not being present in Judaism or among the pagans.  As for Girard’s desire 
for pure morality, Webster suggested that the purest principles of morality could only be 
found in the Bible, which was in perfect accord with Pennsylvania law.  Writing for a 
unanimous court, Joseph Story acknowledged that had Girard established a school “for 
the propagation of Judaism, or Deism, or any other form of infidelity,” Girard’s will 
might have been against Pennsylvania law, though Story noted that he did not have to 
rule on the question because Christianity could still be taught to students at the school.  
Story’s opinion shows just how easily the declaration of moral instruction bled into the 
defense of the Christian religion.  Girard’s command that pure morality be taught at his 
school suggested to Story that Christianity, qualified in nonsectarian terms, could be 
taught by laymen in the interests of cultivating morality, because, after all,  
[w]here can the purest principles of morality be learned so clearly or so perfectly 
as from the New Testament? Where are benevolence, the love of truth, sobriety, 
and industry, so powerfully and irresistibly inculcated as in the sacred volume? 
The testator has not said how these great principles are to be taught, or by whom, 
except it be by laymen, nor what books are to be used to explain or enforce 
them.”47  
 
In a final coup de grace, one year later the high court unanimously rejected any 
attempt to appeal to Bill of Rights for the protection of religious liberty against state law, 
explaining that the U.S. Constitution did not protect the citizens of states in their various 
liberties, which were established instead solely by state constitutional and statutory 
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provisions.  Madison’s failure to pass his amendment prohibiting states from infringing 
the rights of conscience now revealed its full importance.  In many states the inability to 
swear belief in the existence of God and an afterlife prevented freethinkers from acting as 
witnesses in court.  Religious societies were so closely connected to charitable 
foundations and educational organizations that the law often treated them as the same, 
and as the Vidal case showed, there was some question as to whether or not a charitable 
organization could be created independently of the Christian religion under Pennsylvania 
law (which resembled the law of many other states).  Blasphemy laws constrained free 
speech and even freedom of the press.  Mostly, as Chief Justice Spencer explained at the 
1821 New York Constitutional Convention, non-Christians were “tolerated.”  Toleration 
is considerably more liberal than outright persecution, but it does not entirely comport 
with the usual laudatory narrative of American religious liberty.  Rufus King, a long-time 
New York Senator, elaborated on Spencer’s point to make clear the kind of toleration that 
was on offer in New York.  “While all mankind are by our constitution tolerated, and free 
to enjoy religious profession and worship within this state,” King explained, “yet the 
religious professions of the Pagan, Mahomedan, and the Christian, are not, in the eye of 
the law, of equal truth and excellence. . . . While the constitution tolerates the religious 
professions and worship of all men, it does more in behalf of the religion of the 
gospel.”48
Put simply, the history of religious freedom is entangled tightly with the history of 
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religious control.  Religious partisans freely granted that—on a national level following 
the First Amendment and on the state level after 1833—the United States had repudiated 
the idea that religious institutions could be financially supported by the state.  That did 
not mean that they accepted that religion and the state, in the realm of law and politics, 
should remain separate.  The distinction between what Delaware Chief Justice Clayton 
called a religion by law and a religion of the people—who could then appeal to the law 
for protection of their religious beliefs—laid the basis for the use of the law to suppress 
religious minorities.  The expansion of evangelicalism, begun at the end of the eighteenth 
century and continuing up to the Civil War and beyond, curtailed Madison and 
Jefferson’s vision of church and state, creating the basis for Protestant cultural control.  
While evangelical expansion Christianized American society, Lyman Beecher and other 
religious leaders codified the social and intellectual basis of the antebellum religious 
rapprochement, offering a set of themes that would characterize post-Revolutionary 
Protestant (evangelical) thought, including the importance of the Bible, the necessity of 
individual and social reformation, and a millennial optimism that reform would 
inaugurate the most enlightened, biblical, and moral civilization that the world had ever 
seen.  Instantiating their thought, the emergent denominations, voluntary associations, 
and Protestant-controlled cultural and educational entities formed a powerful interlocking 
network that helped infuse much nineteenth-century American culture with a distinctive 
Protestant ethos.  At the same time the emerging jurisprudence of Kent, Story, and others 
provided the antebellum religious propositions with the sanction of law.  Even as the 
moral establishment expanded, the extent and meaning of religious freedom remained 
controversial, because it exposed deep disagreements about the nature of the American 
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experiment, the political and moral basis of the union, and what many took to be the 
genius and genesis of American ascendancy.  But religious partisans won more than they 
lost.  In that space between the establishment of Christianity by law and the unforced 
preference of the majority for Christianity—which in turn provided the moral standards 
to be enforceable by law—religious partisans found ample room for legal and political 
maneuvering.  Religiously derived moral standards assumed legal sanction that was 
applicable to believers and unbelievers alike.  The moral establishment was born.
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CHAPTER TWO.  WOMEN AND THE PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUALISM 
Woman, unperverted, the pattern of whatsoever things are pure and lovely, but herself corrupted, a 
paragon of deformity, a demon in human form. 
—Lyman Beecher1
 
Where is this all to end?  In the triumph of woman, in her individual sovereignty, in the grand 
march of progress, her turn has come. 
—Elizabeth Cady Stanton2
 
 Because the moral establishment was a proxy religious establishment, the struggle 
over morals and mores often involved a de facto struggle over the role of religion in 
determining the moral standards enforceable by law.  Nowhere was this struggle more 
pronounced than in the subject of women’s rights and responsibilities.  It was a struggle 
that began as evangelical expansion made its presence felt in public life.  In 1818 Frances 
“Fanny” Wright set sail from Scotland with her sister to make a two-year visit to the 
United States.  Her enthusiasm was so great that after publishing a compendium of her 
travel letters in 1821 entitled Views of Society and Manners in America, which brought 
her both international fame and friendship with the Revolutionary War hero, the Marquis 
de Lafayette, she followed Lafayette to the United States in 1824 and eventually became 
an U.S. national.3   
                                                 
1 Beecher, Lectures on Scepticism, 62. 
 
2 Elizabeth Cady Stanton, “‘The Subjection of Woman’: Speech” in Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. 
Anthony, The Selected Papers of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, ed. Ann D. Gordon (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997-), 2:625. 
 
3 Frances Wright, Views of Society and Manners in America (1821; repr., Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap 
Press, 1963), ix-xvi. 
Yet Wright would not be remembered for her initial enthusiasm for the American 
political system, but for her public commitment to a host of radical causes, her concerted 
plea for women’s rights, and her devoted resistance to religious influence on American 
public life.  In Wright’s mind, her broad reform measures were all interconnected aspects 
of a singular problem.  Wright wanted the reorganization of society in order to place 
knowledge on a scientific foundation and eradicate what she took to be the lingering 
connection of clerical authority and the state.  Her first step was a complete reorientation 
of ethical and moral reasoning, so that people would acknowledge, contrary to the claims 
of the religious, that morals were merely “the ascertained consequences of human 
actions.”  Once morals were rightly understood, she claimed, the freedom of the 
individual became the central moral test, and justice consisted in enacting laws that 
encouraged “the free agency of every individual.”  Her most radical assertion was the 
inclusion of women under the category of the individual, and she consistently decried 
what she regarded as male attempts to reinforce the inequality of women, complaining of 
the “vulgar persuasion” that promoted “the ignorance of women” because it reinforced 
female “subordination” and “ensures their utility.”  To Wright the desire to subordinate 
women and the refusal to acknowledge women’s individual autonomy not only smacked 
of despotism and aristocracy, but was exactly the kind of clerical obfuscation that kept 
the masses ignorant and society, politics, and law easily dominated by a clerical elite.4
 Proponents of the moral establishment looked on Wright with revulsion, calling 
her, alternately, “the great Red Harlot of Infidelity,” “the whore of Babylon,” and “the 
Priestess of Beelzebub.”  If the moral establishment used the police power of the state to 
                                                 
4 Frances Wright, Reason, Religion, and Morals (1834; repr., Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2004), 151 
(first two quotations), 89 (third through sixth quotations). 
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defend a religiously derived morality, it also looked to the more subtle mediating 
institutions of the family, the church, and the voluntary association that Beecher had 
identified to maintain the moral ethos that religious partisans thought necessary for the 
maintenance of society.  At the center of those mediating institutions were women, which 
is why proponents found Wright’s reform measures so offensive.  Lyman Beecher, along 
with almost all Protestants, saw women as fundamental to the cause of national 
Christianity, upholding the moral character of the nation by embodying pure religious 
sensibility through their work in the family.  Women were by nature more attuned to 
virtue, so the thinking went, and their nurturing and dependent orientation existed in 
synergistic relation to the aggressive, governing force of men.  As Beecher explained it, 
when fulfilling her proper role woman was the embodiment of “whatsoever things are 
pure and lovely.”  But should she stray from her God-mandated duty of guarding morals, 
she would cause destruction on such a scale that she should properly be regarded as “a 
paragon of deformity, a demon in human form.”  Beecher’s daughter, Catharine Beecher, 
condemned Wright’s reforms explicitly in a similar fashion, denouncing Wright’s attacks 
on “the safeguards of all that is venerable and sacred in religion, all that is safe and wise 
in law, all that is pure and lovely in domestic virtue.”  “I cannot conceive any thing in the 
shape of a woman,” Catharine Beecher concluded, “more intolerably offensive and 
disgusting.”5  
Because the moral establishment sought to uphold and protect communal 
standards and a mutually obligated social order by subordinating the idea of individual 
                                                 
5 Beecher, Lectures on Scepticism, 62; Catharine E. Beecher, Letters on the Difficulties of Religion 
(Hartford: Belknap and Hammersley, 1836), 28.  For the epithets directed against Wright, see the foreword 
by Susan S. Adams in Wright, Reason, Religion, and Morals, 14; Martin E. Marty, The Infidel: 
Freethought and American Religion (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1961), 80-83. 
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rights to the good of the social whole, the emancipation of women—and the very idea 
that women needed emancipation—brought on apocalyptic visions of the destruction of 
society and the downfall of Christian moral authority.  Proponents of the moral 
establishment demonstrated the claim, put forward by the political theorist Carole 
Pateman, that the social contract of modern democratic society presupposed a “sexual 
contract” in which women, not possessing the required characteristics of individuals, 
became relegated to the private sphere of the family and subordinated to the governing 
and public power of men.  Women did have a crucial role in the moral establishment, its 
male and female proponents pointed out, but one that was supposed to remain in the 
private family life.  Women were an integral part of social reproduction, responsible for 
raising children that carried the internal system of moral control, which was, in Josiah 
Strong’s estimation, necessary for the perpetuation of American democratic society.  In 
other words, paradoxically women’s moral responsibility for national life entailed 
political exclusion, because, according to the logic of the moral establishment, it was 
precisely through political exclusion that women could be assured to take seriously their 
responsibility to the home as the moral standard-bearers of the nation.  Because women’s 
assertion of individual autonomy rejected the idea that the family, not the individual, was 
the fundamental governing unit in society, proponents of the moral establishment foresaw 
cultural dissolution in the claims of the woman’s movement.  As such, religious partisans 
aggressively countered the radical claim of woman’s rights activists, attempting to 
strengthen laws and increase social pressure to maintain what they considered the vital 
component of moral reproduction that women provided. The nineteenth-century woman’s 
movement did succeed in loosening “the bonds of womanhood” that the woman’s 
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historian Nancy Cott has pointed out.  But in the process it revealed the very live power 
of the moral establishment, and the century ended with the woman’s movement tamed 
and the moral establishment still firmly in place.6
Legal Coverture and the Divine Subordination of Women 
 The woman’s movement that Fanny Wright inaugurated was a response to 
women’s position before the law in the early-nineteenth century.  To a considerable 
extent the social and legal arrangements that governed women instantiated the patriarchy 
of the Christian Scriptures.  Legally, the provisions of the common law placed women in 
the more or less absolute control of their husbands.  When a woman married, she 
assumed the name of her husband and legally ceased to exist.  As Blackstone explained 
it, because the husband and wife became one person under the law, “the very being or 
legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated 
and consolidating into that of the husband.”   In the legal doctrine of coverture, as it was 
called, the woman came under the protection or cover of the husband, in whose legal 
identity and name she “performs everything.”  Lacking a legal identity or individuality, 
the married woman, or femme covert (covered woman), accrued severe legal liabilities.  
She could not make contracts, except in his name and with his consent.  All her property 
became his upon marriage, unless it had been placed in a trust, and she could not accrue 
any property within marriage.  Any will she created prior to marriage was dissolved, 
because once married the property ceased to be hers.  She could neither sue, nor be sued; 
her husband was liable for torts against her and, likewise, he had to bring suit for her in 
                                                 
6 Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988); Nancy F. Cott, The Bonds of 
Womanhood, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). 
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the case of wrong.  He was even, in some instances, responsible for her criminal 
infractions.7
 The rationale for the married woman’s lack of standing came from the legal 
notion of marriage itself.  Although treatise writers were careful to uphold marriage as a 
civil contract as opposed to a religious sacrament, they hedged the language of contract to 
make sure that it reinforced conservative religious ideals of the home.  James Kent called 
marriage “an interesting contract,” because the normal rules did not apply.  Unlike other 
contracts, marriage had its foundation “in nature,” was created by Providence as “the 
only lawful relation” for the perpetuation of the race, and maintained a “propitious 
influence on the moral improvement and happiness of mankind.”  Most importantly, 
marriage was “one of the chief foundations of the social order,” which meant that it could 
not be dissolved at the whim of the parties.  Likewise, Joseph Story excluded the 
marriage relation from contract law because it was clearly something more than “a mere 
contract.”  It was nothing less than “an institution of society,” founded in the “the consent 
and contract” of the man and woman, but involving much larger interests than just their 
own.  Because many of rights and duties arising out of marriage were “so important to 
the best interests of morality and good government,” the parties have no control over 
them, and marital rights and duties were to be “regulated and enforced by the public law, 
which is imperative on all.”  But if marriage itself was a crucial bulwark for morality, 
wives were uniquely responsible for the perpetuation of social morals and public duties, 
and a husband’s violation of the marriage did not necessarily abrogate the marital 
                                                 
7 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 9th ed. (1783; repr., New York: Garland 
Publishing, Inc., 1978), 442.  See also, James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 5th ed. (New York: 
James Kent, 1844), 2:128; Tapping Reeve, The Law of Baron and Femme (Burlington: Chauncey 
Goodrich, 1846), 49; Edward D. Mansfield, The Legal Rights, Liabilities, and Duties of Women (Salem: 
John P. Jewett, 1845).  
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contract as would the wife’s.  As Kent reported, some jurists regarded the adultery of the 
husband as beneath the notice of the court, or at least not “subject to the same 
animadiversion as that of the wife; because it is not evidence of such entire depravity, not 
equally injurious in its effects upon the morals, and the happiness of domestic life.” 8
As the century wore on, many treatise writers were hasty to acknowledge that the 
married woman’s loss of personality was a legal fiction, one that did not deny the actual 
personality of a married woman, but still conceptually emphasized the fundamental unity 
of interests that marriage was supposed to entail.  Later writers like Mary Beard have also 
argued that actual practice did not coincide with theory, in which women exerted their 
public personality according to the individual dynamics of their own marriage in a variety 
of ways that did not strictly follow the law.  But the law did impose real liability that 
would become especially apparent in the case of an unhappy marriage, when the 
husband’s marital rights came into clear focus.  Because the wife had no separate legal 
existence, should she wish to separate from her husband she would need some kind of 
property settlement from him, either an agreement that she could use the property she 
brought into the marriage or the husband’s agreement that she could use her own earnings 
(both of which were legally his).  Divorce was a difficult endeavor.  Because the law did 
not condone and so made no provision for consensual divorce, a divorce suit was an 
adversarial lawsuit in which one spouse had to prove that the other had met specified 
grounds, which was often limited to adultery.  Because divorce was a privilege for the 
innocent spouse, some states did not allow the guilty party to remarry.  Absent divorce, if 
a husband and wife lived in separate domiciles but were not legally separated, she needed 
                                                 
8 Kent, Commentaries, 2:74 (first through fifth quotations), 106 (eleventh quotation); Joseph Story, 
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little and Brown, 1841), 100 note 3 (sixth through 
eighth quotations), 102 (ninth and tenth quotations).  
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his agreement not to advertise her as a runaway, which would cut off her supply of credit 
from merchants and others. If she were to leave without his consent, the husband—
normally responsible for all her debts—would not be chargeable “even for necessaries,” 
as Kent explained, and “all persons supplying the food, lodging and raiment, of a married 
woman living separate from her husband,” needed to make inquiries because they 
extended credit “at their peril.”  In short, given her surrender of rights upon marriage, a 
wife either had to prove a limited set of grounds for divorce, or she needed the ongoing 
consent of her husband to let her live alone.9
 The limitations to divorce and the provisions governing marriage drew upon the 
normative ethical system of Protestant Christianity, but with a unique Anglo-American 
jurisprudential cast.  The law of coverture was an expression of the Christian view that 
husband and wife, after marriage, became one flesh.  But the unity of marriage 
consistently ran up against its own contradictions, especially when the common interest 
ideal became a façade in an unhappy marriage.  At that point, marital unity became 
subordination, in which the wife’s interests were manifestly different than the husband’s, 
but still remained subordinated to his authority.  The Anglo-American property scheme 
furthered the contradiction.  Other forms of Christian jurisprudence, derived from 
continental law, translated the Christian ideal of marital unity into the notion of 
community property, in which both husband and wife jointly owned all real estate and 
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chattel.  Yet as the legal historian Henrik Hartok has pointed out, in the Anglo-American 
world in which “title to property was the usual measure of public identity (and of the 
right to represent others),” English and American coverture meshed tightly with the idea 
that the husband alone, as the head of the wife, was entitled to property and, therefore, to 
governance.10
 Religious commentators joined treatise writers in trying to put a positive gloss on 
the legal and social arrangements, usually invoking the idea that man and wife occupied 
equally important, but distinctively separate spheres.  Jonathan Stearns, a Presbyterian 
minister in Massachusetts, explained, “the truth is, there is natural difference, in the 
mental as well as physical constitution of the two classes [men and women]—a 
difference which implies not inferiority on the one part, but only adaptation to a different 
sphere.”  That sphere was, of course, the home, which women assumed in order “to form 
the character of society, and give it a healthy tone.”  If God gave woman the home, 
according to Stearns, he gave man the world, and it was the role of men to protect and 
guard women in turbulent public sphere.   As Thomas Dew, a professor at William and 
Mary College, explained, God charged man as “the shield of woman, destined by nature 
to guard and protect her.  Her inferior strength and sedentary habits confine her within the 
domestic circle.”  That inferior strength did not imply personal inferiority, he was quick 
to assert, because the woman’s “passive” character was “more emblematic of . . . 
divinity: it subdues without an effort, and almost creates by mere volition; whiles man 
must wind his way through the difficult and intricate mazes of philosophy.”  American 
denominations likewise spoke with an essentially uniform voice in upholding woman’s 
                                                 
10 On coverture as a distinctive Anglo-American legal expression of the Christian doctrine of “one flesh,” 
see Hartog, Man and Wife, 119-120, quotation on p. 119.   On the role of Protestant Christianity as the 
normative ethical system in American marriage and divorce law, see Friedman, "Rights of Passage," 668.    
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unique responsibility for national moral regeneration.  Although the emergent 
evangelicalism had theoretical potential to overturn such strict gender prescriptions with 
its more egalitarian focus on the individual’s encounter with God, in practice the 
egalitarian impulse surrendered to the existing strictures and the resulting orthodoxies 
formed an even stronger bulwark against change.11
 Nowhere could the connections between the Anglo-American marriage provisions 
and Christian gender ideals be as clearly seen as in the work of Edward Mansfield.  
Mansfield directed his 1845 treatise, The Legal Rights, Liabilities, and Duties of Woman, 
toward women themselves, in order to instruct them in their legal rights and obligations.  
Because his treatise was part didaction and part apology, defending the existing legal 
structure from criticism while promoting the duties of women in their respective sphere, 
Mansfield articulated the connections between Anglo-American marriage law and 
Christian patriarchy more explicitly than other treatise writers.  Men and women each 
had, Mansfield explained, different parts in “the development of that grand Moral Drama, 
whose Acts fill up all the course of time.”  Marriage was an essential part of that drama, 
nothing less than “an institution of God . . . . begun in the garden of Eden” and 
“perpetuated by the laws of nature, of religion and of civil society.”  Although he 
acknowledged that under Anglo-American law marriage was considered a civil contract, 
he insisted that “in Christian countries, and with Christian people, the revealed law of 
God, so far as it applies to the relations of society, is the only true foundation of human 
                                                 
11 Jonathan Stearnes, Female Influence, and the True Mode of Its Exercise (Newburyport: John G. Tilton, 
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laws.”  Although civil law might not specifically sanction the idea that marriage was 
anything more than a civil contract, it did not change the divine function and purpose of 
marriage, which operated in practice if not in explicit sanction in law.  To that end, 
Mansfield recited “the leading principles of Scripture” in order to show how much 
American civil law conformed to divine law.  Among the operative principles, which also 
clearly demonstrated the fundamental contradictions of Anglo-American marriage law, 
Scripture regarded the husband and wife “as one person” and taught that “men must 
govern their families, and women submit to their lawful requisitions.”12
Equal Rights and the Question of Religious Authority 
 The emergent woman’s rights movement inevitably responded to these legal 
realities, taking its impetus from the social and legal restraints imposed upon women.  As 
the women’s historian Ellen Carol DuBois has shown, in the 1820s and 1830s some 
women like Frances Wright began expressing what she calls a “caste consciousness” as a 
result of their legal subordination.  Their discontent with their subordinate status and their 
exclusion from public life led, in time, to the formation of a political movement to 
address their concerns.  As women began mobilizing to call for individual autonomy and 
individual rights, they consistently ran up against the moral establishment that limited 
women’s autonomy in the interests of what religious partisans considered the 
requirements of moral reproduction.  To change the laws governing women meant 
modifying a significant aspect of the moral establishment, so the debate about women’s 
                                                 
12 Mansfield, The Legal Rights, Liabilities, and Duties of Women, 20 (first quotation), 235 (second and 
third quotation), 261-262 (fourth quotation), 262 (fifth quotation), 263 (sixth and seventh quotation). 
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rights became, very often, a debate about the role of religion in American law and 
politics.13
 That debate began with the inception of the movement by Frances Wright and 
continued even as less polarizing figures emerged into the public spotlight.  In July 1837, 
for example, the Congregational General Association of Massachusetts sounded an alarm 
against an emergent wing of the abolition movement, which had sent Sarah and Angelina 
Grimké on a speaking tour.  The Massachusetts Association thought the Grimkés’ 
activities portended social anarchy and moral degradation, because, the Association 
claimed, they were undermining women’s traditional roles.  The problem, simply put, 
was that the Grimkés were violating “the appropriate duties and influence of woman,” 
clearly stated in the New Testament, through their speaking tours to promote the 
abolitionist cause.  Because women’s primary duty, in the minds of the Association, was 
to wield moral influence that was “unobtrusive and private, but the source of mighty 
power,” the Grimkés’ appearance on a public platform subverted the moral economy 
between men and women when the sisters left the private sphere.  In doing so they 
abandoned those arenas for which God had made them, and posed a threat to the moral 
character of the society for which they were responsible.  For their own good and the 
good of those around them, the Association counseled the Grimkés to return to “those 
departments of life that form the character of individuals and of the nation.”14   
In responding to this kind of criticism, the woman’s movement put forth a radical 
challenge to the legal principles of Kent, Story, and others.  Its iconoclastic potential 
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stemmed in part from its ideological sources, most importantly Quakerism and the 
freethought movement. The Grimkés were originally of genteel stock from Charleston 
and daughters of a prominent slaveholding family.  Led by Sarah, who was thirteen years 
older than Angelina, they rejected the Presbyterianism of their family, left the South, and 
came under the influence of a group of Hicksite Quakers in Philadelphia.  That move was 
momentous, mainly because of the unique characteristics of Quaker belief.  Quakers held 
that God communicated with each person by means of an Inner Light, which every 
person possessed.  Because the Inner Light was present in every human being, Quakers 
posited a fundamental equality among human beings and enacted far more egalitarian sex 
roles than almost any other denomination.  In the 1820s, a group of Quakers following 
Elias Hicks further refined Quaker theology to claim that Jesus was revealed not solely 
through the Bible but through the Inner Light, the Christ Within.  That modification, in 
turn, shifted Quaker religious praxis away from bible reading and prayer and toward 
ongoing personal reformation through experience in the world.  In other words, it 
reinforced Quaker social activism.  Many of the most uncompromisingly radical activists 
in the early woman’s movement had come into contact with Quaker theology in Quaker 
communities.  When the Grimkés entered the Hicksite Quaker orbit, they found in 
Quaker theology a justification for rejecting slavery, their family’s opprobrium, and even 
the disapproval of proponents of the moral establishment like the Massachusetts 
Association, who insisted that women should remain in the home.  In opposition to those 
critics, God himself served as a supreme authority over any human institutions, laws, and 
customs, communicating to each individual through the Inner Light, so the individual 
person became the arbiter of moral obligations and religious praxis.15
                                                 
15 On the role of Quakerism in the woman’s movement, see Judith Wellman, The Road to Seneca Falls: 
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 Yet not all would agree with such a radical vision, and the woman’s movement 
would be split in their response to the moral establishment, with others embracing the 
moral role of women as justification for their enlarged public presence.  Perhaps most 
important among these more conservative women was Catharine Beecher, Lyman 
Beecher’s eldest daughter.  Catharine Beecher had partially moved away from her 
father’s already modified Calvinism after her unconverted fiancé died in a shipwreck, 
which, according to her father’s theology, doomed her fiancé to eternal perdition.  Faced 
with his untimely death, Catharine found that she could not accept the stark 
conversionary requirement of salvation that was central to Lyman’s theology.  Her 
mourning resulted in a clarified moral sensibility that, in her mind, refashioned the role of 
women in society.  But she did not believe in women’s unqualified right to political and 
social equality based on their status as individual moral beings.   Instead, Catharine 
argued that women’s moral superiority required their enlarged public role, which would 
correct the imbalance of men in the public sphere by injecting the principle of virtue and 
motherly love into the broader world outside the home.  In other words, Catharine 
Beecher projected woman’s domestic responsibility for home onto the world at large.16
 The differences between the two positions were stark, with the place and meaning 
of Christianity figuring centrally in their divergence.  While Catharine Beecher gestured 
toward the innate difference of women, established by God, as a justification for an 
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enlarged social role, the Grimkés and their Quaker friends pointed to each human being’s 
possession of God’s Inner Light, which required, they maintained, nothing less than a 
remaking of society along egalitarian lines that acknowledged women as individuals.   
When Catharine Beecher criticized the Grimké faction by calling it anti-Christian, 
Angelina had a ready-made response.  “Thou seemest to think. . . that Christianity is just 
such a weak, dependent, puerile creature as thou has described woman to be,” she replied 
using the Quaker’s antique manner of address.  Because Quaker Christianity asserted that 
human beings were moral beings, they had rights, and because both men and women 
were equal moral beings, Angelina argued, they ought to have equal rights.  Likewise, 
Sarah Grimké reached for Quaker principles to justify her appearance in public after the 
Massachusetts Congregational Association issued its congregational letter condemning 
her.  Claiming that because women were equal moral agents they had just as much right 
and, indeed, responsibility to work for equal rights as men, Sarah went a step further by 
attacking clergy who, she explained, had used “the thralldom of superstition and 
‘traditions of men’” to colonize the minds of women, rather than allowing them to rely on 
their inner resources of conscience.  Christianity itself, she claimed, required the 
reorientation of society and the revision of marriage laws so that women could manifest 
their divinely-mandated “independence and nobility of character.”17
 But as much as both sides claimed to be Christian, Catharine Beecher was partly 
correct in her charge that the Grimkés’ activism could be non-Christian, if not anti-
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Christian, because Quaker principles dovetailed nicely with the arguments of freethinkers 
for woman’s rights.  Robert Dale Owen, for example, the one-time collaborator with 
Frances Wright and the son of the British socialist Robert Owen, criticized marriage laws 
and the denial of woman’s equal rights in almost the same manner as the Grimkés.  He 
did so not by referencing Christianity but by denouncing the connection of religion and 
politics and promoting a purely secular political rationale for woman’s rights.  Prior to his 
marriage to Mary Robinson, he signed a non-binding covenant divesting himself of “the 
unjust rights . . . over the person and property of another.”  Although he could not 
actually do so legally, he considered their marriage—and wanted others to consider it as 
well—as a union of equal persons, each retaining individual rights, and operating outside 
of what he considered “the barbarous relics of a feudal, despotic system, soon destined, in 
the onward course of improvement, to be wholly swept away.”  Likewise the young Lucy 
Stone, a freethinker who would become a leader of the woman’s rights movement, 
followed Wright in registering moral outrage at the legal subordination of women and 
joined the free religion movement, which sought the complete separation of church and 
state and the remaking of religion through their uncompromising dedication to the 
freedom of conscience.  After reading Edward Mansfield’s treatise, Stone pledged never 
to be married in order to maintain her independence, in spite of her intense desire for 
companionship.  As she confessed to her friend and soon-to-be sister-in-law, Antoinette 
Blackwell Brown, “my heart aches to love somebody that shall be all its own,” but she 
could not accept “what a mere thing, the law, makes a married woman.”18
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 These separate justifications for woman’s rights entailed divergent appeals to 
religious authority and ultimately divergent political goals, but at least initially their 
differences remained subordinated to the larger movement out of which the woman’s 
movement emerged: abolition.  It was through the abolitionist movement that woman’s 
rights gained their most powerful advocate, Elizabeth Cady Stanton.  In 1840 Stanton 
was the new bride of Henry Stanton, and the couple spent their honeymoon in London 
attending the meeting of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Societies.  The meeting 
was eye-opening for Elizabeth Stanton on a number of levels.  There she came under the 
influence of Lucretia Mott, a Quaker matriarch, and William Lloyd Garrison, the fiery 
leader of the radical branch of American abolition who, she later claimed, cut “the chains 
of my spiritual bondage.”  Because the English delegates had not been prepared for the 
appearance of abolitionist women, the first day the convention actually spent debating 
woman’s rights, with the result that the convention denied the female delegates their seats 
so they had to watch the proceedings from the gallery.  When Garrison arrived in London 
after the decision had been made, he was appalled and refused his own seat, sitting 
instead in the women’s gallery in silent protest.  The experience was a sad lesson, and 
showed Stanton and Mott that women needed a convention of their own to argue 
explicitly for woman’s rights.19
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 Although it would take eight years to materialize, the resulting Seneca Falls 
Convention of 1848 was a pivot in the history of individual rights in the United States.  It 
was the most articulate expression of the radical wing of woman’s rights since Sarah and 
Angelina Grimké first appeared on the public platform, and was essentially in line with 
their Quaker orientation.  The Convention argued with the broad view of female reform, 
co-opting Blackstone’s maxim that man was entitled to “pursue his own true and 
substantial happiness” by applying it equally to women.  Laws that prohibited women 
from equal pursuit were, the Convention resolved, “contrary to the great precept of 
nature, and therefore of no force or authority.”  In addition, the attendees produced a 
document, modeled on the Declaration of Independence, that it called The Declaration of 
Sentiments.  Listing the grievances of women just as Jefferson listed grievances of the 
colonists against the King, the Declaration maintained that women were “aggrieved, 
oppressed, and fraudulently deprived of their most sacred rights” and demanded 
“immediate admission to all the rights and privileges which belong to them as citizens of 
these United States.”  Yet there was some ambiguity.  Although its support for woman’s 
rights was unequivocal, the rationale for those rights remained obscure, and the 
resolutions of the convention could be read in support of both the radical wing for 
woman’s rights as well as the Catharine Beecher branch.  In places the resolutions 
seemed to gesture toward the prior example of Frances Wright.  Wright revered the 
Declaration of Independence, considering it the supreme contribution of American 
political thought to the world.  But in her estimation, when it got down to actual practice, 
American law, religion and education “are false, narrow, prejudiced, ignorant, and are the 
relic of dark ages—the gift and bequeathment of king-governed, priest-ridden nations. . . 
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whose example they [the American people] are still following.”  In similar fashion the 
Convention condemned “the circumscribed limits which corrupt customs and a perverted 
application of the Scriptures have marked out for her,” and called for woman’s mass 
movement into “the enlarged sphere which her great Creator has assigned her.”  But at 
the same time, the Convention gestured toward the maintenance and perfection of the 
moral establishment, claiming that it was “demonstrably the right and duty of woman, 
equally with man, to promote every righteous cause. . . . especially in regard to the great 
subjects of morals and religion.”20
 By leaving unresolved the exact purpose and rationale for woman’s rights, as the 
movement developed the earlier divide between those who used the moral establishment 
to justify women’s entrance into public life and those who rejected the religious authority 
inherent in the moral establishment threatened to break into the open.  Four years later 
during the 1852 Woman’s Rights Convention in Syracuse, debate finally erupted over the 
implicitly conflicting appeals to authority that women were using to justify individual 
rights.  Antoinette Blackwell Brown, by that time an ordained minister, introduced a 
resolution that claimed that the Bible recognized the equality of woman with man in 
mutual subjection, so that the cause of woman’s rights was in fact a biblical one.  But her 
resolutions raised, in the words of the History of Woman Suffrage written some forty 
years later by Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, “the question of 
authority as against individual judgment.”  The resulting debate lasted intermittently for 
two days, with various factions claiming that the resolution was central for the future 
success of woman’s rights, and others like Ernestine L. Rose, a radical freethinker in the 
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line of Frances Wright, claiming “no need to appeal to any written authority, particularly 
when it is so obscure and indefinite as to admit of different interpretations.”  The debate 
only ended when Lucretia Mott surrendered her moderator’s chair to argue that biblical 
discussions were generally wastes of time.  Instead, she claimed, “self-evident truths 
needed no argument or outward authority.”  Her own authority persuaded the Convention 
to drop the subject, but the issue came up again just two years later in almost identical 
form.  At that year’s convention, William Lloyd Garrison was in attendance and joined 
Mott in shrugging off the Bible controversy, claiming simply, “We know that man and 
woman are equal in the sight of God.”  At the same time, he acknowledged the crux of 
the problem.  Although their argument was self-evident to the members of the 
convention, “with the American people the case is different.  The masses believe the 
Bible directly from God; that it decrees the inequality of the sexes; and that settles the 
question.”  If only the “incubus” of Protestant churches could be removed, he explained, 
the masses “would experience a change of views; they would be with us.”21     
 But Garrison’s explanation assumed too much unity among the delegates.  
Beneath the divergent appeals to authority lurked divergent visions about the role of 
religion in American public life.  Stanton had conceded shortly after the Seneca Falls 
convention that her goal was complete social transformation, because no question more 
affected “the whole human family than that which is technically termed Woman’s 
rights.”  Six months prior to the 1852 Convention, when the controversy first erupted, she 
explained to Susan B. Anthony, who had not been at Seneca Falls but would become her 
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closest confidant and co-leader of the movement, “It is in vain to look for the elevation of 
woman, so long as she is degraded in marriage. . . . the right idea of marriage is at the 
foundation of all reforms.”  What particularly offended her, as she explained two years 
later to the New York Legislature, was the view of marriage as a “half-human, half-
divine institution, which you may build up but cannot regulate.”  Striking at the 
equivocation of jurists and treatise writers who acknowledged that marriage was a 
contract but something more than “a mere contract,” in Story’s words, Stanton wondered 
why it should not be subjected to the same laws as other contracts, dissolvable with the 
consent of both parties or upon the abrogation of the terms and conditions by one.  To 
make that argument, she had to address the moral establishment, and, to the consternation 
of religious conservatives, over the next decade Stanton and Anthony together began 
moving closer and closer to what was known as the social question—the class of issues 
involved in women’s unique role in moral reproduction.  Writing to Lucy Stone, Anthony 
claimed, “Getting the right to hold property, to vote, to wear what dress we please, &c 
&c, are all good—but Social Freedom, after all, lies at the bottom of all—& until woman 
gets that, she must continue the slave of man in all things.”  What the radicals in the 
movement wanted was a broad social recognition, upheld by the modification of the law, 
that women possessed unique individuality and separate existence from men, their 
children, and the home.  But social freedom was exactly what the moral establishment 
was designed to prevent, so Stanton and Anthony’s radical vision would necessarily crash 
against the legal provisions and social mores that the moral establishment promoted.22
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 Early on it looked as though radicals were in a position to accomplish their goals.  
Beginning in 1835, state legislatures all over the nation began enacting statutory reform 
to law of coverture, allowing women to keep estates that they brought with them into 
marriage and creating a more rationalized law in order to establish clear titular claims to 
land.  From an economic standpoint, the common law arrangement could work fine in a 
society in which only the rich had land, and they sold it very infrequently.  But in a 
society with ubiquitous land ownership and a strong real estate market, the common law 
stipulations that gave a third of the husband’s estate to the wife for use until her death 
(dower), or allowed the husband to live on his wife’s land, placed in trust, until his death 
(courtesy), caused a backlog in real estate transactions that inhibited a properly 
functioning land market.  At the same time, because many people claimed land and 
personal possessions of value, the laws of coverture created havoc when people wanted a 
divorce.  Social historians have noted the casual basis of marriage and divorce, the 
prevalence of co-habitation, and the frequency with which people moved among different 
partners when there was little wealth at stake, and in societies where wealth was not as 
evenly distributed marriage was important only to the upper end, as means of wealth 
consolidation and transmission.  But with many people owning something of value in the 
United States, divorce law needed normalization and rationalization in order to establish 
clear titles to land and property when couples declined to remain together.  The most 
significant change in divorce law was the elimination of legislative divorces, where 
couples had to petition the legislature for a divorce, to the creation of judicial divorces, 
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where judges heard divorce suits and decided upon certain legislatively specified 
grounds.23   
 Many in the woman’s rights movement looked to the statutory reform of 
coverture and divorce as a means of strengthening women’s claim to individual rights by 
rejecting the provisions of the moral establishment.  Stanton, in particular, was at the 
forefront in petitioning legislators to establish strong statutory reform, and used the 
annual conventions as a bully pulpit by introducing resolutions in favor of a new 
marriage and divorce law.  But many of Stanton’s arguments for rationalized divorce law 
cut too close to the sensitive area of the movement’s divergent goals, and at the Tenth 
Woman’s Rights Convention in 1860 the tension again exploded into the open.  Ernestine 
Rose led the way in her address to the convention, which took moral establishmentarians 
to task for what she saw as their half-hearted attempt at reform, invoking the moral 
establishment as a reason for women’s broader role in public life rather than rejecting the 
establishment all together.  “Principle does not admit of compromise,” Rose declared, “It 
asks all, or none.”  The woman’s movement needed to maintain its call for complete 
social reformation to meet the ideal of social equality, Rose maintained, even if it could 
only be achieved in increments.  Following Rose, Stanton expanded her claim that the 
logical end of the woman’s movement was social transformation and individual freedom.  
From time immemorial, Stanton explained, the institutions of civil, political, moral, and 
social life all taught that the individual must be “sacrificed to the highest good of 
society.”  That thought rested on a fundamental error, she explained, claiming that it was 
possible to suppress the individual but uphold the highest social good.  Instead, society 
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upheld the highest good precisely by acknowledging the sovereignty of the individual.  In 
her mind the most urgent step to actualize the principle of individual sovereignty was the 
abolition of what she called, “the man marriage.”  Because men had the sole prerogative 
of regulation over marriage, speaking as they had through law and Scripture, the man 
marriage had exalted male power and authority and, according to Stanton, necessarily 
eviscerated female independence and self-determination.24  
 Stanton’s resolutions created immediate and vigorous dissent.  Antoinette 
Blackwell Brown strongly opposed Stanton’s speech, upholding instead the Christian 
position that God intended marriage to be the union of one man and one woman for life.  
Rose, again following Brown, took the platform dismissing Brown’s “sermon” and 
insisting that marriage was “a human institution, called out by the needs of social, 
affectional human nature, for human purposes.”  Because it was a human institution, it 
could be modified to meet human needs, irrespective of the claims of a deity.  Wendell 
Phillips, who would eventually take over leadership of the abolition movement and 
support the conservative faction of woman’s rights, objected to the whole discussion and 
moved that both Stanton and Brown’s resolutions be withdrawn.  But at that point 
Anthony got involved, rebuking Phillips and explaining, “By law, public sentiment, and 
religion, from the time of Moses down to the present day, woman has never been thought 
of other than as a piece of property . . . Therefore, in my opinion, this discussion of the 
marriage question is perfectly in order on this Woman’s Rights platform.”  The combined 
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arguments of Stanton, Anthony, and Rose swayed the convention, and the resolutions 
stayed.25
 Post-convention response was immediate.  Martha Coffin Wright and Parker 
Pillsbury, both prominent abolitionist reformers and friends of the woman’s rights 
movement, wrote to Stanton to offer their support.  Pillsbury in particular seemed to 
relish the iconoclastic spirit in which the resolutions were made, claiming Stanton “must 
have learned in the school of a Wollstonecraft or a Sophie Arnaut.”  Conservatives 
thought so, too.  Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune and future presidential 
candidate, sarcastically wondered if the woman’s rights platform “should not be 
altogether replanked, so as to cover all human relations.”  That was, of course, exactly 
Stanton’s goal.  As she mystically intoned in her letter to Martha Coffin Wright, for 
reform to be properly effected, “anything that is outward, all forms and ceremonies, faiths 
and symbols, policies and institutions, may be washed away, but that which is of the very 
being must stand forever.”26
Yet Stanton’s goal would be delayed, as the outbreak of the Civil War shelved the 
woman’s suffrage movement for the next four years.  It emerged transformed, and the 
emancipation of former slaves led many women’s rights proponents to consider the 
fundamental affinity between freed slaves and women in their social marginalization and 
exclusion from the political process.  Stanton, in particular, began testing a new argument 
that linked woman’s rights and black rights in a joint call for universal suffrage.  When 
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the war ended, Stanton and Anthony called the Eleventh Woman’s Rights Convention to 
put their new plan into action.  Following Stanton’s argument, the Convention declared 
their cause and the cause of the freedslaves as one, and broadened their appeal from 
woman’s rights to human rights.  The convention resolved “to bury the woman in the 
citizen,” dissolving their organization into a new organization, the American Equal 
Rights Association, that was dedicated to all human rights called and would work for an 
expanded notion of citizenship that brought every individual into the body politic.  From 
her platform Stanton declared her intention to pursue her radical political vision, because 
the question of human rights necessarily involved “every other question of trade, 
commerce, finance, political economy, jurisprudence, morals and religion.”27    
 Unfortunately, their faith would be betrayed.  After its creation, the Equal Rights 
Association began to work for the passage of a Fourteenth Amendment that would enact 
universal suffrage.   Though Congressional support existed for an amendment to 
enfranchise freed black men, support for a universal suffrage amendment was uncertain.  
Some within the association, led by Wendell Phillips, Lucy Stone, and Henry Blackwell, 
deciding that it was better to get a partial victory than to risk not gaining any, agreed to 
support the amendment that emerged from Congress, which guaranteed suffrage to male 
citizens over the age of twenty-one but implicitly denied women the vote.  In the 
successive fallout, Stanton and Anthony came to the conclusion that women alone could 
be trusted to work for their enfranchisement, and in 1869 left the Equal Rights 
Association to form the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA), which initially 
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allowed only women to preside as officers.  But if their faith was betrayed, they also did 
some betraying of their own, putting out frankly racist propaganda against the Fourteenth 
Amendment and complaining that, in Stanton’s words, they were willing to press the 
cause of the black man as long as he was “lowest in the scale of being,” but now that “the 
celestial gate to civil rights is slowly moving on its hinges, it becomes a serious question 
whether we had better stand aside and see ‘Sambo’ walk into the kingdom first.”  Turning 
back on their earlier commitment to equal rights, in 1867 Stanton and Anthony entered 
into a strategic coalition with the anti-negro, pro-woman’s rights Democrat, George 
Francis Train, and having taken her position Stanton stuck to it, reiterating similar 
statements about Afro-Americans and immigrants into the 1890s.  The common 
phenomenon of coercive regimes in which the excluded and marginalized turn on one 
another was, unfortunately, on display in Stanton’s response.  In the short term Lucy 
Stone and Henry Blackwell formed what would become a rival, more conservative 
association, the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA), and the rupture of the 
movement was complete.28  
Individualism, Citizenship, and Social Freedom 
 Even with its racism, the radical wing of the woman’s rights movement could not 
help but raise the question of the moral establishment, in particular its notions about the 
obligations of female citizenship implicit in the exclusion of women from political life.  
The rights of citizenship entailed specifically female duties of moral reproduction, 
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because the moral establishment considered the family the fundamental social unit, not 
the individual.  Equal rights, then, made no sense to conservatives, because in the 
rationale of the moral establishment men and women had separate duties corresponding 
to their different function in the family as the fundamental social unit.  To acknowledge 
that women were individuals with equal rights and responsibilities to men meant the 
destruction of the familial political-economy that was the foundation of society.  In the 
minds of religious partisans, the idea of female individualism courted cultural dissolution 
as individuals broke into innumerable atomistic units without the social obligations and 
duties that family life imposed.  That struggle would intensify in the ten years following 
the Civil War.29
 When woman’s suffrage moved out from under the shadow of abolition, its new 
prominence attracted a series of rebuttals from various quarters, which made clear how 
challenging the notion of women as individuals and equal-rights bearers was to the moral 
establishment.  Many said the same things they had always said.  John Todd, a 
Presbyterian minister whose work, Woman’s Rights, gained widespread attention, simply 
denied that women could be independent of men, and therefore did not require individual 
rights because God had not made them to be independent.  They were created to complete 
man and to make the home, which was “the fountain of all that is good on earth.”  
Likewise Orestes A. Brownson, a one-time Presbyterian, Unitarian, Universalist, and 
Transcendentalist, who finally turned to conservative Roman Catholicism, pointed to the 
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“creation” of woman as a wife and mother, and concluded that woman’s enfranchisement 
worked against creation and would “break up and destroy the Christian family.”  Because 
the fundamental social unit of the nation was not the individual but the family, the death 
of the family was of dire concern to the nation, he claimed, and “when the family goes, 
the nation goes too, or ceases to be worth preserving.”30   
Some of the criticisms went beyond the standard formulas to draw out the 
conservative evangelical political theory that Beecher had earlier expressed.  One of the 
most articulate proponents was Horace Bushnell, a widely known minister-theologian 
whose intellectual vivacity spurred the development of liberal theology, but whose 
conservative temperament formed the foundation of his intellectual thought.  His 
response was noteworthy, because although he was part of a small class of emerging 
religious liberals that had an open view of theology, he displayed the common tendency 
of religious liberals to maintain conservative moral sensibilities and a familiar 
understanding of the relationship of those sensibilities to law.  The idea of woman’s 
rights was particularly anathema to Bushnell, because, as he explained, it went against the 
order of nature and was, in fact, unchristian.  Bushnell argued that the impetus for 
woman’s rights, and the rationales put forward by Stanton and others in support of it 
arose out of a naturalistic worldview, advanced first by Rousseau and Voltaire, that 
regarded the civil order as a social compact and acknowledged the citizen as its 
fundamental unit of government.  Even Locke was taken in by this “infection,” which 
passed to the constitutional framers, who used the rhetoric of liberty “more easily than 
was to be desired.”  The problem with the Rousseauean/Voltairean/Lockean view, 
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according to Bushnell, was that it failed to acknowledge the divinely mandated structures 
of authority that were written into the creation itself.  The creational structures of 
authority extended to the hierarchy of the sexes, so that in Bushnell’s way of thinking, 
“masculinity carries, in the distribution of sex, the governmental function.”  It was in 
recognition of the masculine governing prerogative that a woman assumed the last name 
of her husband upon marriage, and she was placed, devoid of legal identity, under his 
protection and governance.  Should women gain suffrage, or any other rights that would 
modify the divinely ordained sex relations, the result would be, Bushnell warned, so 
catastrophic that it could only be regarded as a “second fall.”  Other moral 
establishmentarians saw the woman’s movement as but one part of a many-headed hydra 
that sought to undermine the creational structures of authority in order to promote moral 
anarchy.  As the religious partisan John Ellis explained, it was all too obvious that “the 
mob of discontented women and men who call themselves the Woman-Suffrage Party,” 
had joined hands with the Free Love party in a campaign to end Christian marriage.  It 
would take “but a cursory glance” to show that “the Woman Suffrage party, the Free-
Love party, the Spiritualist party, the Infidel party, are all one and the same organization.  
The triumph of one means the triumph of all.”31
Of course, Stanton agreed with Ellis and other religious critics about the goal of 
woman’s rights.  From her new perch at the Revolution, a weekly magazine started with 
Anthony and bankrolled by George Francis Train, Stanton began responding to her 
critics.  Bushnell, she argued, had merely made her case for her.  Claiming that he had 
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presented the concept of headship as well as could be done, he still could not escape the 
obvious conclusion that male headship “must ever produce selfishness on one side and 
sacrifice on the other, or a never ending self assertion of equality, alike disorganizing and 
degrading both sexes.”  To talk about marriage as dignified or dignifying to women, she 
explained, was impossible until women had a separate political, social, and legal 
existence.  Quoting Ralph Waldo Emerson, Stanton argued in a different article, “We 
cannot have unions, until we first have units.”  As the decade progressed, she waged war 
on two fronts—against moral establishment proponents within the woman’s movement 
and against the proponents of the moral establishment outside of it—which had the effect 
of further radicalizing her statements.   In May 1870, both Stanton and Anthony 
relinquished their leadership of the NWSA, and Stanton began lecturing on the lyceum 
tour, rehearsing her arguments about the need for liberalized divorce laws and the 
modification of creeds and civil codes to recognize the equality of women.  At a meeting 
of a society of radical reformers in 1870 (or possibly 1871), Stanton laid down her most 
far-reaching pronouncement to date, criticizing both sets of her critics at once.  In 
response to those who worried that woman’s rights would undermine marriage, she 
acknowledged that marriage would necessarily “be abrogated in fine by the progress of 
reform.”  In particular, when the law looked upon marriage as a true contract and allowed 
free and easy divorce, the marriage relationship would organize itself according to 
“natural and free adjustments.”  Like Ellis, Stanton agreed that “all reforms and 
innovations stand logically affiliated with each other,” so that the progression beyond 
woman’s suffrage was “next social equality and next Freedom or in a word Free Love.”  
In fact, for those who were merely dabbling in woman’s suffrage without regard for its 
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ultimate outcome, Stanton offered the warning that “if they wish to get out of the boat 
they should for safety get out now, for delays are dangerous.”32   
 With both the most radical women’s reformers and the most entrenched 
conservatives claiming that woman’s suffrage would lead to a host of more radical ends, 
the stage was nearly set for a concerted challenge to the religious morals and mores 
supported by law, but hidden in the shadows was an unsuspected bomb in the form of the 
newest and suddenly most prominent suffragist, Victoria Woodhull.  Woodhull had only 
recently arrived on the East Coast, having grown up in Ohio, married Canning Woodhull, 
and moved to California where she became a spiritualist.  By 1866 when she divorced 
Canning for his alcoholism, Victoria had become something of a celebrity on the West 
Coast, but relatively unknown in the East.  Looking for larger arenas to exercise her spirit 
mediumship, she moved back to Ohio where she became Cornelius Vanderbilt’s principal 
spiritual advisor (and possibly more).  He found her assistance so invaluable that he gave 
her a large cash retainer, which she used to open a stockbrokerage firm with her sister, 
together becoming the first two female stockbrokers on Wall Street.  To add to that fame, 
in 1871 she was elected the president of the American Association of Spiritualists and 
also publicly endorsed woman’s suffrage.  Apparently, Woodhull even developed the 
dominant Woman’s Suffrage strategy after the collapse of the Equal Rights Association.  
Called the New Departure, it sought to press for woman’s suffrage in the courts by 
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arguing that the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments had already laid the legal 
foundation for female suffrage.33
Woodhull’s entrance on the scene was momentous, because she became the 
catalyst in a five-year-long drama that both energized proponents of the moral 
establishment and threatened to derail the radical woman’s rights argument that women 
were free individuals that should have equal rights with men.  Almost as soon as she 
came into prominence rumors about a disreputable past began to surface.  Although the 
details were still vague, in the spring of 1871 Isabella Beecher Hooker, one of Catharine 
Beecher’s sisters and a leader in the NWSA, confronted Woodhull with a series of letters 
about her illicit past, and left copies of the letters for Stanton and Lucretia Mott’s sister, 
Martha Coffin Wright.  While rumors grew, Stanton rallied to Woodhull’s defense, even 
gently rebuking the aged Lucretia Mott with the explanation that it was a “great 
impertinence” to pry into Woodhull’s private affairs.  Unlike others in the NWSA, 
Stanton remained unconcerned about any past moral lapses, and instead saw in the furor a 
darker conspiracy.  The “sentimental, hypocritical, prating about purity,” she complained, 
was “one of man’s most effective engines, for our division, & subjugation.”34
Meanwhile, a more profound revelation was brewing.  Though the exact 
chronology is obscure, over the previous year an ecclesiastical melodrama had opened 
involving Henry Ward Beecher, another one of Lyman Beecher’s progeny, and two of 
Henry Beecher’s parishioners, Theodore Tilton, a prominent newspaper editor, and his 
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wife, Elizabeth Tilton.  Henry Ward Beecher was by 1870 the most famous preacher in 
the United States.  He had made his name through his vigorous support of abolitionism, 
including a speaking tour through England in 1863 to drum up support for the Union 
cause and several occasions in which he auctioned slaves to freedom from the pulpit of 
his church.   In confirmation of his unique prominence Abraham Lincoln tapped him to 
deliver the major address when the U.S. flag was raised again over Ft. Sumter toward the 
end of the Civil War.  Shortly after the Civil War at the 1866 Woman’s Rights 
Convention, the woman’s suffrage movement had gained Beecher’s personal 
endorsement, which cited women’s equal participation in public affairs as “God’s 
growing and least disclosed idea.”  He thought the central question in woman’s suffrage 
was, “Who has a right to construct and administer law?” and his question cut to the heart 
of the moral justification that religious partisans used to explain their cultural and legal 
authority.  Pointing to what he considered a natural development in which “the questions 
of politics are more and more moral questions,” Beecher looked to “these who God made 
to be peculiarly conservators of things moral and spiritual [women] to come forward and 
help us in that work.”  Theodore Tilton introduced him.  Before Beecher’s speech Tilton 
offered some good-natured ribbing about what he considered Beecher’s questionable 
orthodoxy and, after Beecher had handed his bible over to Tilton’s safekeeping while he 
spoke, the fact that Beecher’s bible contained a woman’s name (not his wife’s) on the 
inside cover.  Their good-natured back and forth took on a different coloration when 
rumors began circulating that Elizabeth Tilton and Henry Beecher had formed a closer 
friendship than was normally permitted outside of marriage.  The story was long and 
involved, and had been kept quiet by mutual agreement in order to protect everyone’s 
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reputation.  To insure accountability the papers documenting their agreement, including 
letters back and forth, apologies, admissions of guilt (though without specifics), and 
pledges of silence were entrusted to a disinterested third-party, Francis Moulton.35
About the time that rumors began circulating about Victoria Woodhull, rumors 
about the Beecher-Tilton affair emerged, possibly by way of Elizabeth Cady Stanton.  
Apparently upon learning of Elizabeth Tilton’s infidelities Theodore had rushed to 
Stanton’s house in distress, detailing his new knowledge.  In addition, Elizabeth Tilton 
later confessed the affair to Anthony, though Anthony remained quiet.  While the 
Beecher melodrama was unfolding in (partial) secret, Woodhull, who knew about the 
scandal, decided to confront her critics who had only been growing louder.  Word had 
gotten out that not only had her second marriage never been formally documented, the 
Woodhull abode now housed, along with Woodhull, her second husband, Colonel James 
Blood, her ex-husband, Canning Woodhull, and the anarchist and notorious free love 
advocate, Stephen Pearl Andrews.  To those charging the woman’s movement with moral 
anarchy, the appearance was extremely unseemly, and as she began to sink under the 
weight of public contempt she grasped the slender reed that rumors of the Beecher affair 
offered.  In early 1871, she began leveraging her knowledge to persuade Beecher to 
introduce her at that year’s Spiritualist Association meeting.  She later claimed that she 
was trying to get him to publicly proclaim his adherence to free love, but she may have 
                                                 
35 Stanton, Anthony, and Gage, History of Woman Suffrage, 2: 159 (first and second quotations), 161 (third 
quotations).  For the complete history of the Beecher-Tilton affair, see Richard Wightman Fox, Trials of 
Intimacy: Love and Loss in the Beecher-Tilton Scandal (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); 
Nicola Beisel, Imperiled Innocents: Anthony Comstock and Family Reproduction in Victorian America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 76-86; Altina Waller, Reverend Beecher and Mrs. Tilton: 
Sex and Class in Victorian America (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1982); Charles F. 
Marshall, ed., The True History of the Brooklyn Scandal (Philadelphia: National Publishing Company, 
1874). 
 122
been merely trying to forge a connection in the public mind between herself and Beecher.  
When Beecher refused, she had to find an alternate plan.36   
But as she steadied herself in the face of her critics, Woodhull inaugurated an 
explosive spectacle that proponents of the moral establishment could invoke when 
claiming that woman’s rights was already leading to moral dissolution, the break up of 
the family, and the general lowering of the tone of national life.  After Beecher declined 
to introduce her speech, Woodhull enlisted the help of Theodore Tilton, who introduced 
her before she gave what immediately became an infamous address, entitled “The 
Principles of Social Freedom.”  It was her public proclamation, in defiance of her critics, 
of her adherence to Free Love.  To a considerable extent, Woodhull’s argument reflected 
the anarchism of her houseguest, Stephen Pearl Andrews.  She saw self-government quite 
literally: all should be entrusted to govern themselves to act according to their own 
wishes in the pursuit of individual happiness.  Because individual sovereignty was the 
guiding principle of social freedom, the individual became the basic unit of government.  
Woodhull put forward a radically libertarian position that sounded very much like a gloss 
on Thomas Paine and John Locke.  She claimed that aggregates of individuals formed 
communities (not families), who enacted governments, in order to guard individual 
rights.  Because the individual was the basic unit of government, society must safeguard 
individual rights even when its members disliked what the individual was doing.37   
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Of course, Woodhull’s argument for the sovereignty of the individual had no 
greater consequence than the reevaluation of marriage.  Marriage law that was consistent 
with the idea of individual rights, she claimed, would recognize the marriage relation as a 
true contract, terminable under the same provisions governing other contracts.  The lack 
of freedom in the marriage relation became for Woodhull an archetype of a more general 
lack of freedom in society created by religious partisans.  Lack of marital freedom 
showed, she thought, the connection between religious, political, and social freedom.  
Although religious freedom existed to some extent, and political freedom operated in 
theory, in practice both were, in her estimation, severely limited by a “society-
despotism.”  True religious and political freedom would yield social freedom, she 
claimed, and social freedom was, in two words, Free Love.  In the face of numerous and 
repeated hisses from the crowd, Woodhull waxed prophetic at the coming future, 
claiming that the spiritualization of marriage was necessary for the transformation of all 
of society to accommodate the principles of social freedom.  The “spiritually constituted” 
family would herald “the most wonderful transformation of human society,” a 
transformation that was “even now at the very door.”  The result would be “a nobler 
manhood and a more glorified womanhood; as, indeed, the veritable gateway to a 
paradise regained.” Although Theodore Tilton’s presence at the convention kept her from 
announcing the Elizabeth Tilton-Henry Beecher affair, the material was controversial 
enough.38
 In fact, the effect of Woodhull’s speech was explosive.  Even prior to the 
convention, Isabella Beecher Hooker, Henry Ward Beecher’s sister, had expressed 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 3 (first quotation), 42 (second through fifth quotations).  Compare Woodhull’s argument to 
Andrews’s arguments in Stephen Pearl Andrews, Horace Greeley, and Henry James, Love, Marriage and 
Divorce and the Sovereignty of the Individual (1853; repr., New York: Source Book Press, 1972). 
 124
concern to Woodhull about Woodhull’s extravagant utterances.  In response, Woodhull 
adopted a messianic tone, explaining that she would not have chosen the cause for herself 
but could not resist her “mission.”  She possessed secret knowledge and could see “what 
is to come, though I cannot yet divulge it.”  But Woodhull did offer a glimmer of 
prophecy, proclaiming “the near approach of the grandest revelation the world has yet 
known, and for the part you shall play in it thousands will rise up and call you blessed.”  
If that did not sound ominous to Hooker, it should have.  After her social freedom speech, 
two of Beecher’s other sisters, Catharine Beecher and Harriet Beecher Stowe, the author 
of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, began attacking Woodhull in the pages of Henry Beecher’s 
journal, the Christian Union, while simultaneously working to undermine her support 
through their large network of influential friends.  By the end of 1871, Woodhull had 
concluded that persuasion would not bring Henry Beecher to her cause, and she resorted 
instead to blackmail.  Noting the efforts of his two sisters to “assail my character and 
purposes,” Woodhull warned Henry, “You doubtless know that it is in my power to strike 
back, and in ways more disastrous than anything that can come to me; but I do not desire 
to do this.”39   
 Woodhull’s already questionable reputation—made even more so after her 
speech—put the leaders of the NWSA in a quandary.  The public outcry against 
Woodhull seemed to place the status of their reform in jeopardy, and some began 
wondering if they might not temper their call for a social revolution.  It was a call echoed 
by Henry Ward Beecher, who was upset that his name had appeared in connection with 
an avowed free lover.  In response to a concerned letter from his sister Isabella, Henry 
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begged her not to make any stand in the coming year “except upon suffrage,” effectively 
truncating her reform message to its most conservative and rejecting the idea of 
individual rights with its apparent corollary claim of free love.  He also pleaded that 
though he could not explain why he would make the request, the most effective thing she 
could do for him was to maintain “silence and a silencing influence on all others.  A day 
may come for converse.  It is not now.  Living or dead, my dear sister Belle, love me, and 
do not talk about me or suffer others to in your presence.”  Others, meanwhile, began 
pulling away from Woodhull.  Susan B. Anthony, writing in her diary a month later, 
confessed that the day struck her as sad, because “[o]ur movement as such is so 
demoralized by the letting go the helm of ship to Woodhull—though we rescued it—it 
was as by a hair breadth escape.”40   
But Anthony may have spoken too soon, because two months later Woodhull was 
reaching a breaking point.  Writing again to Beecher, she explained, “The social fight 
against me . . . is becoming rather hotter than I can well endure longer, standing 
unsupported and alone as I have until now. . . . Now, I want your assistance.”  When 
Beecher made no reply, Woodhull moved forward with her plan.  In September 1872, she 
was re-elected president of the American Association of Spiritualists, and in her speech 
before the convention in Boston she unveiled her knowledge that the Reverend Henry 
Ward Beecher was a secret believer in the most advanced doctrines of free love, and had 
had an affair with any number of his parishioners, including Elizabeth Tilton, the wife of 
his close friend, Theodore.  When Beecher’s Boston allies suppressed most of her 
remarks in the newspapers following her speech, Woodhull reprinted her charges in her 
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own newspaper, Woodhull and Claflin’s Weekly.  She wanted, she explained, the article 
to “burst like a bomb-shell into the ranks of the moralistic social camp.  I am engaged in 
officering, and in some sense conducting, a social revolution on the marriage question.”  
While the world trembled on the brink of revolution with men and women hesitating to 
acknowledge their true convictions, she claimed that “organized hypocrisy has become 
the tone of our modern society.”   The Beecher affair was but the most prominent 
example, so although she normally honored the privacy of individual above all things, 
Woodhull explained that she had been driven to this step by the rampant hypocrisy of all 
social institutions, offering Beecher’s example not as the indictment of an individual, but 
of the social system.  She hoped that exposing a man of Beecher’s eminence would send 
an “inquisition through all the churches and what is termed conservative society,” and she 
looked at the Beecher revelation as “the crack of doom to our old and worn out, and false 
and hypocritical social institutions.”  Because the age was “pregnant with great events,” 
Woodhull confidently prophesied that after “the pious ejaculations of the sanctimonious 
shall have been expended,” everyone would see the hypocrisy of the age, and the social 
revolution would come.41  
Woodhull’s disclosure roiled the NWSA, not least because she had publicly 
named two prominent reformers, Paulina Wright Davis and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, as 
two of her sources.  As the situation rapidly careened out of any single person’s control, 
religious partisans began to intervene.  A month after she published her article, Anthony 
Comstock stepped into the fray and jailed both Woodhull and her sister on the charge of 
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obscenity (not libel) for publishing the Beecher issue of her magazine.  Comstock was the 
embodiment of Lyman Beecher’s vision, a young apostle of righteousness committed to 
using voluntary associations and the coercion of law to maintain the moral uprightness 
necessary for the sustenance of the nation.  In 1872 he sent a letter to the Young Men’s 
Christian Association (YMCA) warning of the “the hundreds of gambling hells, the 
defilement of evil reading, and the thousands of influences which threaten the morals of 
the young.”  After his letter caught the attention (and monetary support) of the 
industrialist Morris K. Jesup, a strong supporter of New York’s YMCA, Comstock 
founded the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice and transferred his new-found 
caché into a remarkably successful lobbying effort of the U.S. Congress.  The result, a 
mere year later, was the passage of the so-called Comstock Law of 1873, one of the most 
important tools of the late-nineteenth century moral establishment, which called for a five 
thousand dollar fine and up to five years in prison for distribution of what Comstock 
deemed obscene, lewd, or lascivious literature of any kind.  Comstock’s arrest of 
Woodhull was his first highly publicized vice reform effort and served to establish his 
authority when he lobbied Congress for passage of the Comstock Law the following year.  
He also seized Woodhull’s presses, so that no more magazines could be republished to 
meet the almost insatiable demand for the Beecher issue.  But Woodhull would not go 
away, and after her jail stay in January 1872, she delivered and subsequently published a 
lecture claiming that she had just emerged from “the American Bastile [sic], to which I 
was consigned by the cowardly servility of the age.”  With Woodhull further stoking 
press coverage of the affair, in March 1873 some of Beecher’s most prominent 
parishioners, acting independently of their pastor, decided to drop Tilton from the roll of 
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the Plymouth Church for what they assumed was his role in spreading libelous rumors 
about their minister.  To Tilton it seemed that he was being made a scapegoat, and their 
pact of secrecy began to crumble on all sides.42   
Before it was over, reputations would be sacrificed all around, and the moral 
establishment would emerge strengthened.  Following the Plymouth Church’s discipline 
of Theodore Tilton, the moderator New York and Brooklyn Congregational Association 
council convened to address the affair blamed “the infamous women who have started 
this scandal,” which certainly took in Woodhull and her sister, but possibly also Stanton, 
Anthony, and others.  Tilton responded to his discipline by complaining to the council (in 
an open letter published in papers around the nation) that Beecher or his agents had 
decided “to sacrifice my good name for the maintenance of his.”   Concluding that the 
pact had ended, Tilton included in his letter excerpts of several documents entrusted to 
Francis Moulton that put Beecher in a damning light.  Beecher responded to Tilton’s 
letter by calling for an investigation to be led by several members of his church.  
Although the outcome of the investigation was largely predetermined (because Beecher 
picked the members of the investigating committee), the process created a media scandal 
and daily spectacle, with newspapers around the nation carrying transcripts of each 
session.  In latter the half of 1874 the New York Times alone ran one hundred and five 
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stories about the Beecher-Tilton affair and editorialized on the subject thirty-seven times.  
Accusations of free love went in all directions.  Theodore Tilton, of course, portrayed 
Beecher and Elizabeth Tilton as free lovers.  Beecher portrayed Theodore as a free lover, 
whose numerous sexual conquests after what he called a “marked change in his religious 
and social views” he did not even bother to conceal from the members of his own 
household.  Elizabeth Tilton joined Beecher’s side, characterizing Theodore’s victim 
posture as “a lamentable satire upon the household where he himself, years before, laid 
the corner stone of Free Love, and desecrated its altars up to the time of my departure; so 
that the atmosphere was not only godless, but impure for my children.”43   
With religious partisans clamping down and Beecher’s church members 
defending their pastor’s morals, the radical thrust of the movement went into disarray.  
Beecher began distancing himself from all parties, and his criticism extended beyond 
Theodore Tilton to “one wing of the Female Suffrage party [that] had got hold of the 
story in a distorted and exaggerated form.”  The radical wing of the reform movement, 
Beecher claimed, sought to discredit by way of slander anyone who became noted as a 
reformer but resisted their revolutionary assertions.  He was not above slander himself as 
it turned out.  The Beecher team procured a former Tilton domestic servant to say that 
several female friends of Mr. Tilton, including Stanton, Anthony, Anna Dickinson, and, 
of course, Victoria Woodhull, were often at the Tilton house.  Woodhull had stayed 
several months in the house, and, as the servant explained, Mr. Tilton “seemed to be very 
fond of her; he was with her a great deal; he used to caress her and kiss her; he was very 
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much taken with her in every way.”   When the chair of the committee prompted her 
about the other women, she responded that Tilton was not much interested in other 
women, except Stanton and Anthony.   
Q. How was it then?   
A.  He seemed to think a great deal of Mrs. Stanton and Miss Anthony; I saw her 
sitting on his lap on one occasion when I was coming into the parlor, and she 
jumped up pretty quick. 
Q.  Miss Anthony?  
A.  Susan B. Anthony 
Q.  What was his conduct with Mrs. Stanton?   
A.  Well, I never saw him caressing her, but he used to be alone with her a great 
deal in his study; they used to play chess until two or three o’clock in the 
morning; frequently they were up until after the family had gone to bed—
quite late.”44
 
 With the woman’s movement suffering a great deal of tarnish, Woodhull 
continued her theatrics.  After emerging from jail, legally vindicated but socially crushed, 
she had resumed her newspaper coverage of the trial and published a tract entitled “Tried 
as By Fire; or, The True and The False, Socially,” which reiterated her resolve to conduct 
a “campaign against marriage.”  The entire incident had revealed to her just how much 
the United States needed social freedom.  As she saw it, after her revelation about 
Beecher, “the American Pope,” his allies, including “the United States authorities, urged 
on by the minions of the Church—the Y.M.C. Assassination Association—swooped 
down upon me and carried me off to jail, not for libel on the Pope, but for obscenity.”  
Waiting in jail, she trusted that the public’s moral outrage would secure her release.  
Sadly, she realized in the aftermath, “Beecher was bigger than a free press—of more 
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consequence than free speech.  His danger cowed the whole country into silence; and the 
people sneaked after the trail of the popular preacher, in abject submission.”45
 After another year of trial and testimony, this time in a New York Court when 
Theodore Tilton filed a suit against Beecher for criminal conversation with his wife, 
Beecher’s vindication was complete as a hung jury allowed him to go free.  When 
Elizabeth Tilton abruptly changed her story (for a third time), claiming that she had in 
fact had an affair with Beecher, she was promptly excommunicated from the Plymouth 
Church, socially ostracized by everyone for the remainder of her life, and died lonely and 
blind in her daughter’s Brooklyn apartment in 1897.  Theodore Tilton, prevented from 
finding journalistic work by the numerous influential members of the Plymouth Church, 
emigrated to Paris where he lived in poverty, wrote poetry, and played chess until his 
death in 1907.  Woodhull did not last more than two years after the trial’s end.  In 1877 
when Cornelius Vanderbilt died, some of his squabbling heirs fretted that their father’s 
consultation with spirit mediums might be grounds to challenge his sanity (and, therefore, 
the will) and paid Woodhull to leave the country.  Because her stockbrokerage firm had 
been closed during her jail stay—and her life was increasingly beset with financial strain 
and social ostracism—she took the money and her daughter to England, where at one of 
her speeches on free love she met her very wealthy future husband (her third), having 
discarded her previous when she left the United States.46
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Religious Standards and the Tightening of Family Law 
 As much as the Beecher-Tilton affair provided spectacular entertainment, it was 
more than just spectacle, because it served as a synecdoche for what religious 
conservatives regarded as the general atomization and cultural disintegration that 
threatened the American family in the wake of the woman’s rights movement.  E.L. 
Godkin, editor of the conservative weekly The Nation, editorialized that the scandal was 
“a symptomatic phenomenon. . . illustrative of the moral condition of American society 
generally.”  The principal figures in the scandal seemed to Godkin like people “who are 
living, not more majorum [according to the morals of the majority] . . . but like half-
civilized people who have got hold of a code which they do not understand.”  Godkin 
extended the arena of culpability to that “large body of persons” who, being supremely 
confident in their own development, as he sarcastically construed it, “tackle all the 
problems of the day—men’s, women’s, and children’s rights and duties, marriage, 
education, suffrage, life, death, and immortality—with supreme indifference to what 
anybody else things or has ever thought.”  Rather than a new age, Godkin claimed that 
these reformers heralded “a kind of mental and moral chaos, in which many of the 
fundamental rules of living. . . seem in imminent risk of disappearing totally.”47
 Others echoed Godkin’s criticism, as a spate of religious leaders emerged in the 
latter half of the 1870s in opposition to woman’s rights, an opposition that continued 
through the end of the century.  Augustus H. Strong, the Baptist president of Rochester 
Theological Seminary, responded with a sermon, broadly disseminated, denouncing 
woman’s rights as against the creation of God, whose subordination of woman was the 
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result of Eve’s role in the Fall.  Several years later, Mark Hopkins, president of Williams 
College and widely read ethicist, rehearsed the doctrine of separate spheres and the 
headship of man in order to publicly reject woman’s suffrage in his new ethics text, 
which was the work of choice in many college curricula.  Likewise, Lyman Abbott, who 
assumed Henry Ward Beecher’s pulpit and the editorship of his magazine after Beecher’s 
death in 1887, criticized the “revived paganism which bases marriage on a civil contract, 
and makes it a form of partnership” as just as noxious as “that other analogous notion that 
government is founded on a ‘social contract.’”   Explaining that God had created certain 
structures of authority for both government and the family, he averred, “The normal, the 
divine order, is the order in which the husband is the head of the household, and the 
household is an autocracy.”  The familial disarray and the messy interpersonal 
relationships of the Beecher-Tilton affair displayed, according to proponents of the moral 
establishment, what happened when the constraints of law and moral pressure were 
removed.48
To combat that supposed atomization, beginning in the early 1870s judicial 
writers began to react, recodifying the common law of marriage, divorce, and domestic 
relations in light of the married women’s property acts that had been passed in the two 
decades prior.  The two most important post-property-act treatise writers were James 
Schouler and Joel Prentiss Bishop, and together they held enormous power to refashion 
jurisprudence and to strengthen the moral establishment.  So great was their influence 
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that in the judicial confusion subsequent to the property acts’ passage, many jurists 
decided cases with the phrase “according to Bishop. . .” or “according to Schouler. . .”  
But both were uniformly hostile to the property act provisions.  Schouler complained that 
the current state of family law was in complete disarray, because the passage of women’s 
property acts had established two separate legal systems, a common law scheme and a 
civil law scheme.  The common law scheme began with the assumption of unity in 
marriage so that the wife’s legal existence was suspended in the marriage state.  Though 
he admitted that she sacrificed her property interests and was placed almost entirely in 
her husband’s keeping, she also received or was entitled to his protection and support, in 
Schouler’s estimation, which was enforceable by law and insured the general unity of 
family life.  By contrast, the civil law scheme paid little attention to the unity of the pair, 
and instead acknowledged the personal independence and individuality of husband and 
wife, especially in their property rights.  To Schouler the civil law scheme risked the very 
atomization and cultural dissolution that some read in the Beecher-Tilton affair.  He 
warned that if the legislators continue to reinforce women’s separate rights, the 
legislation would likely “weaken the ties of marriage, by forcing both sexes into an 
unnatural antagonism; teaching them to be independent of one another.”  Such a 
condition was “unnatural” not because it betrayed the human purposes of marriage but 
because “God’s law points to family and the mutual intercourse of man and woman as 
among the strongest safeguards of human happiness.”49   
To strengthen the old common law scheme that was so important to the moral 
establishment, both Schouler and Bishop offered a set of interpretative principles that 
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read the laws in their narrowest possible construction, thereby limiting their impact.  
Schouler, for example, acknowledged that woman’s property rights were necessary 
because of past instances of abuse, but, because women’s property rights were “contrary 
to rule,” in cases of a dispute a married woman had to “rebut the presumption that 
whatever she acquires vests in the husband, and to establish a distinct ownership.”  
Unless the woman specifically established clear and distinct ownership of property from 
the outset, the presumption remained that a woman’s property vested in the husband upon 
marriage, and in that case the old common law rules remained in place.  Schouler’s 
limitation of the property law provisions became his repeated intellectual move, limiting 
the statutory intervention in order to claim that the rest of the common law stipulations of 
coverture continued in place as before.50   
Bishop likewise began by emphasizing “how little of the old law has become 
obsolete among us,” but unlike Schouler he took the opportunity to elaborate what he 
considered “a new branch of the law” that extracted “the true doctrine under the statutes . 
. .  from the application of the old and familiar principles of the law to them.”  
Elaborating a new branch of law allowed him to reformulate the doctrine that marriage 
was a civil contract, an idea that had always caused discomfort to jurists and had allowed 
Woodhull and Stanton the rhetorical space to declare that if it was a contract, it ought to 
be dissolvable on the consent of both parties.  Bishop agreed that marriage originated in a 
contract, but it was a contract to marry, more commonly called an engagement, that was 
completed or performed upon marriage.  Once he located the contract in the engagement, 
Bishop was able to claim that “at marriage. . . the contract ceases.”  Instead of a contract, 
Bishop proclaimed that marriage was a “civil status.”  Because it was a civil status, it 
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could not be dissolved at the whim to the parties, and following a circular logic, “because 
the parties cannot mutually dissolve it,” marriage could not be a civil contract.51   
Bishop also reformulated the rules governing divorce in an effort to ensure that 
the exits were more closely guarded.  Because marriage was a foundational component in 
the perpetuation of a society, Bishop explained, the key point in divorce law was to 
remember that the public was the “third party” in a divorce suit, and that its interests 
needed to be protected on par with, or even above, those of the husband and wife.  One 
way this could be done, Bishop noted, was already taking place in Kentucky, Indiana and 
“perhaps one or two other states” where it was the “duty of the public prosecuting officer 
to oppose all suits for divorce.”  In the states that did not have a public prosecutor to 
insure the interests of the public by opposing all divorce claims, the Court itself was to 
exercise “a constant watchfulness over the public interests in the cause.”  Whatever the 
mechanism, before a judge could grant a divorce the court needed to establish that the 
marriage did more harm than good to the community, thereby “satisfying the conscience 
of the court.”  Bishop’s formulations were phenomenally successful, as the legal historian 
Michael Grossberg has pointed out, in part because of his willingness to spell out in 
exhaustive detail a judicial process whereby judges could maintain the provisions of the 
common law by fending off or limiting the effectiveness of statutory interventions that 
granted women a minimum level of autonomy.52   
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While jurists buttressed the common law provisions of the moral establishment, 
alarmed legislators stepped back from the implicitly egalitarian impulse that underwrote 
the married woman’s property acts and sought to reinforce prescribed social roles in the 
family and limit the burgeoning divorce rate.  Leading the charge was Theodore 
Woolsey, the past-president of Yale and leading member of another evangelical voluntary 
organization, the Evangelical Alliance.  In 1868, Woolsey sounded the initial alarm with 
his book, Divorce and Divorce Legislation, which claimed very simply, “the modern 
divorce legislation of nearly all Protestant countries is unchristian.”  In his preface, he 
noted all Christian denominations seemingly had taken a firm stand and were displaying 
an increasing resolve “to do what can be done in purifying and Christianizing the law of 
divorce in this part of the Union.”  Woolsey described his work as an effort to organize 
what was to be known about marriage and divorce laws so that denominations and 
voluntary associations could act concertedly to mitigate the number of divorces in the 
United States.  The reason divorce so concerned him was that marriage “as the origin of 
the family and of organized society,” naturally bore “close relations to religion, morality, 
and law.”   The history of nations themselves reinforced this ordering, in Woolsey’s 
estimation, which required the strengthening of the moral establishment in opposition to 
the claim’s of woman’s rights advocates.  Families preceded nations, in Woolsey’s 
political theory, and government arose out of the patriarchal relations of extended 
families.  Woolsey’s thought again elaborated the essential rationale of the moral 
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establishment.  From families, to clans, to nations, individuals were defined by their 
adherence to larger collectives and rights were subsumed to those larger collectives. 53
Following the Beecher-Tilton affair, in 1881 Woolsey organized the New 
England Divorce Reform League, which included many prominent New Englanders on 
its rolls, in order to further coordinate the lobbying efforts of the religious denominations.  
In 1885, the League reorganized itself as the National Divorce Reform League (NDRL), 
and petitioned the United States Congress for a federal study of marriage and divorce 
laws, and the rising divorce rate.  The status of the signatories—who in addition to 
Woolsey included Noah Porter, the then-current president of Yale, Samuel W. Dike, the 
nation’s leading divorce statistician, Elisha Mulford, minister and professor at Episcopal 
Theological School in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Charles Comfort Tiffany, a prominent 
Baltimore clergyman, and Theodore William Dwight, professor of law at Columbia Law 
School and grandson of Yale’s former president Timothy Dwight—caught the attention 
of Congress.  The resulting “Bill Providing for the Collection of Statistics Touching 
Marriage and Divorce” led to a comprehensive statistical survey published two years later 
under the auspices of the U.S. Secretary of Labor, Carroll Wright.  The resulting report 
detailed what, to moral establishmentarians, seemed a disturbing trend.  Wright found 
that the majority of the states retained the language of “civil contract” in their laws, rather 
than Bishop’s “more modern, and apparently more accurate” view of marriage as a civil 
status.  At the same time, divorces had increased every year, growing nearly three-fold in 
absolute numbers from 1867 to 1886.54
                                                 
53 Theodore D. Woolsey, Divorce and Divorce Legislation, 2nd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1882), iii (second quotation), 251 (third and fourth quotations), 262 (first quotation). 
 
 139
The problem facing the National Divorce Reform League was that marriage could 
not be regulated on a federal level, so initially partisans worked on a state-by-state basis.  
They did have some success, but what emerged out of the struggle was what James 
Huffman, quoting Max Rubenstein, has called the “dual law of divorce,” or the law of the 
books and the law of action.  Earlier in the century both Indiana (led by Robert Dale 
Owen as a state congressman) and Maine had enacted liberalized divorce laws that 
included judicial discretion as one of the grounds for divorce.  In principle if a judge were 
so inclined, he could allow a divorce simply because the parties were unhappy, a 
provision that alarmed moral establishmentarians.  Because the full faith and credit clause 
of the U.S. Constitution required states to acknowledge the “public acts, records, and 
judicial proceedings” of every other state, the presence of states with liberalized divorce 
laws led to the so-called migratory divorce.  Indiana and Maine became divorce havens, 
to which people moved, established residence, received their divorce, and then moved 
back to their stricter state.  The continued pressure of other states ultimately doomed the 
liberalized divorce laws of Maine and Indiana, so that before the century was up both had 
rolled back their divorce laws.  But it was not an ultimate victory.  When Indiana and 
Maine modified their laws, others stepped in, as first the Dakotas, and then Nevada 
became the divorce havens of choice.  The resulting compromise created a way for 
couples that really wanted a divorce to get one, but the process was expensive and time 
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consuming, which in the minds of religious partisans at least limited the potential for 
abuse.55
But the compromise between the law of books and the law of action never really 
satisfied proponents of the moral establishment, and to combat the presence of divorce 
havens the National Divorce Reform League began working for a federal amendment that 
would allow the Congress to regulate marriage, in order to establish uniform grounds for 
divorce.  Although conservatives failed to garner the necessary support (even after 
Theodore Roosevelt endorsed their cause), it likely would have not have had the intended 
effect.  The contraction of liberalized divorce laws ran up against the real desire of many 
couples for a divorce, and whole industries rose up to procure the (often fabricated) 
evidence of adultery or cruelty required in order to meet the established grounds for 
divorce in the strictest states.  Collusion between the divorcing parties often included the 
courts, which either could not or would not challenge the obvious fraud that litigants 
perpetuated to make their case.  The system created, as the legal scholar Lawrence 
Friedman has pointed out, “a regime of massive lying and deceit. . . . In almost every 
state, perjury or something close to it was a way of life in divorce court.”  In other words, 
in many important respects the efforts of religious partisans to strengthen the moral 
establishment verified Woodhull’s claim that “an organized hypocrisy” had become the 
norm in late-nineteenth century American society.  But organized hypocrisy or not, 
Stanton and Woodhull’s attempts to liberalize divorce law had stalled.  The resulting 
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stand-off between religious partisans like Woolsey and the desire of individuals to get out 
of unhappy marriages remained until the 1970s.56   
Woman’s Rights and Women’s Moral Responsibility 
Faced with the hostile reactions of jurists, legislators, and religious lobbyists, the 
leaders of the woman’s movement confronted the old dilemma of whether it ought to 
oppose the moral establishment in order to advance their agenda or whether the moral 
establishment itself provided the fundamental reason for women’s enlarged public role.  
The dilemma was made more acute by the abrupt failure, just as the Beecher affair was 
coming to its sad conclusion, of the New Departure strategy, which looked to federal 
legal challenges to argue for suffrage.  In 1875 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously 
rejected the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment sustained woman’s suffrage, with the 
simple statement, “The Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of 
suffrage upon anyone.”  With Schouler and Bishop insuring that women’s rights in 
marriage hewed to common law rules that legally dissolved the public personae of the 
wife into her husband, and with legislators tightening the permissible reasons for divorce, 
the High Court now declared that the national citizenship promised in the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not offer women access to the political process that it gave to white 
males.  Within that context the woman’s movement localized its claim of equal rights to 
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suffrage alone, and marginalized critics like Stanton that sought to reject claims of the 
moral establishment altogether.57
 It looked initially as if it could go the other way.  Stanton emerged from the 
Beecher-Tilton affair even more radicalized.  Taking up Woodhull’s argument that social 
freedom required a revolution in the social system, she sought to incorporate woman’s 
rights into the broader world of freethought in an effort to expunge the role of religion 
from the nation’s law and politics in order to prepare the way for the emancipation of 
women.  In a letter to Francis Abbot, a leader in the free religion movement and the 
editor of the freethought publication, the Index, Stanton claimed that because so many 
women were “held in bondage to-day by the complete perversion of the religious element 
in her being,” there was not an “Orthodox” woman on their platform.  To get the 
woman’s rights movement “out of the ruts,” Stanton explained that she thought they 
needed to identify “with the struggle you and a few others are now making for free 
religion, to avert the danger to our schools, our Constitution, in fact to freedom in all 
directions.”  She also began to draw closer to Robert Ingersoll, the late-nineteenth 
century’s most (in)famous agnostic who toured the nation giving polemical lectures about 
the role of religion in national life.  While planning for the 1877 Convention in 
Washington, Stanton wrote to Isabella Beecher Hooker that she wanted to find someone 
to show “how degraded woman has been under all forms of religion,” and suggested 
Ingersoll be tapped to make the argument.  Although he did not attend the convention, he 
had included as part of his rhetorical arsenal a speech entitled “Liberty of Man, Woman, 
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and Child,” which linked the subjection of women with the reign of the church, and the 
improper connection between church and state in laws governing women.58  
 Stanton seemed to have concluded that only by breaking the authority of 
Christianity in public life could women be freed from their legally prescribed obligation 
to the family and stand as individuals in the eyes of the law and in the political process.  
She did have some success in positioning woman’s rights in opposition to the role of 
religion in public life.  The high point came in 1878, three years after the end of the 
Beecher-Tilton affair, at the movement’s Thirtieth Anniversary Celebration in Rochester, 
New York.  Serving on the committee for resolutions that year were an array of Stanton 
allies: Matilda Gage, Lucy Colman, and Amy Post, all freethinkers who agreed with 
Stanton’s claims that the improper union between church and state had created a regime 
of laws that insured women’s subordination.  Among the resolutions they proposed, three 
ignited fierce debate because they singled out the Christian church as uniquely 
responsible for the degradation of woman, having perverted her religious nature in order 
to stunt her individual development and keep her in subjection through “priestcraft and 
superstition.” Amid the many objectors was Susan B. Anthony, who tried to strike the 
earlier rhetorical pose of Lucretia Mott by claiming that debates about the Bible were 
wastes of time.  Anthony had been reticent during the entire course of Beecher-Tilton 
scandal, instead pressing forward a plan for voting rights by introducing her own 
constitutional challenge to women’s exclusion and serving a jail sentence after trying to 
vote herself.  Following the debacle of Woodhull’s provocations, she turned shrewd and 
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pragmatic, apparently concluding that the strength of the moral establishment was too 
great to resist and required a more intense pursuit of singular aims by creating coalitions 
in support of specific issues.  As she complained to Isabella Beecher Hooker, a frequent 
go-between during the entire Beecher-Tilton affair, “Has Mrs Stanton come to that, that 
she would ask nothing of the tyrants but just what she expects them to grant?”  The 
inability to think strategically and to recognize stark political realities, Anthony 
maintained, was detrimental to the movement as a whole.   “But if the Women’s Rights 
women were only alive to the one work of assertion & assumption of the Citizens right to 
vote,” Anthony wrote, “we should soon walk into the kingdom en masse.”  Anthony’s 
pragmatic turn aligned her, in opposition to Stanton, with the religious proponents for 
woman’s rights who sought the right to vote in order to increase the moral and religious 
tone of public life.59  
But in 1878 Stanton and her allies still possessed enough rhetorical and 
organizational strength, so the resolutions passed over conservative and pragmatic 
objections.  Stanton then used the resolutions in a letter to Francis Abbot, published in the 
Index, to assuage the concerns of some in the freethought movement who worried that 
because women were often more religious than men, giving women the vote might 
further increase the role of religion in American public life.  She explained, “I think our 
liberal friends will find those touching on the religious element of woman’s nature 
sufficiently broad to assure them that these women, armed with ballots, will not prove the 
dangerous element so many fear on the side of priestcraft and superstition.”  In response, 
Abbot, who had organized so-called Liberal Leagues around the country as part of his 
                                                 
59 “Third Decade Celebration at Rochester, New York,” in Stanton and Anthony, Selected Papers, 3:386-
399, first quotation on p. 393; Anthony to Isabella Beecher Hooker, July 14, 1873, in Stanton and Anthony, 
Selected Papers, 2:619 (second through fourth quotations). Emphasis in original. 
 145
effort to complete the separation of church and state, called upon Stanton to give 
speeches jointly sponsored by the Liberal League and NWSA, which she happily 
accepted.60
But the breaks within the movement were beginning to show as the proponents of 
the moral establishment began to reassert their power both in law and in the woman’s 
movement itself.  Many liberal leagues also offered to organize Anthony’s lectures, but 
she was markedly less enthusiastic, noting that such sponsorship deterred “the 
religionists.”  Though Stanton had won a minor battle, she was to lose the war, and 
Anthony’s response revealed the turning tide in the movement.  The Thirtieth 
Anniversary Resolutions were the last ones that Stanton was able to pass, and just before 
the passage of those resolutions, Anthony read a letter from Wendell Phillips that would, 
as it turned out, perfectly express the new agenda.  “If I might presume to advise,” he 
counseled, “close up the ranks and write on our flag only one claim—the ballot.”61   
Because Anthony agreed with Phillips in her desire to emphasize suffrage as the 
singular goal of woman’s rights, Anthony and her faction increasingly saw Stanton’s 
radical claim that woman’s rights entailed the rejection of the role of religion in 
American public life as a threat to the exclusive suffrage aim. Perhaps sensing the tide, 
Stanton began withdrawing from NWSA conventions, although Anthony did try to keep 
her involved.  In 1880, Stanton warned Anthony not to let Stanton’s name come up for 
consideration in NWSA officer selection, “as I positively decline.  My work in 
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conventions is [a]t an end; they are distasteful to me.”  But she did not retire completely 
from the movement.  In 1881, Stanton, Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage published the 
first of what they originally conceived as a three-volume series entitled, The History of 
Woman Suffrage.  It represented Stanton’s attempt to influence the current direction of 
the movement by narrating its past.  The text bore the unmistakable mark of Stanton’s 
hand, often drawing lessons from past battles with the church to explain the error of 
truncating the reform effort.  In Stanton’s evaluation, that response simply capitulated to 
forces they had once overcome, and she described the early battles in the 1840s as a 
contest with the church, who “took alarm, knowing that with the freedom and education 
acquired in becoming a component part of the Government, woman would not only 
outgrow the power of the priesthood, and religious superstitions, but would also invade 
the pulpit.”  Although she acknowledged that in the past “the fear of a social revolution 
thus complicated the discussion,” she predicted that women, armed with the ballot, would 
“interpret the Bible anew from her own stand-point, and claim an equal voice in all 
ecclesiastical councils.”  The book began with a portrait of Frances Wright on the 
frontispiece, visually making her critique of the religious influence in public life the font 
of the woman’s movement.   Perhaps most provocatively, the authors included an essay 
by Gage, entitled “Women, Church, and State,” that continued Stanton’s argument that 
the Christian religion was historically responsible for female subordination and that the 
improper connection of church and state in the United States continued the degradation.62
  But such sentiments were less and less characteristic of the woman’s movement 
of the 1880s, and Anthony and her lieutenants increasingly stultified Stanton’s supporters 
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at the conventions.  At the 1885 National Suffrage Convention, Clara Colby, a close 
Stanton ally, introduced two resolutions that called for a withdrawal of support from any 
organization that upheld the subordination of woman, calling in particular upon the 
Christian church and ministry to begin teaching that man and woman were both created 
equally in the image of God, with joint dominion over the world “but none over each 
other.”  The introduction of the resolutions created a vigorous discussion that went into 
the next day, with Stanton arguing that because every form of religion in the long history 
of the world had degraded women, it was an imperative component of the woman’s rights 
program.  Anthony took the opposite side, agreeing that everyone wanted “woman’s 
perfect equality—in the Home, the Church, and the State,” but she objected to Colby’s 
resolutions, because wrangling over interpretations of the bible would “be anything but 
profitable.”  It was the same divide that had existed in 1878 (and, in fact, the same one 
that existed at the 1860 Convention with Anthony on Stanton’s side), but the terrain had 
changed in the interim with the Stanton faction losing its power.  As a result of 
Anthony’s “determined efforts,” in the words of the fourth volume of the History of 
Woman Suffrage (which Anthony co-wrote with Ida Hustead Harper after Stanton’s 
death), the 1885 Convention declined to endorse the resolutions.  At the following year’s 
convention Anthony read a letter from Stanton, who was once again not in attendance, 
essentially reintroducing the contested resolutions.  Her letter created another round of 
argument, which again carried into the next day, with the result that “Anthony read the 
letter without resolution.”63   
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Stanton was about to force the issue.  Three years earlier at the 1888 International 
Council for Women in Washington D.C., she had decided that it was time to move 
forward with a commentary on the Bible to expose the nefarious effect of Christianity on 
women.  After the 1890 merger between the NWSA and the AWSA, which was filled 
with religious partisans such as the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union  president, 
Frances Willard, Stanton withdrew even more, instead focusing her energy on what 
would become her Woman’s Bible, published in two parts in 1895 and 1898.  Stanton’s 
intention was to expose the patriarchy that ran throughout the Bible, in order to limit its 
influence and undercut the argument of evangelical suffragists such as Frances Willard.  
The book was (and remains) a remarkable document, part critical commentary, part 
cranky tirade.  It was not, in spite of its title, a new version of the Bible, but a selection of 
passages that touched upon women, with commentary from a selected group of women 
that made up the so-called Revising Committee.  Her strategy was, in part, to point out 
the Biblical contradictions affecting women, most fundamentally the two different 
creation stories in the first two chapters of Genesis.  In the first, man and woman were 
created at the same moment, equally in the image of God, and jointly given dominion 
over all the earth.  In the second, woman was created, in Stanton’s words, as “a mere 
afterthought.  The world [was] in good running order without her.  The only reason for 
her advent being the solitude of man.”64   
Taken as a whole, the Woman’s Bible sought to reject the concept of women’s 
moral authority and their responsibility for perpetuating society’s moral norms.  But it 
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possessed a certain amount of multivocality, with religious establishmentarians included 
on the committee in order to help Stanton make her point more forcefully.  As Stanton’s 
critical edge became clearer, some members of the Revising Committee grew concerned 
that her tone did not more reverently acknowledge the “Word of God.”  Recording the 
controversy in the pages of the Woman’s Bible itself, her response was unequivocal.  
Stanton asked, “Does anyone at this stage of civilization think the Bible was written by 
the finger of God, that the Old and New Testaments emanated from the highest divine 
thought in the universe?”  She pointed out the extended process of mediation, in which 
the Bible was written over a long period of time by numerous people, edited by forgotten 
editors, copied by forgotten scribes, translated by committee, published in multiple 
forms, and subject to multiple commentaries, all of which demonstrated that the Bible 
was an ongoing conversation, not the ossified and complete version of truth.  Stanton 
offered her commentary on the Bible as part of that conversation, not because she viewed 
it authoritatively but because others did.   She wanted to divest it of authority in order 
release its hold on both the popular mind and the partisans within the woman’s 
movement.65  
 The resulting furor upon publication went partially according to Stanton’s plan.  
She had both expected and counted upon criticism from religious conservatives.  Their 
criticism resulted in publicity, and publicity generated curiosity, and curiosity generated 
sales, with the paradoxical result, as she wryly observed, “bigots promote the sale.”  Once 
it was published everyone understood that the Bible was largely Stanton’s product, and 
ignoring her protestations that it was the result of a committee, attacked the Woman’s 
Bible as the work of a pernicious mind, a heretical sensibility, and the logical outcome of 
                                                 
65 Stanton, The Woman's Bible, part I, p. 61 (all quotations).  
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the woman’s rights movement.  Because it was largely her product, she had to defend it 
herself, which she did with gusto.  When a clergyman claimed that the Woman’s Bible 
was “the work of women, and the devil,” Stanton retorted, “This is a grave mistake.  His 
Satanic Majesty was not invited to join the Revising Committee, which consists of 
women alone.  Moreover, he has been so busy of late years attending Synods, General 
Assemblies and Conferences, to prevent the recognition of women delegates, that he has 
had no time to study the languages and ‘higher criticism.’”66
 What Stanton did not expect was censure from her own organization.  The furor 
over Stanton’s work worried the leaders of National-American Woman Suffrage 
Association, the new association created by the 1890 merger of the NWSA and the 
AWSA.  NWSA delegates had formerly tolerated Stanton’s pronouncements, robbed of 
official endorsement, out of respect for her place in their movement’s past.   But when 
Stanton’s Bible was published it was immediately connected with the woman’s 
movement in religious denunciation and in the public mind, and NAWSA leaders worried 
that their movement was falling into disrepute.  It did not help that Stanton had used the 
Woman’s Bible to address her opponents, calling their reluctance to provoke religious 
opposition “but another word for cowardice.”  Woman’s complete emancipation could 
not occur, Stanton maintained, “without the broadest discussion of all the questions 
involving in her present degradation. . . . For so far-reaching and momentous a reform as 
her complete independence, an entire revolution in all existing institutions is 
inevitable.”67   
                                                 
66 On the general response to the Woman’s Bible, see Kern, Mrs. Stanton's Bible, 172-222, first quote on 
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But the National-American Woman’s Suffrage Association was not looking for a 
revolution, especially not one that rejected the role of Christianity in American life, and 
the following convention would show just how out of step Stanton had become.  As the 
1896 Convention opened, someone whispered to Anthony, after she had started speaking, 
that the meeting had not been opened with prayer.  Diffident to her young lieutenants, 
Anthony called upon Anna Howard Shaw, a religious conservative who would be one of 
the movement’s future leaders, to offer an invocation.  Perhaps missing the omen, 
Anthony offered another.  After the prayer she praised Anna Shaw and Carrie Chapman 
Catt, who would succeed her as president, and noted her delight in seeing “these girls 
develop and outdo their elders.”  With Anthony apparently oblivious, the Convention 
buzzed on the floor with the controversy, which exploded into the open after Rachel 
Foster Avery read an annual report containing the resolution subsequently known as the 
Bible Resolution, which disclaimed any “official connection with the so-called 
‘Woman’s Bible.’”  It was widely, and correctly, viewed as a stinging rebuke to Stanton.  
Once Avery read the resolution, the public jockeying began, with Anthony’s own 
lieutenants aligned in favor of its passage.  Anthony herself maintained a conspicuous 
silence for most of the debate, which took several days.  Finally, after prompting by 
Stanton’s supporters, she rose from her chair to come to her friend’s defense, belatedly 
invoking the principles of religious freedom that had long been a central tenet of the 
woman’s movement.  “I shall be pained beyond expression if the delegates here are so 
narrow and illiberal as to adopt this resolution,” Anthony exclaimed, beseeching the 
convention not to embark on a path that stank of “censorship” and “inquisition.”  
Anthony pled for “religious liberty” as a core principle that they ought to follow, and 
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tried to show the full magnitude of their act.  Notwithstanding Anthony’s impassioned 
argument, the resolution passed 53 to 41, and the National-American Woman’s Suffrage 
Association censured its honorary president.68
    Stanton, of course, was personally wounded, but the censure vote only solidified 
what had already occurred over the last decade—the contraction of the woman’s 
movement to the acquisition of suffrage and the disavowal of any radical revisioning of 
religious power in public life or in the fundamental institutions of society.  Stanton’s 
rejection of religious authority became politically anathema to pragmatists like Anthony 
who, whatever their personal preferences, looked to the continued hold of the moral 
establishment as the strongest justification of female entrance into public life.  That 
decision is very telling about the establishment’s ongoing strength at the end of the 
nineteenth century.  Pragmatists ultimately joined religious partisans in yoking woman’s 
rights to their avowed goal of strengthening moral prescriptions in national life.  The host 
of resolutions concerning Sabbath-breaking, temperance, and, in Frances Willard’s 
phrase, “home protection” that would emerge from later conventions demonstrated the 
rejection of the individual rights philosophy that Stanton had advocated in favor of the 
communal social ideals of the moral establishment.  Women were to act as ciphers of a 
publicly approved morality in their capacity as stewards of the home, and although the 
projection of that responsibility onto the world at large would require a greater public 
role, it entailed only an extension and intensification of the rationale for the moral 
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establishment, not the fundamental challenge that Frances Wright, Victoria Woodhull, 
and Stanton had offered.69    
In trying to advance her political philosophy, Stanton had to criticize religious 
authority, because the legal recognition of the rights of woman as an individual and as 
citizen could not occur without the modification or rejection of civil law that was, in 
Schouler and many others’ estimation, girded by “God’s law.”  But during Stanton’s 
lifetime that challenge would not succeed.  Instead, the same year that Stanton published 
the second volume of her Woman’s Bible, she republished a speech, given originally 
before the U. S. Senate Committee on Woman’s Suffrage in 1892, called “The Solitude 
of Self.”  It was her greatest rhetorical performance and captured perfectly both her life’s 
argument and her position at the end of life.  Rather than the passive submission to 
authority, women needed every opportunity to be fitted for independent action, she 
argued, because each woman constituted a unique human soul and bore the experience, 
common to all, of “the immeasurable solitude of self.”  Each comes into the world alone, 
unlike any that had come before, and each leaves the world “alone under circumstances 
peculiar to ourself.”  Because “[n]o mortal has ever been [and] no mortal ever will be like 
the soul just launched on the sea of life,” Stanton pled for fullest possibilities of 
individual development, including the full autonomy and individual maturity of women.  
That individual maturation was necessary because in all the great moments of life, men 
could not protect women.  Taking the unquestionable womanly act to prove her point, in 
each childbirth women went alone “to the gates of death” where “[n]o one can share her 
fears, no one can mitigate her pains.”  Even when the birth was successful, a time would 
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come when women faced death as individuals, just as men, and the Angel of Death, who 
“makes no royal pathway” for women, would usher them beyond life’s gates.  In that 
moment of death, each soul became an individual, and whether society acknowledged it 
or not “[i]n that solemn solitude of self, that links us with the immeasurable and the 
eternal, each soul lives alone forever.”  Given the surpassing solemnity of each individual 
soul, Stanton wondered, “Who, I ask you, can take, dare take, on himself the rights, the 
duties, the responsibilities of another human soul?”70   
For all its poetry and pathos, Stanton’s speech merely begged the question that lay 
at the heart of the debate.  If God had decreed a sphere of action for women as the moral 
arbiters of the nation’s destiny, then unless Stanton could call into question that divine 
decree, all of Stanton’s other arguments were for naught.  The work of the woman’s 
movement in the nineteenth century did significantly expand the role of women in public 
life.  Stanton’s appearance before the Senate committee, without the apocalyptic 
denunciations that greeted the Grimkés, represented a real advance over the preceding 
sixty years.  Yet the emancipation of women, particularly when the appeal to rights was 
not instrumentally related to the advancement of moral norms, struck at the heart of the 
debated role of religion in American public life.  The tawdry spectacle of the Beecher-
Tilton affair, Victoria Woodhull’s war against marriage, the exponential increase in the 
number of divorces, and what religious conservatives considered the diminished moral 
tone in the nation’s life all provided religious partisans with a justification to maintain 
and extend the moral establishment.  Stanton’s appeal to individual rights, by contrast, 
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which followed Frances Wright, the Grimké sisters, and Victoria Woodhull in their call 
for social revolution, tended to call into question the entire series of propositions on 
which the moral establishment was based.  The moral establishment looked to communal 
obligation, the maintenance of moral ideals rooted in private religious sensibilities, the 
role of the family, and women’s legally prescribed role within the family, to provide 
mediating mechanisms between the outright coercion of law and the supposed anarchy of 
individuals in the maintenance of public moral norms.  Stanton’s radical rights claims 
that the individual was the fundamental social unit, not the family, consistently ran up 
against the contrary claims of the moral establishment.   Within that asymmetrical 
struggle, the revisioning of society that was present in the most radical claims of 
woman’s rights succumbed to what proponents of the moral establishment claimed was 
the good of the whole.
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CHAPTER THREE.  THE CIVILIZING MISSION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
 
 
Morality and industry generally go together.  Especially in the weak tropical races, idleness, like 
ignorance, breeds vice.  The best sermons and schools amount to little when the hearers and pupils 
are thriftless. 
—General Samuel C. Armstrong1
 
The blacks are religious. . . . But with such ignorance among priests and people, and with the 
diabolical training of slavery almost compelling theft, falsehood, and unchastity, it is little wonder 
that much of their piety is emotional and immoral. 
—The Reverend Michael E. Strieby2
 
 In 1898, Jabez Lamar Monroe (J.L.M.) Curry, a former slaveholder, Confederate 
army veteran, and member of the Evangelical Alliance, wrote the black leader Booker T. 
Washington to provide advice on the latter’s upcoming speaking tour.  Curry, who had 
been associated with the Peabody Fund for Negro Education since 1881 and after 1890 
the head of the John F. Slater Fund for Negro Education, was an important figure in 
southern black education and among the strongest proponents of the moral establishment 
in the South.  But Curry’s outlook, like many figures associated with post-Civil War 
southern philanthropy, was not inclined toward an unconditional view of rights for freed 
slaves.  A white Baptist minister, he held contempt for black ministers in particular and 
black Christianity in general as a moral code and system of values.  Afro-American 
Christianity, he explained to Washington, emanated from slavery.  In fact, in Curry’s 
evaluation “the Negro” had a whole host of “false ideas of freedom, of education, of 
religion, of civil rights, of the true means of progress,” due to “habits, to traditions, to 
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ignorance, to superstition, to prejudice, [and] to appetites” that characterized slavery.  
The greatest task in southern black education, according to Curry, was to rid southern 
Afro-Americans of their slavery-bred outlooks to avert the danger they presented to 
American democracy.3   
 Curry’s attitude revealed the contradictions and dilemmas that black Christianity 
posed to supporters of the moral establishment.  If the moral establishment limited 
women’s inclusion as equal citizens, because their responsibility for the home overtook 
their claim to individuality and equal rights, the sudden emancipation of millions of one-
time slaves posed an even greater problem to the logic of the moral establishment.  
During slavery, Christianity was necessarily caught up in the slave system as a malleable, 
but equivocal tool for both slaves and masters.  After slavery, Afro-American 
Christianity—and in particular the connection of black Christianity to black morals and 
mores—remained suspect at best.  Of course, many Northern evangelicals whole-
heartedly supported abolition.  But alongside that support was the belief, later articulated 
by Josiah Strong, that a functioning democracy required its citizens to “have sufficient 
intelligence and moral character to be capable of self-government.  Without such 
qualifications. . . liberty lapses into license and ends in anarchy.”  To proponents of the 
moral establishment, self-government required an internalized moral standard (the 
conscience) that was necessarily rooted in religious belief.  If the religion was defective 
then the conscience would also be defective, and those individuals could not be trusted as 
agents of self-government.  The problem to moral establishmentarians was that Afro-
American Christianity was a central element in the black community, firmly rooted and 
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fervently believed.  The black church formed the fundamental institution by which black 
communities organized, and because it was the sole cultural institution under black 
control it served multiple cultural, social, and economic functions.  Yet white Protestants 
in both North and South were never certain that black Christianity was, in fact, Christian.  
They looked upon Afro-American Christianity’s surviving Africanisms, its apparent 
emotionalism, and, in many cases, its autonomy from white control with deep unease.  
Even more to the point, Afro-American Christianity seemed to offer an inadequate 
foundation for morality, lacking, in the estimation of religious partisans, the internal 
system of control that ought to characterize proper Christianity and by which individuals 
could be trusted to act according to communal moral standards without devolving into 
anarchy or licentiousness.  Proponents of the moral establishment worried that the 
ignorance of freed slaves would act in combination with what they saw as slave 
immorality and licentiousness to undermine the moral foundations of the nation.4
In order to shore up the moral foundations of the nation, defenders of the moral 
establishment undertook what they saw as a civilizing mission among freed slaves of the 
South.  Northern Christians took the lead, providing charitable services and moral 
instruction in an effort to remake black Christianity and thereby promote the self-
governing capacity of individual freed slaves.  Southern white Christians, who had 
argued that slavery was both biblical and an important component of the southern moral 
establishment, joined the game late, eventually arguing that black religion and black 
moral capacity required a system of segregation so that the southern moral establishment 
was not threatened by what they viewed as the rogue moral elements of black Christians.  
In both cases, white Christian perceptions of black Christianity and black moral capacity 
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offered a clarifying lens of what moral establishmentarians took to be the fundamental 
character of Christian America and the defining features of the moral establishment.  
Slave Christianity and Slave Control 
In one sense the dispute over black Christian belief was an old one, because 
Christianity had long figured in the struggle between black people and their-would be 
rulers, with the twin issues of power (or empowerment) and control fundamental to black 
religion.  Slave Christianity, which in some instances could be traced back to Northern 
Africa and conversion by the Spanish and Portuguese, began on a large scale with the 
revivals of the Second Great Awakening.  After the Great Revival begun at Cane Ridge, 
Kentucky in 1801, itinerant preachers and enthusiasts moved throughout the Southeast, 
actively seeking the chance to preach the evangelical gospel to Southern slaves.  Because 
they often needed the permission of masters, slave evangelization and slave conversion 
entailed an elaborate set of calculations in the often-contested relationship between 
master and slave.  Not all slaves responded positively to evangelicalism’s so-called 
mission to them, but many, even the vast majority did convert, in part because the 
emotional appeal and free worship possibilities of evangelicalism offered an outlet for the 
expressive orality of slave culture and an emotional harbor from the brutalities of the 
slave system.  Masters, who had initially resisted slave evangelization because they 
worried that it might prompt slave insurrection or claims of slave equality, in time 
changed their mind and viewed slave conversion as a useful tool to insure slave 
quiescence.5   
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Because slave desire for religious autonomy conflicted with the white desire for 
control, the content of theology itself often became a struggle, as the egalitarian 
tendencies of evangelical Christianity ran up against the equally prominent New 
Testament passages that called for slave obedience to masters.  Of course, the evangelical 
Christianity that slaves adopted was not necessarily the Christianity of the white 
establishment.  Rejecting the language of submission heard from white preachers, slave 
Christianity blended African and Anglo religious elements to create a distinct cultural 
form.  One of the first components that they adapted was the concept of conversion.  In 
evangelical theology, the convert responded to the work of the Holy Spirit, who 
convicted the individual of sin, leading to a response of faith in God.  Afro-American 
conversion combined the Anglo-idea of conversion with the idea of Spirit possession, a 
central feature of African religions of the Bantu, Yoruba, and Fante-Ashanti tribes of 
West Africa, from which many American slaves had originated.  Reinterpreted in 
Christian terms, after a period of seeking the Spirit took possession of the seeker, 
producing an ecstatic trance in conjunction with conviction of sin, and served as a 
corollary proof of conversion.  So important was Spirit possession that slaves often 
regarded a claim to faith dubious unless it was accompanied by a period of possession.  
Slaves modified evangelical worship as well, and spirit possession commanded a central 
role there, too.  In slave worship, the goal was what W.E.B. Du Bois famously called The 
Frenzy.  Slaves would steal away, under the cover of night, to meet for a separate 
worship services that incorporated African and Anglo worship forms.  A pot of some 
kind was turned upside down, because slaves believed that it would catch the sound and 
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insure secrecy.  The meeting itself consisted of prayer, singing, shouting, and when a 
preacher was present, exhortation, but did not conform to white forms.  Perhaps most 
unusual (and problematic after emancipation) was the shout, or ring shout, which 
seemingly derived from African custom.  Participants would gather in a circle and shuffle 
slowly around, accompanied by hand clasping, singing, and foot stomping.  
Distinguished from a dance, which some thought was sinful, a shout required all feet to 
remain on the floor without ever crossing.  Also important was antiphonal singing and 
preaching, in which participants engaged one another in characteristic verbal forms, 
emphasizing call and response, polyrythm, and syncopation, which brought the whole 
group into the Spirit.  When the goal was reached, in Du Bois’s words, it “varied in 
expression from the silent rapt countenance or the low murmur and moan to the mad 
abandon of physical fervor,—the stamping, shrieking, and shouting, the rushing to and 
fro and wild waving of arms, the weeping and laughing, the vision and the trance.”   
Ultimately, the frenzy was evidence of contact with the divine, and spiritually transported 
slaves from where they were into heaven.  Because slave theology and worship did not 
conform to white standards, the slave practice of stealing away to meet without the 
supervision or knowledge of masters created an autonomous system of theology and 
religious expression that the Afro-American religious historian Albert Raboteau has 
called the invisible institution of slavery.6
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 In tension with the autonomous, invisible black religion was the reality of white 
Christian institutions into which slaves moved when they converted.  When slaves 
accepted Christianity it opened the door for masters to achieve a greater penetration into 
black culture than by any other means, and both surrounding and limiting the invisible 
institution of slave religion were the visible, institutional churches of the South.  Masters 
and slaves usually worshipped together on Sunday, with slaves segregated on benches in 
the back, in the balcony, or in an adjacent lean-to where they could still hear the sermon.  
Slaves made up twenty to forty percent of Baptist churches, and were sometimes in the 
majority in individual congregations.  Aside from free black congregations (which were 
rare in the South), white clergy and masters always retained control.  Slave membership 
in white churches was usually voluntary (with some exceptions), and connoted some 
measure of acceptance and submission to the white spiritual authority.  Because white 
clergy were in many ways dependent upon the goodwill of masters, if they did not own 
slaves themselves, very few sought to improve the conditions of bondage under which 
slaves lived, even if they were inclined.  Instead they often offered moral prescriptions 
through their sermons, catechisms, and Sunday Schools, reminding slaves that it was 
their spiritual duty to obey, to be content, and not to steal, lie or run away.  Slave 
acceptance of white instruction became a way of insuring, at least in the minds of slave 
owners, that slaves’ moral standards, enforced by divine sanction, made them docile and 
quiescent workers.7   
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 Between these two worlds—the visible world of the slave system and its 
Christianity and the invisible church of slave religion—stood the figure of the slave 
preacher.  Achieving renown as a man of words, the preacher was both deeply connected 
to the other participants in slave religious life and acquired authority as the person at the 
center of the religious ritual.  His authority came with certain privileges.  Some preachers 
did not have to engage in hard manual labor and were relatively free to minister as they 
pleased.  One former slave explained that the preacher on her plantation walked about 
“all dressed up” in a frock coat and “store bought shoes,” conducting services as he 
wished and traveling to other places to hold prayer meetings.  Privileges came with risk, 
though, as many preachers became the focal point of pressure from white masters to keep 
slave Christianity safely within the bounds of the slave system.  Transgressing these 
bounds could mean working in the fields with the rest of the slaves and the loss of other 
privileges.  Straddling these conflicts produced a share of rascals, whose call was 
primarily to status and privilege, and, as Raboteau has noted, possibly formed the basis 
for folktales about the so-called jackleg preacher.8
 Because the preacher was a mediating figure, evaluations by both slaves and 
masters were often ambivalent, if not contradictory.  Some former slaves criticized slave 
preachers as “the mouthpiece of masters,” but many masters feared that, as one former 
slave put it, “preachers were ruining the colored people.”  Denominations sought to 
control preachers by a system of licensing, although underground, unlicensed preaching 
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still seems to have flourished.  When a white church founded a slave congregation, 
whites forbade slave ministers or church leaders from participating in denominational 
gatherings and required that white delegates represent them at association and state 
meetings.  Slaves preachers had to work within this system without succumbing entirely 
to white control, and as a result of the precarious position, the slave preacher required 
great dexterity—moving at once with slaves and masters—reinforcing his ambivalent 
image.  Though not specifically referring to the slave preacher, Du Bois again 
summarized the status of the black preacher best as “the most unique personality 
developed by the Negro on American soil.  A leader, a politician, an orator, a ‘boss,’ an 
intriguer, and idealist,—all these he is, and ever, too, the centre of a group of men, now 
twenty, now a thousand in number.”9
Precisely because the slave preacher lived at “the centre of a group of men,” he 
was an important figure to both master and slave.  The slave system incorporated almost 
every element of society, whose goal was the maintenance of the system itself.  Pressure 
came from individual masters, churches, and denominational agencies on slave 
Christianity and the slave preacher, to keep it within the bounds of the slave system.  
Simultaneously, the slave preacher as a folk leader sought slave autonomy and control of 
religion expression within that system.  In short, Christianity, and the slave preacher as 
the chief representative of slave Christianity, had a contested cultural significance for the 
system of slavery and figured centrally in slaves’ ongoing struggle for self-determination 
and in masters’ attempt at efficient slave management.   
                                                 
9 Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk, 120 (third quotation).  For the conflicting evaluations of slave 
preachers and the practice of licensing, see Raboteau, Slave Religion, 134-36, 232, 238.  On slave 
preachers’ restricted participation in denominational life, see Blassingame, The Slave Community, 91-92. 
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There the tension stayed until emancipation, after which the uneasy compromises 
worked out in slavery had to be renegotiated under even more complicated conditions.  
The most immediate black response to emancipation was a desire for ecclesiastical 
separation, with former slaves leaving their white-controlled churches in droves in 
explicit rejection of what many masters thought was a desirable arrangement.  Lucius 
Holsey, an early bishop in the Colored Methodist Episcopal (C.M.E.) denomination, 
formed in 1866 in response to slave desire to leave Southern Methodism, elaborated why 
separation was necessary.  Although “the war had changed the ancient relation of master 
and servant,” he explained, masters still carried “all the notions, feelings, and elements in 
his religious and social life that characterized his former years.”  Although many white, 
southern church spokesmen warned against a hasty departure by freedmen, the conditions 
the white establishment set for their stay largely predetermined the outcome.  The 
Alabama Baptist Convention of 1865, for example, confidently proclaimed, “the changed 
political status of our late slaves does not necessitate any change in their relation to our 
churches.”  Freedmen were expected to sit, as before, in a segregated area and abide by 
the discipline of white churchmen and their former white masters.  Black ministers in all 
denominations were kept to strict rules when governing their churches, and in some cases 
were still required to find white representatives at denominational gatherings.  The 
continuation of the status quo did not appeal to freed people, of course, and black 
ministers led many into autonomous Baptist congregations where the minister and leaders 
had maximum control over church life.10  
                                                 
10 Lucius Holsey, "The Colored Methodist Episcopal Church," in Afro-American Religious History: A 
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 When it became apparent that freed people were leaving regardless of their 
proclamations, white church leaders swung to a hasty affirmation that perhaps racially 
segregated congregations were desirable after all. Once decided, Southern denominations 
embraced the idea of separation with a convert’s zeal.  Fear of social mixing began 
almost immediately after freedmen were out from under their control.  In the Southern 
Baptist Convention, this shift happened amidst an overwrought debate in 1869 over the 
formation of a Freedmen’s Department under the auspices of the Domestic Mission 
Board.  Passionately denouncing the plan, critics reminded delegates that their erstwhile 
slaves were “easily puffed up,” and warned that interracial churches and denominational 
support would move according to an inexorable logic, whose end would require white 
members “to admit them [former slaves] to your homes, to your tables, and lay them 
upon your beds.”  Given the aroused state of convention members, moderates could 
muster only a statement exhorting state associations and conventions “to pay special 
attention to the religious instruction and spiritual interests of the colored people,” but 
could not create a department for freedman assistance.11   
The sinister overtones of the convention’s exhortation “to pay special attention” 
to freedpeople were probably not accidental.  Southern white church leaders and 
parishioners, though they deplored the idea of social mixing, could only look with great 
unease at independent black churches, fearing that they were becoming havens for 
political organizing out of white control that would perpetuate the supposed moral 
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disorder that masters had long complained about slaves.  The result was what the 
southern historian Paul Harvey has dubbed “a dialectic of paternalism and violence.”   
White churches occasionally issued pious proclamations that they needed, out of 
Christian duty, to help freed slaves, but their actual financial contributions did not 
amount to much.  Meanwhile, vigilante acts of violence insured that black churches 
remained on notice not to stray too far from what white churches saw as acceptable 
bounds.12
   
Reconstruction and the Civilizing Mission 
 Although southern white distrust of black churches would become an important 
consideration after Reconstruction, at least initially southern white attitudes were not the 
most important consideration in the post-War reconstruction of the southern moral 
establishment.  Emancipation placed freed slaves in the midst of a messy political 
struggle, as black Christianity acquired even more importance as the stakes for 
controlling the so-called freedmen were upped on all sides.  Freed people, of course, 
primarily wanted control over their lives, but as in slavery the control of the black church 
became an important consideration to all who wanted controlling interest in the 
Reconstructed South.  In particular, the renewed mission to the slaves became a 
significant component of the larger northern evangelical goal of reinforcing their 
Christian Nation ideal and maintaining the moral establishment.  The key issue to those 
pushing for a new moral establishment in the South, which included the many freedmen’s 
aid societies sponsored by Christian churches working in close cooperation with the 
                                                 
12 Paul Harvey, Redeeming the South: Religious Cultures and Racial Identities among Southern Baptists, 
1865-1925 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 52-60. 
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federal government, was whether or not black Christianity, born in the cultural milieu of 
the slave structure with its reliance on exterior rather than interior compulsion, could 
provide the internal moral guidance to enable freed people’s success in the free labor 
system.  It was, in fact, a commonplace, dating back to the Revolutionary era, to link 
industry and morality as twin and related objectives in the creation and maintenance of 
religious and educational societies that were necessary in the preservation of American 
freedom.  The 1776 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, for example, claimed that “firm 
adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, industry, and frugality” were “absolutely 
necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty.”  In similar manner the 1836 Arkansas 
Constitution proclaimed it the duty of the legislature to pass laws guaranteeing the 
“rewards and immunities” of organizations that “countenance and encourage the 
principles of humanity, industry, and morality.”  The issue in both cases, and in many 
other examples that could be cited, was that participation in certain organizations—often 
religiously directed educational societies—provided individuals with the necessary moral 
temperaments to make them good and productive citizens.  In the minds of northern 
proponents of the moral establishment, those moral temperaments gained their ground 
through religious commitment and ideals.  Because they regarded Afro-American 
Christianity, with its connection to the slave system, as an inadequate ground for black 
morality, northern Christians undertook a civilizing mission as part of their vision of 
Reconstruction, in order to remake both black Christianity and black Christians into what 
they regarded as reliable moral individuals and productive citizens.13
                                                 
13 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights of 1776, art. XIV; Arkansas Constitution of 1836, art. VII, sec. 1.  
See also the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, part II, ch. V, sec. 2; New Hampshire Constitution of 
1784, art. XXXVIII; Indiana Constitution of 1816, art. IX, sec. 1. 
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Slaves, of course, entered a world of precarious existence on emancipation day, 
lacking money, land, and, in many cases, the goodwill of their former white masters.  
Mere survival required effort and ingenuity.  To meet the real needs that came of the war, 
an army of volunteers and agents from the benevolent societies of the North poured into 
the South with the advancing battlefront to effect, in the phrase of the historian Joe M. 
Richardson, a “Christian Reconstruction.”  At the head of the group in terms of size and 
dollars was the mammoth American Missionary Association (AMA).  A league of 
abolitionist societies organized in 1846, the AMA dedicated itself to both the abolition of 
slavery and the establishment of a Protestant Christian America. In directing post–Civil 
War northern philanthropy and charting the course of the civilizing mission, the AMA 
wielded unparalleled influence. In the twenty-five years after the Civil War, the AMA 
began several institutions of higher education and countless normal schools to train 
teachers throughout the South.  By 1888, of the estimated fifteen thousand black teachers 
in the South, nearly half had been trained in AMA schools.  Its commanding position 
stemmed from its wealth.  Made up of primarily wealthy Congregationalists and 
Unitarians, the AMA’s operating budget, totaling almost seven million dollars between 
1861 and 1889, was as large as all other benevolent societies combined.  That amount 
constitutes nearly one-third of all northern benevolence for southern relief over the 
period.  Given the relative scarcity of resources for post-emancipation support, the 
AMA’s commanding financial position made it a dominant policy player before the 
inauguration of Jim Crow.14
                                                 
14 On the operating budget of the AMA compared to other benevolent societies, see Ralph Luker, Social 
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 But the benevolence of the AMA and other missionary societies did not come 
without strings.  In addition to being a vehicle for northern philanthropy, the AMA was a 
missionary society, committed to inculcating civilization in what it considered the 
backward races of the South as an accoutrement to its offer of tangible aid.  Central to the 
AMA vision for the remaking of the South was the education and Christianization of 
former slaves.  Although slaves had converted to Christianity in large numbers prior to 
the Civil War, the AMA looked upon the surviving Africanisms and distinctive worship 
forms of Afro-American Christianity with distrust, worrying in particular that slave 
religion was an expression of freed slaves’ ignorance and supposed viciousness that 
would burgeon in the South with the high birthrates of African Americans.  To effect a 
moral reconstruction the AMA sought continuously to keep what they considered the 
obligation of Northern Christians to Christianize and civilize the freed slaves before the 
public mind.  In its 1875 pamphlet, “The Nation Still in Danger, or Ten Years after the 
War,” AMA representatives warned, “the education and morality of the Negro is the only 
safety for the South and the Nation.”  The AMA’s secretary, the Reverend Michael E. 
Strieby, further elaborated the logic by acknowledging that “[t]he blacks are religious,” 
but he qualified his evaluation.  Because he saw “such ignorance among priests and 
people, and with the diabolical training of slavery almost compelling theft, falsehood, and 
unchastity,” Strieby argued that it was unsurprising that “much of their piety is emotional 
and immoral.”  In other words, following the conventional dictum that a rightly formed 
religion was the basis of a properly grounded morality, Strieby claimed that black 
religion did not offer the moral guidance necessary to restrain individual transgression 
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and that the putative antisocial tendency of the freedpeople increased the risk of racial 
antagonism.  So although Christians should “do more for the distant heathen,” Strieby 
advised his readers that, for the good of the nation, foreign missions ought not to trump 
the great mission field of “the blacks at our doors.”  Theodore Woolsey, the ex-president 
of Yale University and a leader in the Evangelical Alliance, agreed with Strieby, 
confessing that he was “sorry to be obliged” to believe that as long as southern blacks and 
their leaders remained illiterate, “their own religion . . . will not save them and the 
country from the evils, which may grow out of collision of races.”  To save the nation, 
southern blacks needed to be taught a “sound religion and morality” that would make 
them “prudent, cautious of offense, kind to all, peaceable.”  Washington Gladden, 
another prominent minister who would later become the AMA president and whose name 
would be synonymous with the social gospel, made the civilizing mission explicit.  The 
South required a moral reconstruction, because “[t]here will be no peace at the South till 
the South is civilized, and men are not civilized by edict.”15
 What was true Christianity to the AMA?  Its answer derived from the profound 
economic changes already well underway in the North as a result of the industrial 
revolution.  Many scholars have noted that the industrial transformation produced what 
Eric J. Hobsbawm has called the “conquering bourgeois,” whose victory as a class 
proved, at least in their own eyes, the superiority of the system of values that enabled 
their eventual triumph.  The bourgeois ideology, sometimes labeled the ideology of free 
labor, became the dominant view of northern sectionalism in the lead-up to the Civil War.  
Proponents of free labor viewed slave labor as morally inferior since wage earners could 
                                                 
15 Strieby, ed., The Nation Still in Danger, 2 (second quotation), 6 (third and fourth quotations), 7 (fifth 
quotation), 8 (sixth and seventh quotations), 11 (eighth through eleventh quotations), 15 (twelfth 
quotation). 
 172
rise through their own thrift and industriousness to financial independence in a free labor 
system.  The AMA thought that Protestant Christianity was integral to that system, 
because Christianity alone produced the virtues of discipline, moral sobriety, self-control, 
and seriousness of purpose necessary for economic success.  In its most crass form, the 
success ethic of the AMA meant that those who prospered reaped the just reward for their 
inner virtue, which resulted in their upward social mobility.  Conversely, the poor were 
poor because of their own thriftlessness, laziness, and self-indulgence.16
When they evaluated freed slaves, AMA leaders connected the bourgeois idea of 
free labor to what they viewed as the former slaves’ racial degradation, and slave 
religion, in particular, became the quintessential expression of what they considered the 
former slaves’ stunted racial development that made them unfit for work in a free labor 
system.  In the minds of AMA leaders, African American religious ritual seemed to offer 
an emotional escapism detached from morality.  The emotionalism of black 
Protestantism, in the AMA’s estimation, encouraged idleness and dissolution because it 
promoted an otherworldly orientation among freed slaves, to the neglect of the present 
world. To prepare freed slaves for the new economic system, then, the AMA thought that 
black Christianity, with its surviving Africanisms and ostensibly otherworldly 
orientation, needed to give way to the liberal Christianity of the AMA as a first step in the 
acquisition of the virtues necessary for economic success in a free labor system.17
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The AMA’s mission was also tightly connected to U.S. government policy.  In 
July 1864, a convention of benevolent associations met in Indianapolis to discuss how 
best to cooperate on the religious reconstruction of the South.  Declaring that the Civil 
War promised a grand opportunity for Christian benevolence and expressing 
disappointment that no bureau had yet been created for oversight of the freed slaves, the 
convention spent two days crafting a petition to President Lincoln.  Several such petitions 
finally yielded a bill creating a Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, 
popularly known as the Freedman’s Bureau, which was charged with “control of all 
subjects relating to refugees and freedmen from rebel states.”  The purpose of the bureau 
was to offer “supervision and care” to all loyal freedmen in order to “enable them as 
speedily as practicable to become self-supporting citizens of the United States.”  Most 
significantly, the bill required that the commissioner of the Bureau “at all times coöperate 
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with private benevolent associations of citizens in aid of freedmen, and with agents and 
teachers duly accredited and appointed by them.”  Cooperation, the bill went on to say, 
included providing buildings by lease or hire for purposes of education, so long as the 
association provided teachers and the other means of instruction.  Because the AMA so 
dominated the field in providing educational services to the freed slaves, the Freedmen’s 
Bureau worked with it as something like an equal partner.18  
The eventual choice of Oliver Otis Howard to lead the Freedmen’s Bureau further 
reinforced the general affinity between the two organizations.  A Union General and 
devout evangelical Christian who found Christianity at an 1857 church meeting in 
Florida, Howard was endearingly called “the Christian General.”  Though he denied that 
he favored the AMA, Howard used his position to form a significant cooperation between 
the two organizations.  In part, cooperation was natural because both organizations had 
similar views of supposed black degradation and moral laxity.  Immediately after his 
appointment, Howard issued his first circular letter laying down initial policy instructions 
to Bureau agents.  He wanted it made clear to each freedman that “on no account, if able 
to work, should he harbor the thought that the Government will support him in idleness.”  
Four days later, Howard followed up with another circular instructing agents that in 
addition to removing the purported reluctance of some erstwhile masters against 
employing their former slaves, they needed to correct what he saw as the “false 
impressions sometimes entertained by the freedmen that they can live without labor” and 
to overcome the “singular false pride” that, in his estimation, allowed freedmen to live off 
contributions rather than work.  He further reminded his agencies that rather than 
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competing with the benevolent agencies already at work in the South, the goal was to 
“systematize and facilitate them” in their attention to the “education and moral condition” 
of freedmen.  Howard’s outlook shaped the organization, and his views were reproduced 
on the ground.  In 1870, for example, a white superintendent of Louisiana schools 
reported that although many black students were religious, in the black community “the 
most heathenish vagaries and superstitions are encouraged and the grossest imoralities 
[sic] tolerated.”  Because “their religion takes on gross forms and is not always followed 
by the virtue of morality,” he continued, religious retraining provided a fundamental task 
for schooling, in order to inculcate a reliable, bourgeois character.19   
 The general ideological affinity between the two organizations soon blossomed 
into a tight administrative cooperation that began at the top and worked down.  In 1865, 
the Bureau’s superintendent of education, John W. Alvord, introduced Howard to George 
Whipple, the AMA executive, in part to allay Whipple’s concerns that the AMA would 
be frozen out of Freedman’s Bureau assistance.  Whipple need not have worried.  Alvord 
himself was an evangelical abolitionist with long ties to Whipple, and the AMA had 
considered employing him as corresponding secretary the previous year.  Within a few 
months of their meeting, Howard and Whipple became good friends and often exchanged 
letters of advice.  In 1866, Whipple sent Howard a letter explaining how the Bureau 
could best assist benevolent societies, and Howard’s eventual policies on transportation, 
rations, and rental of land and equipment were very close to Whipple’s suggestion.  This 
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cooperation extended to personnel as well; each fired their subordinates if the other made 
the request.  In addition, the AMA commissioned many Freedman’s Bureau agents as 
AMA missionaries, in an elaborate system of dual appointments that blurred the 
organizational boundaries and increased the AMA’s prominence in the attempt to 
reconstruct the Afro-American Christians.20
Nowhere was this elaborate cooperation more apparent than in the creation of 
freedmen’s industrial school, Hampton Institute, started by another Christian General, 
Samuel C. Armstrong.  Armstrong grew up in Hawaii under missionary parents and 
attended Williams College, where he came under the influence of its president, Mark 
Hopkins, a Congregationalist and leading member of the Evangelical Alliance. After 
working as the commander of a black regiment from Maryland during the Civil War, 
Armstrong moved into the Freedmen’s Bureau in 1866 as the assistant superintendent for 
Virginia. Almost as soon as he assumed this new position, he began laying the foundation 
for what he called an industrial school. His first step was to publish a “Letter of Appeal” 
in early 1866 in the AMA’s magazine, American Missionary, explaining his philosophy 
of industrial schools and urging their creation to uplift freed slaves in the South. Later 
that year, Armstrong met with northern philanthropists and businessmen, including 
Robert C. Ogden, a manager for the department store magnate John Wanamaker, to 
further explain the idea of industrial schooling and its place for the uplift of freedmen.  
Because George Whipple, head of the AMA, was slow to warm to the idea of industrial 
schooling, Armstrong enlisted Mark Hopkins, future-president James Garfield (who he 
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knew from his days at Williams), and Edward P. Smith, AMA secretary and liaison to the 
Freedmen’s Bureau, in choosing the site and lobbying Whipple.   By July 1867, 
Armstrong had enlisted the support of Oliver Howard, the Freedman’s Bureau 
Commissioner, and secured $44,000 for the plan.  With a site chosen, money in hand, and 
the backing of Howard, Whipple conceded, and the plan went ahead.  In November 1868 
while he was still on staff at the Freedman’s Bureau, the AMA commissioned Armstrong 
as a missionary in his work at Hampton, solidifying his connection with both 
organizations.21
Though he had initially had a hard time persuading Whipple to accept his idea of 
industrial schooling, if anything Armstrong’s view of industrial education further 
demonstrated the connection of racial developmentalism and bourgeois values that 
dominated the AMA and the Freedmen’s Bureau and revealed the moral 
establishmentarian ambitions of both.  According to Armstrong, bondage had inculcated 
slaves with a weakened character, particularly in their desire for work.  In part, their 
desire not to work was a racial trait of “weak tropical races,” in which “idleness, like 
ignorance, breeds vice.”  To combat those alleged racial traits, Armstrong lifted his plan 
of industrial schooling directly from his father’s missionary practices in the Hawaiian 
Islands, arguing that freed slaves and island natives both possessed “not mere ignorance, 
but deficiency of character.”  According to Armstrong, slavery had exacerbated the racial 
tendency of freed slaves and bequeathed to them “improvidence, low ideas of honor and 
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morality, and a general lack of directive energy, judgment, and foresight.”  The problem, 
in Armstrong’s estimation, was not a lack of skill or money, but “one of morals, industry, 
self-restraint; or power to organize society, to draw social lines between the decent and 
indecent, to form public sentiment that shall support pure morals.”  Afro-Americans did 
not possess true morality, in Armstrong’s appraisal, because “they do not possess its 
conditions, which require self-control rather than pure devotional life.”22
Following the plan he laid out in his appeal, Armstrong sought to create a school 
that taught freed slaves necessary skills for the New South and, perhaps most 
importantly, inculcated them with the character that, he concluded, if they ever had, had 
been lost or damaged by their time in slavery.  The curriculum omitted all study of the 
classics.  He required students to work, paying for half of their room and board in cash 
and half in labor.  The trustees found benefactors to pay for student tuition, $70 a year per 
student in 1873–1874.  Although on occasion Armstrong put forward the provision of 
work as a practical necessity so that poor black girls and boys (though many were 
actually adults) could attend, its economic function was secondary to its educational 
purpose.  Admitting that “such an education must be in the outset expensive,” Armstrong 
dismissed economic concerns because the goal of industrial schooling was not economic 
self-sufficiency.  Instead, he saw manual labor as central to the educational process itself 
because “[c]haracter is the best outcome of the labor system. That makes it worth its cost 
many times over. It is not cheap, but it pays.”23
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Behind Armstrong’s concern for character was the belief that religion and 
morality were intimately connected.  Armstrong affirmed that Christian evangelical 
conversion was “the starting-point of a better life,” but added to conversion was labor, 
because “if man is to work out his own salvation, he must learn how to work.”  
Summarizing his point, Armstrong declared that “morality and industry generally go 
together.”  In Armstrong’s view, labor was a powerful moral agent that conferred upon 
the laborer diligence, honesty, and virtue, thereby offering reformers the perfect tool to 
reorient the ostensibly deleterious training suffered by the freed slaves under the slave 
system.  Alongside labor, Armstrong was a strong believer in the co-education of males 
and females, because “if a race is to be saved it is by creating the unit of Christian 
civilization, the family.”  Women needed the benefit of labor just as much as men, and he 
claimed that the marriages of industrial school graduates furthered the Christian ideal.  
Because of the complex goals of the educational mode, industrial schooling was, as 
Armstrong fully admitted, “parental,” with teachers acting as parents, foremen, and 
instructors to the students in a mission to remake freed slaves.24
As Armstrong’s writing showed, the AMA’s civilizing mission, operating with 
the full support of the Freedman’s Bureau, was equal parts racist paternalism and classic 
liberal thought. In the free labor ideal of the nineteenth century, the AMA regarded all 
people as equal before the law, but the guarantee of equality was strictly formal.  So long 
as the law did not actively discriminate between persons, any structural or substantive 
claim of inequality was outside the purview of the law, and though some individuals 
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might possess better opportunity, family resources, or bargaining positions that 
perpetuated or resulted in profound actual inequality, so long as anyone could adopt the 
necessary values for success in the free labor system, classical liberalism called the 
system fair.  Of course, the civilizing mission had a dark side, and it is not hard to see it 
as an attempt to acquire cultural control rather than simply an expression of humanitarian 
concern.  Many in the AMA thought that freedom required freed slaves to absorb a 
specific set of cultural values that would act as an internal system of control.  If former 
slaves as a group failed to internalize those cultural values, the freedpeople posed a threat 
to the American democratic experiment.  As the historian Thomas C. Holt has argued of 
the British civilizing mission in the Jamaican colonies (but with equal applicability to the 
United States), work-discipline became “both the source and test of internal control, and 
those who failed to demonstrate that discipline were fit only to be ruled by others.”  That 
contradiction would become the Achilles heel of the civilizing mission, allowing southern 
whites to invoke the very same premises when justifying segregation.25
Booker T. Washington: Colonized and Colonizer 
 With southern black Christians seeking autonomy, white southerners seeking 
racial control, and northern white Christians seeking moral reconstruction, the field was 
pretty much set.   But an unexpected participant arrived in 1880s, who would try to 
control, massage, divert, and manipulate the various interests seeking to control Afro-
Americans in the South by appealing to the moral establishment and the civilizing 
mission.  Booker T. Washington’s historical legacy has suffered from his role in 
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perpetuating the civilizing mission, and it is an ongoing question how to understand him, 
as the civilizing mission’s principal instrument or as its principal victim. 
Washington came of age when the AMA still exerted a dominant influence on 
northern philanthropic work in the South, and he received his education at Hampton, 
where he internalized the values of the civilizing mission.  Washington was Hampton’s 
star pupil, and General Armstrong was so pleased with his protégé that in 1881, after the 
Alabama legislature created a school for African Americans called the Tuskegee Institute, 
he recommended Washington for the new position of principal.  But when Washington 
arrived in Alabama, his school existed only in theory, with no buildings, no books, and 
no teachers.  Because the legislature had already set state appropriations before Tuskegee 
was created, he had no state-funded operating budget for another full year.  To get the 
school off the ground, Washington sought the advice of his Hampton mentors on a 
constant basis, stressing “the only way to make this a permanent and successful school is 
to get it on the labor system as soon as possible.”  Though he managed to scrape together 
enough money to buy land, build a school, and hire teachers, his first decade at Tuskegee 
was difficult, with more students always arriving, more buildings needing to be built, and 
never enough money.  Eliciting funds to keep the school afloat was an almost 
overwhelming task, and Washington quickly settled into a money-raising role, spending 
up to six months of the year in the North passing the hat in churches and other venues.26
By far, most of Washington’s money came from the abolitionist contingent of 
New England and friends of the American Missionary Association who had previously 
supported Hampton Institute, and his training at Hampton had well prepared him to 
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collaborate with the AMA and push forward the cultural ideals of the civilizing mission.  
Seizing on the northern fear of black degradation, he promised his audiences that he 
would instruct southern African Americans in the moral, religious, and industrial 
standards that they and he held.  Washington put particular emphasis on the issue of black 
ministers, stressing that because African American clergy were at the center of black 
religious life (with its ostensibly dubious character), they were among the most important 
subjects for the civilizing mission.  Before a meeting of the National Education 
Association in Madison, Wisconsin, in 1884, for example, Washington disparaged the 
“so-called leaders” of African Americans, “who are as a rule ignorant, immoral preachers 
or selfish politicians,” and decried that the average black man had “no standard by which 
to shape his character.”  Elaborating on the poor quality of black leaders, Washington 
rolled out a story that would thereafter become a staple, recounting a visit to a black 
church near Tuskegee that had two hundred members and nineteen preachers.  Noting 
that the number of preachers was “legion,” he alluded to the Biblical story of a man 
haunted by demons whose collective name was “legion,” at once deferring to his 
audience’s religious sensibilities and impugning those of the African American ministry.  
He also elaborated on Armstrong’s connection of character to labor, portraying the 
movement of so many black men into the ministry as a calculated attempt to get out of 
manual labor, thereby causing them to miss out on its virtue-inducing properties.  At a 
speech before the Women’s New England Club in 1890, after repeating the story of the 
church near Tuskegee with two hundred members and nineteen preachers, he embellished 
it with a parable of a defunct man who might well have been a minstrel figure.  
Washington claimed the work ethic of most black preachers could be summed up by a 
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man in a cotton field at the end of a hot July day who stopped, looked up into heaven, and 
cried, “Lord, de work is so hard, de cotton is so grassy, and de Sun am so hot, dat I 
believe dis darkey am called to preach.”  His use of the vernacular was likewise 
calculated, stressing both his understanding of and separation from the poor black 
ministers he was trying to civilize.27
 Washington never limited himself to criticizing ministers, but argued in AMA 
fashion that black ministers encouraged and relied upon moral degradation among their 
parishioners.  In doing so, he assumed the moral establishment ambitions of the AMA, 
which viewed religion and morality as integrally related.  Reasoning backward, if a 
person failed to demonstrate proper (bourgeois) character, which required discipline, 
emotional equilibrium, and conscious, rational control, that person had a defective 
religion.  Washington never tired of pointing out that black Christianity fell very short of 
the standard, and he frequently derided what he saw as the emotionalism of black 
Christianity as evidence that many African Americans were not authentically Christian.  
In his 1890 speech before the Women’s New England Club, for example, he conceded 
that many ministers were religious but argued that their religious sensibility consisted 
“largely in emotion.”  In “real practical Christianity,” he claimed, they were very 
wanting.  What was true of ministers was equally true of members.  Washington warned 
that although the great majority of black people in the South belonged to a church, “a 
large proportion of these people” were as far from Christianity as “any people found in 
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Japan or Africa.”  Lest the audience members miss his point, he reminded them that 
“Christian heathen . . . demand as much missionary’s effort as the heathen of foreign 
fields.”  With that, he quickly turned to a plea for money to educate the black people of 
the South to read.28
 His rhetorical assault on black ministers and their parishioners got the attention of 
many in the AMA, and Lyman Abbott, who assumed Henry Ward Beecher’s pulpit after 
the latter’s death, asked Washington in 1890 to contribute an article on African American 
clergy to Abbott’s journal, the Christian Union, which had been formerly edited by 
Beecher.  By publishing his attack in the Christian Union, Washington could present his 
arsenal of effective critiques before a national audience, because supporters of the AMA 
mission (and readers of the Christian Union) had spread after the Civil War throughout 
the South as teachers and administrators in AMA schools.  He jumped at the chance, 
repeating verbatim the story of the church with many ministers and the black man who 
received the call on a hot day in July.  He also expanded his critique, layering statistics 
with anecdotal observations that resulted in large-scale generalizations, like his claim that 
“three-fourths of the Baptist ministers and two-thirds of the Methodists are unfit.”  He 
particularly highlighted what he saw as the self-serving nature of many African American 
ministers.  Although “not one in twenty” ministers had any standing as businesspeople in 
their communities, Washington snidely (and somewhat hypocritically given his own 
fundraising efforts) claimed that much of a black religious service seemed “to revolve 
itself into an effort to get money.”  While he attacked ministers by charging ignorance 
and moral vice, he repeated his claim that black religious ritual, cultivated and supported 
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by black ministers, was in fact an expression of their parishioners’ ignorance and moral 
degradation.  Because the standard for good preaching was the extent to which a preacher 
is “able to set the people in all parts of the congregation to groaning, uttering wild 
screams, and jumping, finally going into a trance,” he argued, African American religion 
pandered to the lowest impulses of the congregation and proved many black parishioners 
to be “as ignorant of true Christianity . . . as any people in Africa or Japan.”29
 Washington’s solution, which was in keeping with the usual nonsectarian ideals 
of the moral establishment that still connected religion and educational institutions, was 
the creation of a theological school that would reform black ministers.  After noting that 
only a small proportion of black ministers had received theological education of any kind, 
he suggested that a school be established “at some central point in the South, on a 
thoroughly Christian but strictly undenominational basis, with a one or two years’ course 
covering such branches as would fit a student to get a comprehensive idea of the Bible, to 
teach him how to prepare a sermon, how to read a hymn, how to study, and, most 
important, how to reach and help the people outside of the pulpit in an unselfish Christian 
way.” He even went so far as to suggest that $1,500 or $2,500 would be enough to pay 
for teachers and operate the school, though where the facilities, books, and other teaching 
materials were to come from, he left to the readers’ imagination.30
 The article, published in August 1890, was already yielding fruit by September. 
That month a wealthy spinster from New York, Olivia Egleston Phelps Stokes, sent 
Washington a check for two thousand dollars “to help in the education of colored men of 
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good moral character, particularly those who have the ministry in view.” Seeking more, 
Washington reached out to one of Stokes’s acquaintances, Alfred Haynes Porter, to pitch 
the idea of a Bible School at Tuskegee. Meanwhile, that November he wrote Stokes a 
letter (now lost) in New York apparently thanking her for her contribution and wondering 
what her concerns were for colored people in the South. She responded that in her 
experience of listening to black preachers, she “felt their lack of Bible knowledge in their 
sermons” and recognized a definite need of “practical Christian instruction.” Coming to 
the point, she asked Washington if he knew “how and where” young colored men could 
“be best prepared for the Christian ministry?”31
Washington responded with characteristic circumspection. Earlier that year, even 
before the Christian Union article was published, he had already mentioned the 
possibility of a Bible School to Edgar James Penney, a black Congregationalist minister 
from Andover Theological Seminary.  Tempering Penney’s apparent excitement, 
Washington warned that it would “take at least one or two years to get it on foot.”  His 
attempt to woo Penney to Tuskegee was itself part of his method to obtain the school, 
because Penney, as a Congregationalist, had significant ties to the northeastern 
philanthropic community and had even requested that his call to Tuskegee be formal and 
definite so that he could use it to obtain funds from the AMA.  In June Washington wrote 
him a formal offer of employment as campus pastor, while referencing an anonymous 
“friend in Brooklyn,” most likely Alfred Haynes Porter, who was at work on “the other 
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project.”  Washington assured Penney that, should the plan fall into place, he would be 
able to slide into a position at the head of the Bible School. Penney accepted the offer.32
 Holding Penney’s acceptance letter and Stokes’s inquiry, Washington swung into 
action, writing to Horace Bumstead, president of Atlanta University, A. N. McEwen, 
editor of the Montgomery Baptist Leader, and Francis J. Grimké, a mulatto minister and 
nephew of Sarah and Angelina Grimké, for endorsements.  McEwen had the clearest idea 
of Washington’s intent, wishing him well in his effort to find “some rich friend to help 
you in such a work,” but all three were unanimous in their support.  Having received their 
backing, Washington moved forward on one final front, announcing the creation of the 
Tuskegee Negro Conference, which invited “representatives of the masses—the bone and 
sinew of the race”—to Tuskegee in order to find out the “actual industrial, moral and 
educational condition of the masses.”  Predictably, one of the findings of the Negro 
Conference, which took place in February 1892, was a call to “our generous friends” for 
their financial contributions to produce “strong Christian leaders who will live among the 
masses as object lessons.”33
Washington, a master of publicity at this stage in his career, carefully controlled 
the press coverage of the first conference.  Because he wanted to be absolutely sure that 
all gave a favorable report, he put off another offer to publish the proceedings by William 
Torrey Harris, the Hegelian philosopher and U.S. Commissioner of Education. But 
Washington was more than willing to allow AMA representatives to report on the 
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conference in their northern newspapers.  Writing to his mentor Samuel Armstrong, 
Washington expressed his gratification at “the great amount of interest shown by the 
American Missionary Association.”  He was keenly aware that the AMA’s presence 
would bolster the legitimacy of the proceedings, noting that the organization had sent 
“three of its strongest men.”  Added to the official AMA delegation were reporters from 
several important northeastern abolitionist newspapers, including the Independent, the 
Christian Union, and the Congregationalist, which also insured positive coverage.34
 Having hired a black Congregationalist minister to teach at Tuskegee, confirmed 
his evaluation of black ministers through the Negro Conference, obtained endorsements 
of his plan from prominent black leaders, and enlisted representatives of the AMA as 
(perhaps unwitting) propagandists, Washington moved forward to secure what he had 
wanted all along: cash to start a Bible School and a building to house it.  Negotiations 
with Olivia Stokes and her sister, Caroline, went well, and they gave advice on all aspects 
of the school from the curriculum to the building. Olivia Stokes wanted the curriculum to 
be “simple, direct, and helpful,” preparing men for rural ministry rather than training 
pretentious theological intellectuals.  Of course, the central component of the curriculum 
was that would-be ministers had to engage in manual labor along with the rest of the 
students, thereby addressing any deficiencies of character.  In keeping with their desire 
for simplicity, the sisters rejected the first building plan, claiming it was too elaborate for 
the plain surroundings of Tuskegee.  But all parties agreed that the Bible School would 
do nothing but good, and by the time of the first Negro Conference or shortly thereafter, 
the Stokes sisters had agreed to give additional money to build what was eventually 
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called Phelps Hall, a chapel that would house Phelps Hall Bible School.  Washington’s 
strategic maneuvering had brought the deal to a successful conclusion.35
Although Washington got what he wanted, his pursuit of the civilizing mission 
and his characterization of southern black ministers and their parishioners distorted what 
was, in fact, a heterogeneous body of several million people. The numerous divisions 
among southern black congregations made Washington’s characterization inaccurate, if 
not opportunistic. By 1890 Southern black religious life was divided among four different 
denominations: the African Methodist Episcopal (AME), the African Methodist 
Episcopal Zion (AME Zion), Colored Methodist Episcopal (CME), and numerous 
independent Baptist congregations, but an ideological distinction provided the more 
salient context for Washington’s assault. Black elites fell along a continuum, both ends of 
which referenced the moral establishment.  On the one hand was what has been called an 
emancipationist or prophetic tradition and, on the other, an acculturationist, middle-class 
position. The acculturationists—who included many urban ministers, black women’s 
rights advocates, and members of the emerging black middle class—advocated an 
educated ministry who would train their parishioners in a restrained worship style and in 
the dominant bourgeois ideals advocated by the AMA.  In other words, they supported 
the moral establishment and looked to conform black religious life to the dominant 
standards in a strategy of assimilation.  The emancipationists, in contrast, sought the 
transformation of American society (and the place of black Americans in it) through 
black nationalism expressed in congregational and denominational governance, black 
communal self-help, pan-African socialism, and, in the twentieth century, the 
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international anti-imperialism expressed by Martin Luther King Jr.  They rejected the 
moral establishment by proposing an alternate moral calculus for American life.  The 
positions were fluid but distinct, and although individual black leaders might move back 
and forth between them or combine them in various ways, the two positions represented a 
dialectical impulse that provided a fundamental tension in African American thought.36
Washington’s criticism of black ministers, then, was an assault on the 
emancipationist position in the name of acculturation.  By impugning those who 
disagreed with him as either lazy or vicious, he effectively tightened his leadership and 
strengthened his emerging significance before white, northern philanthropists.   Of 
course, many black ministers were incensed, viewing Washington’s criticism as 
predatory, self-serving, and opportunist.  Others, though, joined the Washington phalanx. 
Shortly after Washington published his article, Bishop Daniel A. Payne of the AME 
denomination came to Washington’s defense after observing the “various animadversions 
from North, South, East and West” against Washington’s statement. Payne’s support was 
stunning. An acculturationist who avidly sought to stamp out what he saw as the heathen 
practices among southern black congregations, Payne had organized the AME church-
planting initiative following the Civil War and personally ordained many of the leading 
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AME ministers in the South. In offering his support to Washington, Payne presented his 
claims in unequivocal terms, arguing “emphatically, in the presence of the great Head of 
the Church, that not more than one-third of the ministers, Baptist and Methodist, in the 
South are morally and intellectually qualified.”  In response to anticipated criticism, he 
promised to name “name[s], times and places” to substantiate his assertion.37
Washington used Payne’s support to buttress his own position before other black 
leaders.  After receiving Payne’s letter, he wrote a rebuttal to his critics in the 
Indianapolis Freeman, a national black weekly that was sympathetic to Washington, and 
he appended Payne’s letter to his own.  The Freeman published both letters together, and 
the effect was a powerful one-two punch.  Washington began his letter by coming 
directly to the point, assuring his detractors in the first sentence that “no resolutions or 
actions or words of individuals or organizations will have the least effect in preventing 
my saying just what I consider to be in the interest of the race and truth,” and he defiantly 
stood by his earlier statements in the face of his critics.  He could do so, in large part, 
because of Payne’s influence.  Coming to his conclusion, Washington pointed to Payne’s 
letter and asked, “Will any one say that Right Rev. Daniel A. Payne, D.D., L.L.D., senior 
Bishop of the A.M.E. Church, does not know whereof he speaks?”  Instead, portraying 
those who disagreed with him as complicit in what he saw as the moral failings of 
ministers, Washington referenced “friends all over the country in all denominations” who 
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stood ready to create a qualified colored ministry.  “Our friends,” he concluded, “will 
honor the race far more for being ready to expose corruption than for covering it up.”38
 The effect of Washington’s maneuvers was powerful, and his critique worked on 
two different fronts.  First, he presented himself as a trusted reformer before white, 
northeastern philanthropic circles dominated by the AMA, and, second, he used  his 
standing with northeastern donors to tighten control over his black competitors. Multiple 
papers reprinted Washington’s letter to the Freeman, along with Payne’s letter of support, 
leading to a seemingly interminable debate in the black press over Washington’s 
statements.  Ida B. Wells, the black firebrand journalist from Memphis, read 
Washington’s letter in the Detroit Plaindealer and felt compelled to commend him on his 
“manly criticism of our corrupt and ignorant ministry.”  Others were much less 
complimentary.  The Reverend J. M. Henderson of Detroit complained about the brilliant 
rhetorical move that Washington had accomplished.  “Every self respecting minister who 
inclines to remonstrate against this wholesale slander upon his class,” he explained, is 
liable to the response, “‘why do the worthy ministers seek to screen the unworthy?’”  
What most offended Henderson was Washington’s “farcical heroism, with much vanity 
posing as a great reformer who is prosecuted and threatened on every hand.”  For Payne, 
Henderson had only contempt, calling him cynical, out of touch, and old.  Others 
reversed the contempt.  One anonymous minister wrote to the editor of the Freeman, 
“The colored ministry, as a whole, never thought enough of the attempt of the Professor 
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[Washington] to gain notoriety to reply to him; but when such a person as Bishop Payne 
comes forward with such a statement, it is time for the Southern ministry to rise.”39
 A debate begun in one paper often spilled into another.  Ida B. Wells, reading the 
Plaindealer in Memphis, reprinted Henderson’s rejoinder in her paper, the Memphis Free 
Speech, and offered the not-entirely-candid editorial comment, “[I]t would seem to an 
impartial observer that the preachers who have protested against Prof. Washington and 
Bishop Payne’s severe arraignment ‘protest too much.’”  In turn, the Plaindealer 
reprinted her editorial critiquing Henderson’s letter, and Henderson offered his response, 
essentially reiterating his earlier objections.  A week later, on January 2, 1891, the 
Plaindealer published an editorial summary of the nationwide remonstration against 
Washington, noting that “with only a few exceptions every writer on the subject has 
stooped to traduce Prof. Washington to accuse him of selling his opinions for ill-gotten 
gains, of slandering his race to curry favor with white men.”  For example, the Southern 
Recorder quoted a Bishop Gaines dismissing Washington as “a sycophant, selling out his 
race for money,” and calling upon the Lord to “take charge of our children [at Tuskegee] 
. . . especially our girls.”  In an AME Zion paper, Bishop J. W. Hood, one of the earliest 
AME Zion bishops in the South and a staunch emancipationist, threw his own authority 
against Washington (while studiously ignoring Payne) in order to repudiate Washington’s 
“wild, random, thoughtless, and as I fully believe, slanderous statement, respecting 
colored ministers.”40
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 The reason Washington struck such a raw nerve, as the Plaindealer perceptively 
explained, was the common belief that “the history of the church is the history of the 
race. Its progress is the race’s progress.”  Because criticizing the progress of the church 
was the same as criticizing the race, Washington’s detractors complained that criticizing 
the race in the face of white hostility was self-defeating.  More incisively, because the 
black church was the only institution solely within black control, it offered an 
autonomous social space where African Americans, apart from the supervision of their 
would-be white rulers, could develop and practice what the anthropologist James C. Scott 
has called the “hidden transcript” that oppressed groups cultivate beneath the surface of 
public accommodation.  Washington’s criticism was an assault on the black church’s 
status as an autonomous social space and, by extension, its dissident subculture.  His 
comments threatened to subsume black religious communalism under the bourgeois 
individualism of industrial market culture.  That threat provoked a harsh response from 
both emancipationists, who resisted the acculturating impulse, and some acculturationists, 
who had previously been in support of Washington but thought his charge was unfair or 
unwise.  As one AME Zion minister complained, Washington’s condemnation raised the 
question of “which one of the colors he belongs to, for the whites as a rule say better 
things than these about us as a race.”  More presciently, another reader in the Plaindealer 
objected that Washington’s censure was too close to that of racists, whose complaints of 
“Negro immorality” and a lack of “Negro intelligence” were “the lying weapons used by 
our white enemies to prove our unfitness for the civil and social household.”  Even to 
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many supporters of racial uplift, Washington’s criticism had crossed the line and too 
closely mirrored the criticism of racist whites.41
 During the decade after his article was published, Washington did not change his 
critique but instead expanded his two-front operation (raising money and consolidating 
his leadership position before northern white philanthropists and among other black 
elites) by adding more anecdotes and criticism to his arsenal.  Before a Birmingham 
audience in 1899 he told a story, repeated often thereafter, about an old black woman 
who wandered into an Episcopal worship service.  Midway through the liturgy, after the 
rector had begun his sermon, she began to moan and clap in the back of the sanctuary.  
Her exhibition broke up the service, and a church officer went back to stop the 
commotion.  Switching into the imaginary conversation, Washington parodied both 
parties: “‘What’s the matter with you, aunty, are you sick?’  ‘No, sir; I’se happy; I’se got 
religion. Yes, sir, I’se got religion.’  ‘Why, don’t you know,’ said the officer, without 
thinking, ‘that this isn’t the place to get religion?’”  Although his story poked fun at both 
black and white, it also illustrated his often-repeated claim that African American 
religion was “a mere matter of form or emotionalism.”42
 Deepening his critique, Washington also began connecting the emotionalism of 
black religion with what he saw as the tendency “to live in the next world.”  Before the 
National Unitarian Association in 1894, he claimed that three-quarters of a Negro sermon 
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in the South consisted of an imaginary description of heaven and pointed out the apparent 
contradiction that “our people like to talk about heavenly mansions, and at the same time 
are content to live in one-room cabins in this world.  They like to talk about golden 
slippers, and too often go barefooted here.”  Washington implicitly invoked the success 
ethic of the AMA, claiming that the otherworldly orientation of African American 
theology inhibited black parishioners from advancement in this world.  After quoting 
from the hymn “Give me Jesus,” which was otherworldly in its lyrics, he explained that 
black parishioners needed to understand that to have Jesus “in a substantial way” was to 
“mix in some land, cotton and corn and a good bank account.”  The result, he proclaimed 
“by actual experience,” was that “the man who has Jesus in this way has a religion that 
you can count on seven days in the week.”43
But the implication of his praise for a religion “that you can count on” was his 
connection of African American religious emotionalism with shiftlessness and moral 
unreliability.  Because he claimed that black religion looked to the future and not the 
present, he intimated that the rules of bourgeois society did not make much of an 
impression on many black Christians and their moral character was suspect at best.  To 
the 1899 Birmingham audience, Washington reiterated one of his mentor’s maxims, “it is 
mighty hard to make a good Christian out of a hungry man.”  In case they missed his 
point, he went on, simultaneously criticizing black religion and showing the menace to 
those around its adherents: “A negro goes home from church, where he has been shouting 
and praying, as a negro so loves to do, and if he finds nothing to eat at home, he very 
generally goes out and finds something to eat before morning.”  In other words, he at 
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once suggested that black religious worship and piety held a tenuous connection to the 
black moral code and also insinuated that white property was in peril because of it.  If 
black clerical leaders were retrained to honor work, thrift, and honesty, Washington 
claimed, the ministers in turn would retrain their parishioners, which would lead to what 
he considered the increasing civilization of the race as a whole.44
Christianity, Segregation, and White Man’s Burden 
 Washington’s embrace of the civilizing mission would work only so long as 
northern philanthropists maintained substantial influence in the South, but in the post-
Civil War South rulership was not stable.  With the inauguration of Jim Crow the regime 
changed, and control flowed to southern politicians and northern businessmen who were 
less sanguine about the possibility of black acculturation.  Unfortunately for Washington, 
his appeal to the civilizing mission played into the hands of southern segregationists, who 
began using the categories of the civilizing mission and the moral ideals enforceable by 
the moral establishment, as reason to impose segregation throughout the South.  Caught 
in the transfer of power, Washington faced an altered context in which his support for the 
civilizing mission—with its clear similarity to the racist arguments of southern politicians 
and northern businessmen—had a different political valence than he had originally 
intended.  Simultaneously, southern white and northern business response to Washington 
showed the beginnings of the twentieth century southern moral establishment, which 
would cite Afro-Americans putative moral incapacity as reason to exclude them from full 
citizenship. 
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In 1895 Washington gave the speech at the Atlanta Expostion to a large crowd of 
white southerners and northern businessmen that served as a turning point in his 
prominence as a black leader and in the constituencies he was most concerned to manage.  
Later dubbed the “Atlanta Compromise” by W. E. B. Du Bois, it catapulted Washington 
onto the national stage as the preeminent African American leader in the country because 
he seemed to offer an exchange of black political and social rights for economic 
advancement.  The speech itself was made against the backdrop of the southern embrace 
of segregation, enforced by law and lynching throughout the South.  Washington’s 
speech took its meaning in large part from the hardening southern racial policies, and he 
equivocated so that different members of the audience could hear what they wanted.  
Urging black southerners to “cast down your bucket where you are,” Washington warned 
that the “greatest danger” in the leap out of slavery was that black laborers might forget 
that “we shall prosper in proportion as we learn to dignify and glorify common labour, 
and put brains and skills into the common occupations of life.”  To his southern white 
listeners, he urged beneficence and tolerance, while assuaging their concern for social 
mixing. He confessed that black southerners stood ready to interlace “industrial, 
commercial, civil, and religious life with yours in a way that shall make the interests of 
both races one,” but he treaded a fine line, agreeing that “in all things that are purely 
social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to 
mutual progress.”  Although he rejected “artificial forcing” on the social question, 
Washington confidently proclaimed that “no race that has anything to contribute to the 
markets of the world is long in any degree ostracized.”  Seemingly trading the political 
demand of equal rights for economic opportunity, he announced a plan of racial uplift in 
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terms that appealed to white southerners, northern businessmen, and, at least initially, 
prominent African Americans and that sealed his stature as the preeminent spokesman for 
black people in the United States.45
 One of the most significant results of his speech was Washington’s increased 
visibility to northern business philanthropists.  The February before he gave the address, 
Washington met William Henry Baldwin Jr., then the second vice president of the 
Southern Railway.  Baldwin had been born in Boston of abolitionist ancestors but became 
part of the rising business elite with broad connections within northern business 
philanthropy.  Businessmen were some of the strongest supporters of the moral 
establishment, eschewing regulation in economic affairs but enthusiastic about the effort 
to impose Christian moral standards on the nation as a whole.  Comstock’s prodigious 
support from Morris K. Jesup was in that way not unusual, and Washington sought to 
replicate it in the South.  Recognizing Baldwin’s potential benefit to Tuskegee, 
Washington invited Baldwin to join the board of trustees, and Baldwin accepted after 
making a thorough inspection of the school.  To appeal to the sensibility that Baldwin 
represented, Washington began retooling his speeches and his image to make him 
friendly to business interests of the North and South.  In 1900 he began the National 
Negro Business League, an effort to promote black business that also advertised his 
business-friendliness to potential donors.  Most importantly, he wrote his second 
autobiography, Up from Slavery, which told a (literally) rags-to-respectability story of 
self-help and self-reliance that appealed to the business elite. Washington presented 
himself as a leader who rose to the top by pluck, perseverance, and willingness to work, 
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and utilizing a trope of self-dependence and moral responsibility, he portrayed himself as 
one type of black man in contrast to others, confirming his superiority before business 
philanthropists as the paramount black leader.46
The comparison between his leadership and that of minister-politicians is one of 
the most striking themes of the work, and his rhetorical comparisons figured centrally in 
his support for the civilizing mission.  Contrasting his own work ethic with theirs, 
Washington again accused black ministers of laziness, which lay behind ministerial 
ambition and, to some extent, defined ministerial theology.  He told the story of a black 
minister, “one of the numerous local preachers,” who tried to convince him that all work 
was sin because God had cursed labor after the Garden of Eden.  The week that 
Washington found him, he explained, “he seemed . . . supremely happy, because he was 
living, as he expressed it, through one week that was free from sin.”  He also used the 
idea of a ministerial call to further undercut ministerial credibility, imputing ministers 
with manipulation as well as laziness.  Though he reiterated his story of the man in the 
cotton field, he told another of a man in church, surrounded by the worshipping black 
community.  When the call came, “[w]ithout warning the one called would fall upon the 
floor as if struck by a bullet, and would lie there for hours, speechless and motionless. 
Then the news would spread all through the neighbourhood that this individual had 
received a ‘call.’”  With barely concealed disapproval, Washington acknowledged that if 
the man were inclined against the divine summons, “he would fall or be made to fall a 
second or third time. In the end he always yielded to the call.”  Because almost everyone 
who received an education also received a call, Washington confessed that when he had 
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earlier longed to read and write he feared that if successful he too “would receive one of 
these ‘calls.’”  Lest the reader miss the obvious contrast, Washington pointed out that 
“for some reason, my call never came.”47
The biography was very successful, and appeal to the moral establishment’s 
civilizing mission was about to pay off.  In 1899 Baldwin began an endowment campaign 
“to relieve the principal, Booker T. Washington, somewhat of the constant daily strain of 
collecting the money for the daily life of the institution and give him time for the 
executive work of the school.”  Before the year was out, Washington held a fund-raising 
meeting in Madison Square Garden in New York City with the leading lights of business 
in attendance, many of whom were among the strongest supporters of the moral 
establishment, including John P. Morgan, Morris K. Jessup, Charles H. Parkhurst, John 
D. Rockefeller, and Collis P. Huntington.  Washington began the meeting by reading a 
letter from Grover Cleveland expressing his regret that he could not attend and informing 
Washington that he had secured a matching donation from an unnamed woman in a 
western city for twenty-five thousand dollars.  The sizable contribution encouraged 
others, and Washington began working over the next couple of years for an even larger 
amount.  For that, Washington’s autobiography had already begun to achieve results.  
After Up from Slavery came out, his publisher, Frank Doubleday, entertained the 
industrialist-turned-philanthropist Andrew Carnegie between golf shots by reading from 
Washington’s work.  Carnegie’s interest was piqued, and he promised twenty thousand 
dollars for a new library at Tuskegee a little over a month after the Madison Square 
Garden event.  Although the gift was fairly routine, since Carnegie gave sums all over the 
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country to build so-called Carnegie libraries, Washington used it to gain more.  After the 
library was built, Carnegie was so impressed by the two-story brick building’s low cost 
of twenty thousand dollars that he began donating ten thousand dollars a year for 
Tuskegee’s operating expenses.48
The signs looked promising, but Washington had no idea what Carnegie would do 
next.  At a second Madison Square Garden fund-raiser in 1903, Washington made 
another stab at attracting a large donation.  This time Grover Cleveland was in 
attendance, and Cleveland began the meeting with what he took to be a sympathetic 
address for Tuskegee’s cause.  Proclaiming that emancipation did not erase the “racial 
and slavery-bred imperfections and deficiencies” among Negroes, Cleveland explained 
that their chief problem was a lack of moral standards, most importantly, “a grievous 
amount of ignorance, a sad amount of viciousness, and a tremendous amount of laziness 
and thriftlessness.”  He proclaimed his full sympathy with the white South and averred 
that because nine-tenths of the black population lived in the South, white southerners 
were “entitled to our utmost consideration and sympathetic fellowship.”  It was “their 
material prosperity, their peace, and even the safety of their civilization interwoven with 
the negro problem.”  But precisely because “the solution of the negro problem must . . . 
bear the heat of the day and stagger under the weight of the white man’s burden,” he 
threw himself behind Tuskegee’s goal of helping fit the Negro for “his place” and 
proclaimed himself a friend of the Negro.  Cleveland was not alone in intertwining praise 
for Washington with racist and denigrating comments about black people. Edgar Gardner 
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Murphy, an Episcopal minister from Montgomery, Alabama, warned forebodingly that 
“the rotting body” of black ignorance and moral decay that was “polluting the 
atmosphere we breathe.”  Still he assured his audience, “amid all the bewildering and 
rasping nonsense of pro-negro sentimentality,” Tuskegee stood apart “with incomparable 
dignity and sanity.”  Carnegie sat listening in Cleveland’s box, and, whatever the 
philanthropist thought about the speakers’ comments, three days later he gave Tuskegee 
$600,000 in U.S. Steel bonds, one quarter of which were for Washington himself.  
Calling him “[t]he modern Moses, who leads his race and lifts it through Education to 
even better and higher things than a land overflowing with milk and honey,” Carnegie 
wanted Washington to be free of pecuniary worries so that he could go about his mission 
as he saw fit.  Finally, Washington’s financial worries were over.49
 Yet as the insidiously racist comments of Cleveland showed, the logic of 
Washington’s civilizing mission had begun to unravel.  Of course, Grover Cleveland and 
others were not relying on Washington when they concluded that southern African 
Americans lacked a fully formed bourgeois morality, and Washington was not 
responsible for their criticism.  From the antebellum period, southern whites had 
complained of the putative laziness, immorality, and general unreliability of their slaves, 
a criticism that continued after the Civil War.  But Washington consciously advanced the 
civilizing mission with similar complaints.  Although his criticism bore close 
resemblance to that of racists, it was always predicated upon the possibility of black 
progress outlined by the acculturationist program of the AMA, but when the AMA’s 
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influence in the South diminished, first with the end of Reconstruction and then with the 
advent of Jim Crow, Washington’s civilizing mission acquired a different political 
valence than it had earlier possessed.  Instead, in the words of the African American 
historian Kevin Gaines, “Within the repressive New South social and economic order of 
disfranchisement, political terror, debt slavery, and gerrymandering,” the advocacy of 
racial uplift and the civilizing mission “constituted a measure of ideological collusion 
with discriminatory ideologies and practices.”50
The charge of ideological collusion began at the inception of the Jim Crow regime 
and deepened as the systematic oppression expanded.  As early as 1899, Washington 
received a rebuke from T. Thomas Fortune, the prominent black editor of the New York 
Age and, at the time, a strong Washington ally.  Fortune had read an article in the New 
York Evening Post that quoted Washington claiming that he was, in Fortune’s 
paraphrase, “more discouraged than ever in your life about your own race.”  He warned 
Washington that he could not afford to get discouraged, especially in print, because that 
would do more “than anything else to discourage the friends of your work and to lessen 
the financial support of your work.”  Most importantly, Fortune continued, the Post 
article “knocks the props from under you by placing you in an attitude of doubt upon the 
vital question of the race’s moral reliability.”  He admonished Washington that even if he 
had his doubts, he should have kept them to himself so as not to “give the whole case 
away.”51
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Instead of acknowledging the problem, Washington initially blamed the AMA, 
revealing a split that began with Washington’s decision to court northern business 
philanthropy and southern political support.  As Washington complained to Francis J. 
Grimké in 1898, AMA officers “do everything in a sly way to hinder the work at 
Tuskegee.”  In response to Fortune’s complaint, Washington assumed that the statement 
had come from a joint press conference following his European trip that the AMA had 
subsidized, and he explained to Fortune that he was careful to have his secretary by his 
side in order to verify what was said.  At issue, Washington thought, was that “the funds 
of the A.M.A. have been dropping off lately and they want to place me in the same bag 
with themselves.”  But the AMA’s operating budget had begun a slow but steady incline 
over the prior decade, an incline that would continue into the first decade of the twentieth 
century even as its political influence diminished.52
In fact, the increasing division between Washington and the AMA was about 
more than money and bore directly on Fortune’s criticism.  Toward the end of the 1890s, 
the AMA began to lose confidence in the civilizing mission, which it had originally 
undertaken in the belief that inculcating freed slaves with a specific set of cultural 
characteristics would ensure black success in the free labor system.  In the early 
imagination of the AMA, formal equality before the law—with just a minimal level of 
governmental and philanthropic intervention to retrain the moral character of freed 
slaves—would yield an upwardly mobile society in which opportunity was the norm. Yet 
the liberal narrative of progress on which the civilizing mission rested contained a 
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fundamental weakness.  Faced with the intransigence of southern racism, which placed 
all African Americans, regardless of individual characteristics, behind the barrier of a 
racial caste, many initial supporters of the AMA mission began wondering if a formal 
definition of equality would ever produce the kind of upward social mobility envisioned 
by proponents of the civilizing mission.  It seemed more likely that southern African 
Americans would form a laboring proletariat under the rule of their one-time masters who 
appealed to the supposed moral inadequacies of Afro-Americans as reasons for their 
political marginalization.  Some in the AMA began to acknowledge the darker sides of 
their ideas of progress and racial development, especially when southern racists began 
using the slow pace of progress to justify segregation.  When that happened, the AMA 
reconsidered its financial and intellectual support of the civilizing mission, as the 
Southern moral establishment locked into place.53
 At no time was Washington’s dilemma more apparent than June 1900, when John 
Roach Straton, a white, conservative, Southern Baptist minister, launched a salvo against 
Washington in the North American Review.  The essay argued for segregation from the 
very premises that Washington used to validate his civilizing mission.  Straton began by 
singling out Washington’s educational model as the solution that most recognized the 
truncated extent of black capacity and the slow process of racial development.  Among 
the white minister’s many claims, Straton argued that racial development occurred over 
centuries, that blacks’ immorality and criminality showed them far behind the Anglo-
Saxon, and that in racial encounters the weaker race often faced destruction.  With the 
abolition of slavery, Straton claimed, the Negro found himself in situations for which he 
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was not fit.  Because post–Civil War social arrangements departed from the antebellum 
way of life, black racial development, he argued, had not yet progressed sufficiently to 
meet the new conditions, and the Negro was “weakening perceptibly in his physical 
manhood year after year,” as well as “degenerating as regards thrift and industry.”  The 
proponents of black education were wrong to assume that it could solve the race problem, 
Straton insisted, because “the true civilizing process is not a sudden and artificial 
development from without, but a gradual and harmonious growth from within.”  Because 
racial contact in the South would prove disastrous to the weaker race, Straton suggested 
the “great responsibility” of white people “in the presence of this simple-minded, 
impressionable and imitative people” required a different social arrangement.  To protect 
the Negro race and allow it to develop mentally and morally, Straton urged racial 
segregation and the large-scale deployment of Washington’s educational plan.54
 Faced with Straton’s attack, which in too many ways resonated with his own 
views, Washington could only lamely respond, “We must not pass judgment on the negro 
too soon.”  He did not differ markedly with Straton’s assumptions, only his conclusions, 
and Washington could not deny that his numerous comments criticizing the moral code 
of black people and the quality of their leaders tended to undermine whatever else he 
might say about black moral reliability.  At the same time, the increasingly derogatory 
estimations of black potential and character—like Grover Cleveland’s charge of 
ignorance, viciousness, laziness, and thriftlessness—placed Washington in a quandary in 
responding to Straton, because many of Washington’s own white supporters had begun 
pointing to black immorality and criminality as a reason to deny civil rights to African 
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Americans.  His response, then, was very tempered.  Washington agreed, “it requires 
centuries for the influence of home, school, church, and public contact to permeate the 
mass of millions of people, so that the upward tendency may be apparent.”  This did not 
mean that black people were not improving, he claimed, even if it took centuries to show 
the results.  On the delicate subject of black morals, Washington offered no protest and 
instead conceded that African Americans had a problem, but he shifted the blame.  
Although he appreciated Straton’s “special stress upon the moral weakness of the race,” 
Washington held the system of slavery ultimately responsible.  Granting that African 
American morals were lax, especially in “improper relations between the sexes,” 
Washington explained that because slave owners encouraged lax sexual mores during 
slavery, “a custom that was fostered for three centuries cannot be blotted out in one 
generation.”  The salient point, according to Washington, was not “that the negro has not 
done better, but that he has done as well as he has.”  Instead of segregation, Washington 
counseled that his educational method, “a judicious system of industrial, mental and 
religious training,” would, in time, “solve the race problem.”55
 While Washington puzzled over how to move forward, saber rattling began from 
other black leaders, who were growing concerned that Washington’s continued embrace 
of the civilizing mission played into the southern white impulse to place all African 
Americans behind the barrier of race.  In 1902 William Monroe Trotter, the radical 
Boston newspaperman and a future Du Bois ally, denounced what he called 
Washington’s “race belittlement.” With outrage and dripping sarcasm, Trotter protested 
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Washington’s methods of fund-raising “by his crocodile tears here in the North” in order 
to open “a little Jim-Crow ‘Theological school,’ at Tuskegee, to which he points, telling 
northern white men ‘I teach the Negro an industrialized religion too.’”  Because 
Washington knew that the black ministry wielded tremendous influence, Trotter thought 
that he hoped “to undermine this influence, by telling his followers that ‘the minister who 
has not a bank account is not to be believed or trusted.’”  Rising to his climax, Trotter 
addressed Washington directly in a series of not-entirely-rhetorical questions: “How long, 
O Booker, will you abuse our patience?  How long do you think your scheming will 
escape us?  To what end will your vaulting ambition hurl itself?  Does not the fear of 
future hate and execration . . . in no wise move you?”  A year later, W. E. B. Du Bois 
entered the fray with his The Souls of Black Folk.  Although Du Bois to some extent 
shared Washington’s distaste for the folk worship practices of rural African Americans, 
he complained repeatedly of “the distinct impression left by Mr. Washington’s 
propaganda” and was particularly concerned that Washington seemed to think “that the 
South is justified in its present attitude toward the Negro because of the Negro’s 
degradation.”  The next year Ida B. Wells-Barnett, having changed her mind about 
Washington, made the break as well. Complaining that Washington had “the ear of the 
American nation as no other Negro of our day” and was instrumental in “molding public 
sentiment and securing funds,” she wondered why he was willing “to injure his race for 
the benefit of his school” by reinforcing the false conception of black moral 
unreliability.56
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 The AMA weighed in as well, observing Washington’s pronouncements and 
turning instead toward his rivals.  In large part, the AMA’s shift was the result of its new 
president, Washington Gladden.  Gladden had wholeheartedly embraced the civilizing 
mission at first, but as he noted the dramatic rise of lynching and southern racism, he 
concluded that the mission was inadequate to ensure black success, if not misguided 
entirely.  After he was elected to head the AMA in 1901, Gladden began talking to other 
black leaders, and in 1903 he made a visit to Atlanta University, where he met W. E. B. 
Du Bois, who gave him a copy of his newly published book, The Souls of Black Folk.  
Gladden was so moved that he devoted most of his next Sunday’s sermon to the book, 
asking his audience to “[i]magine yourself living in a civilization whose overwhelming 
sentiment puts you into a lower nature of being and means to keep you there.”  Although 
he acknowledged that Washington’s emphasis on “economic efficiency” was a “great 
need,” Gladden observed, “Mr. Washington emphasizes the argument that if the Negro 
will but succeed in a material way all doors will be open to him. But that is not quite 
certain. The history of the Jews is evidence that industry and thrift do not disarm race 
prejudice.”  In contrast, Gladden claimed that Du Bois’s book refuted Washington, 
explaining to his audience that Du Bois had shown how African American “political 
degradation” was responsible for whatever “economic inefficiency” existed, not vice 
versa.  Later that year during his AMA presidential address, Gladden expanded on his 
sermon and drove home the new mission of the AMA.  “For this Association,” he 
explained, “the way of duty is very clear. It finds itself now, at the beginning of this 
century, with a sacred charge to keep. . . . If ever there was need to hold up the standards 
of justice and to reaffirm the fact of human brotherhood, that need is now upon us.”  
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Those standards of justice included a more substantive equality and different moral 
calculus than the kind that underwrote the civilizing mission, and the AMA dropped its 
earlier support.  A year later Gladden aligned his organization with the emerging Du Bois 
faction when he invited Du Bois to address the 1904 AMA annual meeting.57
 Faced with abandonment by the AMA, criticism from other black leaders, and the 
rather dim evaluations of black character from his own white supporters, once 
Washington achieved his financial independence in 1903 he began backpedaling.  At a 
celebration of Lincoln’s birthday in New York in February 1904, Washington assured his 
audience that “[f]rom both a moral and a religious point of view, what measure of 
education the Negro has received, has paid, and there has been no backward step in any 
state.”  Though not entirely a ringing endorsement of black moral and religious standards, 
he continued to fight Straton’s assertion that the greater the education black people 
received, the greater the extent of their criminality.  Instead, Washington warned that 
moral progress should not be judged by the man on the street and promised his listeners 
that “the moral lines are beginning to be as strictly drawn in my race as in yours, and it 
must not be forgotten that we are as proud of our race as you are of yours, and that the 
more progress we make in education, the more satisfaction do we find in our own homes 
and social circles.”58
                                                 
57 White, Liberty and Justice For All, 132-141 (first through sixth quotations on p. 138, seventh and eighth 
quotations on p. 139).  The AMA’s shifting positions paralleled similar movements among humanitarians 
and missionary enthusiasts in Great Britain, although not on precisely the same timeline. See, for example, 
Andrew Porter, “Trusteeship, Anti-Slavery, and Humanitarianism,” and “Religion, Missionary Enthusiasm, 
and Empire,” in Andrew Porter, ed., The Nineteenth Century, Oxford History of the British Empire 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 198-221, 222-246. 
 
58 “A Lincoln’s Birthday Address in New York City,” February 12, 1904, in Washington, Papers, 7: 432 
(first quotation), 435 (second quotation). 
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Clearly still bothered by ongoing criticism and the increasingly bestial depictions 
of black people in the press, in July 1905 Washington contributed an article to the North 
American Review entitled “The Religious Life of the Negro.”  Washington warned that 
many people viewed black religious life as static and unchanging when, in fact, “the 
Negro people, in respect to their religious life, have been, almost since they landed in 
America, in a process of change and growth.”  Having laid the rationale for his change in 
public statements, Washington recounted the religious history of African Americans from 
Africa to the United States as a narrative of progress, though elements of his old 
statements remained.  He claimed, for example, “It was natural and inevitable that the 
Negro Church, coming into existence as it did under slavery, should permit the religious 
life of the Negro to express itself in ways almost wholly detached from morality.  There 
was little in slavery to encourage the sense of personal responsibility.”  But on the whole 
his assessment of contemporary black religion was positive, and he consoled his readers 
that “the leaders of the different denominations of the Negro Church are beginning to 
recognize the force of the criticism made against it.”59
Later that year he continued his new direction in an article published in the 
Independent.  Gone was any criticism of black religion or the black ministry.  Instead, 
Washington again defended black improvement, this time gesturing toward “what the 
Negro himself has been doing during the past forty years . . . thru the religious 
organizations controlled by him.”  After explaining that more than two-thirds of black 
adults were members of a church, he moved through each major denomination, Baptist, 
AME, AME Zion, and Colored Methodist, providing detailed accounts of money spent 
                                                 
 
59 Washington, “The Religious Life of the Negro,” North American Review, 181 (July 1905), 20–23, ibid., 
8:333 (first quotation), 334 (second quotation), 335 (third quotation).  
 213
by each throughout the previous year.  Concluding that in the last ten years, “the Negro in 
America has contributed at least $2,000,000 thru his churches toward his own education,” 
Washington praised what he thought was “a pretty good record for a race of people which 
was in slavery forty years ago.”  With that, he tried to drop the issue and move back to 
more comfortable ground.60
 Unfortunately, the ground was shifting under him.  At no time was Washington’s 
paradox, or his tragedy, more apparent than in 1906, Tuskegee’s twenty-fifth anniversary.  
That May, Washington received near universal acclaim from the business community at a 
gala in Tuskegee, with Carnegie and others offering laudatory support.  Judging by the 
gala, it would have been easy to conclude that Washington’s civilizing mission had 
fulfilled its original hopes of integrating southern African Americans into the nation as 
full citizens, a conclusion that would have been disastrously false.  Though people of the 
highest political and economic clout once again surrounded Washington, the threat of 
lynching and vigilante justice had only increased for many black southerners over the 
prior twenty years.  Unfortunately, Tuskegee’s twenty-fifth anniversary was not the 
reason that 1906 would be remembered.  Instead, that year saw the five-day-long Atlanta 
race riot in late September, an orgy of violence prolonged by police disarmament of black 
residents and the decision to deputize two hundred aggressive whites.  The riot vividly 
demonstrated the failure of Washington’s strategy, and he made his way to the city two 
days afterward, completely at a loss for how to respond.  After casting about for two 
weeks, he wrote a confidential letter to the founder of the Philadelphia Tribune, calling 
for “the leading classes of Southern white people to shoulder the responsibility of the 
                                                 
60 Washington, “Negro Self-Help,” Independent, 59 (November 23, 1905), 1207–8, ibid., 8: 445 (first 
quotation), 448 (second and third quotations). 
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protection of the Negro.”  Four weeks later he publicly elaborated his new formula at the 
Alabama State Fair.  Trying to calm racial tension, he warned against imputing the 
laziness and immorality of a segment of black people onto the race as a whole, and he 
expressed concern that the estrangement of the races would lead to the perpetuation of 
such confusion, with possibly violent results.  As a remedy, Washington encouraged a 
return “to the old days when there was a closer touch between the best element of negroes 
and the best element of white people” and urged black ministers to open their pulpits and 
encourage “the best white ministers and white leaders [to] talk to his people.”  He was 
confident of the future, he assured his audience, because he believed that the white people 
of the South were beginning to realize their duty “to enlighten and civilize” not just the 
heathens of Africa and Asia but also “the black man that lives right by their side.”  
Washington’s civilizing mission had become, in short, the white man’s burden.61
After the Atlanta Riot, Washington lost all direction, and his civilizing mission 
reached its sad apotheosis in a talk given six years later.  Addressing the Men and 
Religion Forward Movement, Washington proclaimed that no people should be more 
interested in Christianizing southern African Americans than “the captains of industry,” 
because “nothing pays so well in producing efficient labor as Christianity. Religion 
increases the wants of the laborer.”  Since the man “with the spirit of Christ in his head 
and heart wants land, wants a good house, wants another house, wants decent furniture,” 
Washington reasoned that people with money in North and South should be interested in 
                                                 
61 Washington to Christopher James Perry, October 5, 1906, ibid., 9:86 (first quotation); “Excerpts from a 
Speech at the Alabama State Fair,” October 27, 1906, ibid., 9:107 (second through fifth quotations).  For a 
contemporary account of the twenty-fifth anniversary celebration, see “An Account of the Twenty-fifth 
Anniversary of Tuskegee Institute by Jesse Max Barber,” May 1906, ibid., 9:15–24.  On violence and the 
conflicted colonial consciousness, see Paolo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman 
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black Christianization, which would lead to the advancement of both the race and the 
economic prowess of the United States.  Coming to his conclusion, Washington intoned, 
“Through the medium of religion let us continue to multiply the wants of the Negro, and 
they will render six days of honest labor in order to supply these increased wants, and 
thus become one of the most efficient class of laborers that the world has seen.”  It was a 
theme he would stick to for the remainder of his life, appealing to the moral 
establishment in a vain attempt to forestall violence, by promising that the civilizing 
mission offered a bright future of mutual enrichment.62
The central issue in Washington’s pronouncements was the widely shared belief 
that productive citizenship required certain internal moral characteristics that Afro-
Americans did not possess.  Because black Christianity ostensibly remained detached 
from Afro-American morality, in the perspective of moral establishment proponents the 
millions of black Americans posed a threat to American democracy.  As J.L.M. Curry 
wrote to Washington in 1898 complaining of American territorial ambition and what he 
considered “the stupid willingness to incorporate millions of untrained into our 
citizenship,” American citizenship required training in self-control and self-government 
to perpetuate itself in liberty.  The question in Curry’s mind was “how we shall discharge 
the debt; social, civil, religious, [that] we owe to our Afro-American citizenship.”  Yet if 
citizenship required internalized moral values that, according to religious partisans, were 
grounded in religious belief and practice, then Afro-American citizenship, in so far as 
Afro-Americans rejected the religious ideals of the moral establishment, was always in 
question in the South.  The call to civilizing benevolence that Washington frequently 
                                                 
62 “Extracts of an Address before the Men and Religion Forward Movement,” April 21, 1912, in 
Washington, Papers, 9:527. 
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sounded entailed a simultaneous acknowledgement that, according to the moral 
establishment, perhaps Afro-Americans did not possess the requisite moral characteristics 
for full citizenship.  As the civilizing mission failed to yield the transformation that 
northern whites and Washington had anticipated, southern white proponents of 
segregation were able to point to black resistance to the civilizing mission as evidence 
that the southern Afro-Americans required segregation for the good of American 
democracy and the maintenance of the southern moral establishment.  It was their vision 
of the southern moral establishment that emerged dominant at the end of the nineteenth 
century, in which the imperatives of social maintenance, in this case with a decidedly 
racial cast, overcame the black argument for individuals and equal rights.
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CHAPTER FOUR.  THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
 
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression.  In our 
Government the real power lies in the majority. 
—James Madison1
 
In the United States religion not only regulates mores, but extends its empire over intelligence.  
Among the Anglo-Americans, some profess Christian dogmas because they believe them, other 
because they are afraid of not looking like they believe them.  Christianity therefore reigns without 
obstacles, on the admission of all.   
—Alexis de Tocqueville2
 
In 1854, the Missouri Supreme Court handed down a ruling that, on first blush, 
did not seem very different from the many other antebellum Sabbath law cases.  The 
opinion touched on familiar themes.  It claimed, for example, that the organic law of a 
constitution took its meaning from “the people for whom it was ordained,” and, because 
the Missouri state constitution appeared to have been made by “Christian men,” 
Christianity was written upon the Constitution itself and protected as the law of the land.  
In response to the defendant’s claim that the Sabbath law violated his free exercise right, 
the court asked, “Convert Sunday into a worldly day by law, and what becomes of 
Christianity? How can we reconcile the idea to our understanding, that a people 
professing Christianity would make a fundamental law by which they would convert 
Sunday into a worldly day?”  Put succinctly, the court held that the Christian heritage of 
the United States, written into the Constitution, protected the religion of the people for 
whom it was written.3   
                                                 
1 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 17 October 1788, in Madison, Papers of James Madison, 11:298. 
 
2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 279. 
 
3 Missouri v. Ambs, 20 Missouri at 216 (first and second quotations), 219 (third quotation) (1854). 
Although the Christian nation rhetoric was more strident and thoroughgoing than 
ever, anxiety touched with outrage coursed through the opinion, signaling an unease not 
found in Justice Kent’s Ruggles verdict.  That outrage yielded a revealing aside that 
brought up the central issue facing the moral establishment.  To argue that the free 
exercise clause would prohibit the official observance of the Christian Sabbath was to 
imagine, according to the court, that the constitution was “an instrument framed for a 
state composed of strangers collected from all quarters of the globe, each with a religion 
of his own, bound by no previous social ties, nor sympathizing in any common 
reminiscences of the past.”  The court tried to argue that the Christian Sabbath, and the 
whole system of American law, in fact relied on a fundamental consensus, a shared 
pattern of religious belief rather than a pattern of exclusion or coercion, that sustained 
American democracy.  But by mid-century, the initial conflicts over the meaning of 
disestablishment had matured.  Socially and intellectually the country was becoming a 
very different place, and much more religiously, ethnically, and culturally diverse than it 
had been when Jefferson, Madison, and Paine had lived.  That complexity necessarily 
affected the moral establishment as changes in American societal organization challenged 
the traditional mechanisms of cultural reproduction.  The increased presence of 
freethinkers who denied the public authority of Christianity alarmed Christian leaders.  
Moral establishmentarians fretted that the nation was losing its moral compass and 
religious foundation.  Freethinkers, for their part, deplored the influence of the Protestant 
cultural authority, and provoked constant controversy by insisting that the United States 
could only live up to the promise of its founding by purging the remnants of an 
ecclesiastical establishment from its laws and politics.  Joining freethinkers were a small 
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group of nascent religious liberals, who walked a tightrope between sometime deference 
to the conservative clerical establishment and simultaneous reinterpretation (or 
abandonment) of traditional Christian creeds.4
 Although the conflict had not yet come into its fullness in 1854, the Missouri 
Court’s opinion pointed to the fundamental question Christian leaders would face as the 
United States became an industrialized society.  After what had seemed a promising 
beginning, the moral establishment was under attack.  Religious partisans fretted that the 
nation was devolving into anarchy or despotism.  They worried that the libertarian 
radicalism advocated by freethinkers would be unable to sustain the common bond or 
moral fiber to hold American society together.  More than anything, they claimed that, by 
rejecting the idea of God and the threat of divine sanction in the life of individuals, 
freethinkers cut loose the major incentive to moral obligation, creating individuals whose 
appetites and vices would rage without control.  In response, religious partisans 
mobilized to defend what they took to be the foundation and future of American culture.  
Freethinkers and their sympathizers met moral establishment proponents blow for blow, 
insisting that the official justification of the moral establishment, which gestured toward 
the cohesion and religious foundation of American society, was merely a pretense to 
mask their own desire for cultural and social power.  The resulting conflict ultimately 
pitted the rights of the individual against the prerogatives of the majority, and clarified 
the essential limitations of individualism under the moral establishment.5   
                                                 
4 Ibid., at 215. 
 
5 The phrase “libertarian radicalism” comes from Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, 23. 
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Challenges to the Moral Establishment 
  By 1854 when the Missouri court handed down its opinion, the urban-industrial 
transformation was already profoundly reordering the material bases of life in human 
society.  Over the course of eighty years, from the turn of the century to the 1880s, the 
United States fundamentally changed from a predominantly agricultural nation, with 
many family farms, small-scale artisanal manufacturing, and a merchant sector based in 
seaport cities that exported raw goods and imported manufactured items, to become an 
industrial powerhouse that produced manufactured goods for the United States and 
abroad.  It went, in short, from a relatively pastoral cluster of colonies to an expanding 
land empire dotted with cities on the order of Gotham.  The emergence of industrial 
capitalism entailed large-scale social transformations, like a massive migration from the 
countryside to cities, so that, increasingly, many Americans lived in urban centers and 
worked for industrial wages.  Transportation and communication networks consolidated 
the national economy, and the Civil War, though it briefly ruptured that financial system, 
actually provided the administrative networks and the accumulation of capital that 
prepped the northern industrial economy for take-off.  In addition, and in contradiction to 
the Missouri court’s argument, the increasingly robust industrial machine drew people 
from all over the globe to work as laborers in American factories, with immigration 
numbers surging from over a million and a half immigrants during the decade of the 
1840s to close to nine million in the first decade of the twentieth century.  Although the 
ultimate scale and result of the transformation was not apparent in 1854, the extent to 
which American society was changing was very apparent and, to proponents of the moral 
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establishment, a cause for great concern.6
Merely understanding the extraordinary social transformation posed a challenge, 
and the transformation necessarily had intellectual and political effects.  Perhaps most 
fundamentally, the rapid social changes showed the malleability of the social order itself.  
Because Christian social philosophy tended to trade in axiomatic, almost platitudinous 
statements of immutable and universal rules, it had to come to terms with a rapidly 
changing social order in which past rules no longer made sense.  Focusing on the 
stunning change, many social theorists came to the conclusion that a society was the 
product of its own history, and could not appeal to immutable laws or platitudinous 
axioms as a justification for social arrangements.  In other words, the seemingly simple 
proposal that a society was the product of its own history pointed out the contingency of 
social arrangements.  Charles Darwin’s 1859 publication of Origin of the Species 
extended the idea of contingency to the natural order itself, arguing that even species 
were subject to change according to external stimulus and environmental context.  The 
social and natural order, formerly fixed, came loose from their anchors, and social 
theorists, legal scholars, and ordinary people had to come to terms with a world lacking 
ultimate fixity.  Trained to think in axioms, many felt what that keen observer of the 
industrial transformation, Karl Marx, expressed: “All that is solid melts into air, all that is 
                                                 
6 On the urban-industrial transformation, see Sydney Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 749-750; Eric H. Monkkonen, America Becomes Urban: The 
Development of U.S. Cities & Towns 1780-1980 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 69-110; 
Klein, A Population History of the United States, 107-144.  On the social and intellectual effects of the 
industrial revolution, see Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American 
Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority, Second ed. (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2000), 1-47.  On the integration of markets and the unstable emergence of 
industrial capitalism, see George Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (New York: Rinehart 
and Co, 1958); Glenn Porter, The Rise of Big Business (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan-Davidson, 1992). 
 222
holy is profaned.”7
This profound revelation caused ripples both within Protestantism and outside it, 
challenging the prevailing legal framework and the somewhat complacent Protestant 
politico-moral assumptions.  In part, the challenge came from the somewhat amorphous 
group of people, with murky connections to one another, called freethinkers.  The 
freethought movement, to the extent that it could be called a movement, was a motley 
group composed of socialists, anarchists, spiritualists, agnostics, free love advocates, and 
a healthy dose of crackpots and eccentrics.  What united them was their absolute 
opposition to the influence of Christianity in American public life.  It was their initial 
forays into political debate the prompted Lyman Beecher, late in his life, to decry the 
reemergence of “infidelity of the Tom Paine school.”  Whom he had in mind in particular 
was the English socialist who had set up a utopian colony in the United States, Robert 
Owen.  Owen irritated religious sensibility in 1826 when he published his “Declaration of 
Mental Independence” to coincide with the fiftieth-anniversary celebration of the United 
States.  Freethought continued to grow throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, 
but, as mid-century social and intellectual development gained steam, changes began 
occurring within Protestantism itself.  Religious liberals responded to the social 
transformation by reworking standard evangelical creeds, rejecting formerly central 
                                                 
 
7 Karl Marx, “The Communist Manifesto,” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 
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doctrines in an effort to accommodate the theology of the church with the changing 
society.  Ironically, at the forefront of the nascent Protestant liberal movement was 
Lyman Beecher’s son, Henry Ward Beecher.  A large man of flowing hair, fashionable 
appearance, and amiable ideas, Henry Beecher was exquisitely attuned to the sensibilities 
of his upper-class parishioners, even after the debacle with Elizabeth Tilton.  Looking at 
him, it is tempting to say that liberals could be separated from their conservative 
counterparts by a change of temperament as much as doctrine.  Yet important doctrinal 
changes accompanied his geniality.  Beecher, and other religious liberals, embraced the 
idea of a progressive unfolding of divine revelation as culture developed historically.  As 
the historian Grant Wacker has argued, the liberal embrace of a historical understanding 
of culture is what, to a large extent, defined them as religious liberals.  The contingency 
and mutability of the historical process offered hope, not anxiety, to religious liberals, 
who welcomed what they saw as the breakdown of narrow, old creeds as the church came 
in tune with the spirit of the age and the progressive unfolding of the knowledge of God.  
Beecher in particular saw the progress of history as the enlargement of the sphere of 
revelation, “adding to the Bible the revelation of Nature, and of man’s reason and moral 
consciousness.”  When the sphere of revelation included reason and moral consciousness, 
humans necessarily began with “experience and observation” to unfold their theological 
understanding.  The result was a theology that recognized “the God idealized from our 
best ascertainments,” bringing human beings centrally into the development of theology 
as they responded to the historical unfolding of God.8
                                                 
8 Henry Ward Beecher, "Progress of Thought in the Church," North American Review 135 (August 1882): 
106 (first quotation), 116 (second and third quotation).  On the liberal embrace of a modern idea of history, 
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In the same way that he enlisted the historical process in his reformulation of 
theology, Beecher drew upon the doctrine of evolution, reconceived socially, to support 
his idea of the developmental enlargement of the knowledge of God.  He saw in 
Darwinism a natural metaphor for growth and change in human societies, in which the 
stronger and more complete representations of God would in time overcome the simpler 
and out-of-date ideas enshrined in creeds.  Putting it provocatively, Beecher claimed, “the 
unbelief of to-day is the faith of to-morrow. . . . The skepticism of honest men unfold the 
truth, and becomes the convictions of the aftertime.”  The evolutionary growth of the 
knowledge of God could be found in the Bible itself, he thought, as the cruder 
understanding of the Old Testament yielded to the fuller revelation of the New.  It was 
this emphasis on evolutionary change that first drew Beecher to the most prominent 
American freethinker, Robert Ingersoll.  In 1872, Beecher published an editorial in his 
weekly magazine, the Christian Union, satirizing the reaction of “some good people of 
Central Illinois” to Ingersoll’s sarcastic claim (quoting Alexander Pope), “an honest God 
is the noblest work of man.”  Ingersoll charged orthodox Christians with bad faith, 
upholding a creed that offended contemporary moral sensibilities while self-righteously 
appointing themselves as guardians of the moral order.  In place of their duplicity, 
Ingersoll urged them to refashion an “honest God.”  Beecher fully concurred, admitting, 
“Every man constructs his God out of the materials that are furnished him.”  What 
Beecher found curious was that orthodox Christians, and especially Calvinists, readily 
saw “the physical and moral deformity” of heathen gods, while they were unable or 
unwilling to see their own “soulless formularies and logical inferences” as “scarcely less 
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repulsive.”  Beecher was confident that in time the development from heathen gods to the 
soulless formularies of Calvinism would continue to a more full-hearted representation of 
God in the nineteenth century.9
Because liberals were so concerned to purge the narrowness of the orthodox 
creed, they in turn embraced greater independence and self-control for the individual, 
which Beecher insisted was “the one paramount doctrine of the New Testament.”  
Because God’s revelation was still unfolding, liberals reasoned, the place for certainty, 
fixity, and rigid adherence to creed had passed, and any attempt to enforce theological 
orthodoxy merely ossified the on-going revelation of God.  Accepting the contingency of 
theological thought, religious liberals were loath to declare that religious sentiment or 
conformity was a necessary characteristic for a stable social and moral order, though 
many remained with the conservatives in declaring that God was necessary to maintain 
moral standards and moral ideals.  But the connection between religious sentiment and 
public morality was a tricky issue for liberals.  As early as 1863 in his novel Norwood, 
Beecher described the “high moral tone of public sentiment” found in many New 
England towns.  Although he conceded that such a moral tone could work to good effect, 
the “penetrating and almost inquisitorial character” of some towns, in which “good men 
are so thoroughly intent upon public morality that the private individual has scarcely any 
choice left,” risked a war between different sectors of society, by which he meant a war, 
in the parlance of the nineteenth century, between the better classes and those below.10      
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The risk of war, to the extent that it was manifest, played itself out in the courts, 
and the challenge that social change presented to theology also worked its way into the 
legal realm.  Though the change was many-faceted, perhaps the most discernable legal 
development was in the nineteenth-century principles of jurisprudence.  In eighteenth-
century jurisprudence, law was conceived of as a fixed body of doctrine whose 
occasional codification through luminaries like Blackstone enabled a better application of 
relatively fixed principles.  Justice Kent and his successors, who appealed to axiomatic 
maxims in antebellum church-state cases, were essentially in line with eighteenth century 
jurisprudence, at least in their conception of church and state.  Over the course of the 
nineteenth century, judges reconceived American jurisprudence, particularly in the area 
of business and commerce, as a flexible instrument to promote variable social ends.  
Although it took some time, this shift eventually affected the legal consensus that grew 
up around Kent’s Ruggles opinion.11   
The first crack in the consensus appeared in an 1853 Ohio Supreme Court 
Sabbath law case that rejected the idea that Christianity was part of the common law of 
the state of Ohio.  Citing the freedom of conscience clause in the Ohio constitution, the 
Court reasoned, “Neither Christianity, or any other system of religion, is a part of the law 
of this State.”  If the opinion ended there, it would have already been a significant shift in 
legal thought, but it continued to strike at the heart of the legal consensus advanced by 
Kent and Story, elaborating the ramifications of the shift.  Fundamentally, the court 
argued, because Christianity and the state are completely separate, the freedom of 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 Henry Ward Beecher, Norwood; or, Village Life in New England (New York: Charles Scribner & 
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conscience clause not only created a regime of toleration in which dissenters were free to 
believe what they wanted so long as they did not disturb the majority; it also, more 
robustly, guaranteed that a dissenter from the majority reposed “not upon the leniency of 
government, or the liberality of any class or sect of men, but upon his natural, 
indefeasible rights of conscience, which, in the language of the Constitution, are beyond 
the control or interference of any human authority.”  This was a foundational shift, 
echoing the logic of Thomas Paine by completely disavowing the prerogatives of the 
majority for the integrity of individual rights.  Although the court went on to uphold the 
legality of the Sabbath law, claiming that a cessation of labor fell under the proper 
purview of legislative authority to achieve desired social ends, the damage was already 
done.12
Five years later, the California Supreme Court completed the legal rationale of the 
Ohio court by striking down a Sabbath law for the first (and only) time in the nineteenth 
century.  But the issue was so contentious that the three justices produced three different 
opinions, with one in dissent.  Chief Justice Terry followed the straightforward argument 
that a Sabbath law necessarily furthered the interests of the Christian religion, agreeing 
with the plaintiff, who was Jewish.  He went on to address the argument of the state, 
namely that the California Constitution’s free exercise clause “merely” guaranteed 
toleration.  Instead, Terry argued that the republican form of government and the 
provisions of the Constitution guaranteed “religious liberty in the largest sense—a 
complete separation between Church and State, and a perfect equality without distinction 
between all religious sects.”  His view was the most consistently opposed to the influence 
of religion on public policy, arguing that everyone must obtain some benefit from a law 
                                                 
12 Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. at 390 (first quotation), 391(second quotation) (1853).   
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so that all would equally submit, which left very little room for the unrestrained 
prerogatives of majorities.13   
 The concurring opinion by Justice Bennett put a sharper point on the issue of the 
rights of the individual by claiming that the Constitution required equal protection of all, 
not equal toleration of all, but it also allowed for some interaction between church and 
state.  The point of the “no preference” clause, according to Bennett, was the protection 
of the individual, and “if there be but a single individual in the State who professes a 
particular faith, he is as much within the sacred protection of the Constitution as if he 
agreed with the great majority of his fellow-citizens.”  Bennett still conceded that insofar 
as legislature could extract principles from a religious system that were applicable to 
legitimate civil ends, then they could be passed as civil laws and enforced.  But if “there 
is no ground or necessity upon which a principle can rest, but a religious one,” then the 
no preference clause of the constitution stepped in and denied that principle the sanctity 
and enforcement of law.  Because Bennett thought the Sabbath law could rest only on a 
religious principle, he concurred with Terry, though he was not entirely in agreement 
with the Chief Justice’s strict separation.14
 The dissenting opinion by Stephen J. Field proved to be the most illuminating.  
Whereas the two concurring justices focused on the issues of equal protection, the rights 
of the individual, and the no preference clause of the California Constitution, Field drew 
on the rationale advanced by the Ohio Supreme Court five years earlier, that a Sabbath 
law fell within the authority of the legislature as a civil regulation.  Because the law 
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14 Ibid., at 514 (first quotation), 513 (second quotation). 
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solely regulated the ability to conduct business transactions on Sundays, Field claimed 
that it presumed only to enforce civil conduct and left religious profession and worship at 
the discretion of the individual citizen.  His reasoning was an important concession, and 
represented the shift in nineteenth century jurisprudence.  Instead of arguing, like Kent, 
that Christianity was a necessary part of the moral fabric of the nation and the foundation 
of its social cohesion, he argued that the Sabbath law was part of the legislature’s 
prerogative to oversee “the preservation of health and the promotion of good morals.”  
He did not entirely abandon the idea of Christian majority rights, though.  Echoing 
Bennett’s opinion that if a religious principle promoted a legitimate civil end it could be 
enshrined in law, Field went a step further to argue that if a legitimate civil end could find 
support in a religious principle, so much better for the legislation.  It would result in a 
more wholehearted embrace of the principle of law, “not merely from the requirements of 
the law, but from conscientious or religious convictions of their obligation.” It was 
Justice Field who had the last laugh when, three years later, a reorganized California 
Supreme Court, with Field now sitting as Chief Justice, reversed itself and approved the 
California legislature’s most recent attempt at a Sunday law, citing Field’s dissenting 
opinion as the basis of its ruling.15
 As alarming as religious conservatives found the Ohio and California Sabbath law 
cases, the real nightmare came in 1872 when the Ohio Supreme Court went a step beyond 
its (in)famous 1854 decision to elaborate the most thoroughgoing view of church-state 
separation since James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.  Although the issue before the 
court was whether the public schools of the state could read from the Bible and teach 
Christianity in class, the court permitted itself to address several points lying outside the 
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 230
case proper because, it noted, the case touched upon “religious convictions and 
prejudices” that threatened “to disturb the harmonious workings of the state government.”  
Although the court again denied that Christianity was part of the common law of the 
state, arguing instead that “all history shows us that the more widely and completely 
[religion and the state] are separated, the better it is for both,” it went well beyond its 
prior ruling by suggesting that there was to be no connection between church and state 
whatsoever.  Summing up its view, the court called its doctrine “hands off”:  “Let the 
state not only keep its own hands off, but let it also see to it that religious sects keep their 
hands off each other.”  The state’s primary role in religion was to ensure that the minority 
received the protection of the Constitution because “the majority can protect itself.”  Yet 
lest it be accused of promoting a new doctrine, the court claimed that it was not new at 
all, quoting James Madison in support.16
It would be entirely possible to overstate the legal importance of these three cases, 
and, for the most part, conservatives did.  The opinions did not advance secularism and 
did not appeal to science or any rival body of knowledge.  In the most alarming court 
decision, the same Ohio judge who urged that the state keep its hands off religion, 
simultaneously affirmed that the United States was a “Christian country, and that its 
constitutions and laws are made by a Christian people.”  Yet the courts’ move to 
liberalize church-state law, focusing on the rights of the individual versus the prerogative 
of majorities, meshed tightly with the attempts of religious liberals to free themselves 
from creedal restrictions in order to formulate a new theology.  Given the profoundly 
unsettling pace of change and the dissent of liberals within Protestantism itself, the 
                                                 
16 Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. at 245 (first and second quotation), 248 (third quotation), 250 
(fourth quotation), 250-251 (fifth quotation)  (1872). 
 231
actions of the court only further increased the feeling among religious conservatives that 
the American social fabric was fraying and on verge of tearing apart.  It was within that 
unstable context that the most reviled figure of all made his debut.17 
The Specter of Robert G. Ingersoll 
As alarming as moral establishment proponents found the burgeoning liberal 
movement and the isolated decisions of the courts, no single person embodied the 
challenges to the establishment more than Robert G. Ingersoll.  The son of a revivalist 
Presbyterian minister and a staunchly abolitionist mother, Ingersoll had been a free soil 
Democrat before bolting the party to join the Republican cause.  He saw combat in the 
Civil War, was taken prisoner at Shiloh, and returned home to honors with the promise of 
a bright legal and political career ahead of him.  His impeccable credentials promised a 
bright future, but his respectable and conventional career was not to be.  Something 
happened along the way to derail his political potential and turn him into a rabid critic of 
what he saw as religion’s pervasive, and pernicious, hold on American public life.   
That incident was the 1868 gubernatorial contest in his home state of Illinois.   
His heroism in the Civil War and his oratorical skills as a lawyer had brought a 
groundswell of support for his ascension into political office.  As the support gained 
momentum, there was talk of a nomination for the governorship of Illinois during the 
1868 campaign.  Ingersoll’s main competition was Major General John M. Palmer, 
founder of the Republican Party in Illinois and sixteen years Ingersoll’s senior, who coyly 
gave signals that he was not a candidate while quietly building a following through back 
channels.  A wire from Palmer to Ingersoll in April of 1868 promised that he would not 
                                                 
17 Ibid., at 247. 
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accept if elected, and an elated Ingersoll wrote to his brother that Palmer had been 
“smoked out.”  “I don’t think they can all beat me any way in the world,” he exulted.  But 
some problems lingered.  Two years earlier, Ingersoll had given his first iconoclast 
lecture, in which he asserted that the church had enslaved the mind of humanity and 
retarded the progress of the human race.  The majority of his would-be constituents did 
not share his religious sentiments, of course, and doubts about Ingersoll’s political 
viability swirled beneath the surface.  When Ingersoll became aware of Palmer’s 
backroom movements, he wrote angrily to his brother, “It looks now as though Palmer 
really wants to be governor after all.  He will likely beat me; but I am going to fight it out 
to the bitter end.  If he allows himself to run, he will simply prove himself to be a dirty 
dog.”  When the convention rolled around, as if following a script, some delegates 
expressed concern about Ingersoll’s heterodoxy, and Palmer, after being canvassed by the 
convention, acknowledged his “duty” to accept.18   
The experience radicalized Ingersoll’s religious heterodoxy—moving it from a 
personal religious perspective to a sense of political mission.  Although he had vowed 
that if he lost he would give up his political aspirations and settle down to law, he still 
took the defeat hard.  He was “heartily disgusted,” he wrote to his brother, and 
complained that he had been “throwing pearls before swine—that my party has not the 
sense to understand me.”  Professing to be “sick of the whole thing,” he considered 
“bidding a long farewell to all of my greatness” and settling down to a quiet life out of 
the public eye.  Although he did devote himself to law, he did not remain out of public 
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view.  After his initial iconoclast lecture in 1866 and his defeat at the nominating 
convention, he crafted a series of lectures with titles like, “The Gods,” and 
“Individuality” and, perhaps most infuriating to conservatives, “Some Mistakes of 
Moses,” which rankled clerical sensibilities and drew large, interested crowds.  As he 
became more provocative, his reputation grew, and he became renowned as an arresting 
orator and a dangerous infidel.19
Part of the reason religious partisans reacted so strongly to him was that he played 
directly upon their cultural anxieties.  Ingersoll’s central theme was that the changing 
social order would bring about progress heretofore unknown in human society, liberating 
individuals from the oppressive structures that held them in the past.  It was Ingersoll 
who best showed the connection between rapid social change and the emergent embrace 
of individual rights.  Unlike religious conservatives, he looked upon the rapid social 
change of the nineteenth century with hope, seeing vast potential for human beings to 
control their own destiny without reference to God.  In his mind, progress, liberalism, 
science, and optimism were all tightly bound together and peculiar characteristics of the 
age.  As he explained in one of his earliest lectures, “The Gods,” science promised not 
just knowledge of the world but also “knowledge of the laws of life; of the conditions of 
happiness; of the facts by which we are surrounded, and the relations we sustain to men 
and things.”  Knowledge of these laws, rather than relying on the inscrutable provision of 
God, promised to remake humanity’s relation to the world, because man could subjugate 
nature and bend “the elemental powers to his will, making blind force the servant of his 
brain.”  Science reinforced liberal individualism, because a belief in divine providence 
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not only limited investigation of the external world but “is inconsistent with personal 
effort.”  As Ingersoll saw it, the forward movement of science necessarily meant the 
secularization of the world and the reeducation of individuals to rely on themselves, 
rather than on an “aristocracy of the air.”  His most basic intellectual inclination was an 
absolute trust in the capacity of individuals.  As he put it, “Every mind should be true to 
itself—should think, investigate and conclude for itself.”20   
Although all the currents of the age seemed to point to the liberation of mankind 
to harness the power of nature and empower individuals, he pointedly criticized the 
clergy for what he considered their superstition and fear mongering that acted as a drag 
on the freedom of the individual.  According to Ingersoll, religious freedom was sadly 
lacking in a country that claimed to honor the freedom of individual conscience.  He 
complained bitterly, “Society demands, either that you belong to some church, or that you 
suppress your opinions.”  More than just social conformity, the Protestant establishment 
wielded political power to preclude any openly non-Protestant of whatever stripe (with 
the exception of political machines run in big cities) from attaining political office, as 
Ingersoll himself found in his run for the governorship.  Although Ingersoll eventually 
returned to politics in order to stump for political candidates, his activism was never 
rewarded with an appointment.  After the election of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1876, 
rumors circulated about a diplomatic appointment to Berlin as thanks for his efforts on 
the campaign trail, but as Ingersoll wrote to his extended family, “You need place no 
confidence in what you hear about the Berlin mission.—I do not believe that Hayes dare 
appoint me.  He is afraid of the religious world.  I must be and I am perfectly willing to 
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pay for the privilege of saying what I think.”21
To make way for the liberation of the individual (and himself), Ingersoll attacked 
Christianity and the power of the clergy, trying to create a series of walls between 
religious belief, political governance, and legal jurisprudence.  Coercion, he thought, was 
a necessary development of the claim that the United States was a Christian nation, 
because it was inherent in the doctrines of Christianity itself.  As he put it, “Allow me to 
ask here, why a Christian should have any hesitancy in burning a man a few minutes for 
heresy, when he worships a God who will burn the same man forever?”  To undermine 
ministerial credibility and vitiate the power of the informal religious establishment, 
Ingersoll claimed over and over again, in different words, that American government was 
founded not “upon the rights of gods, but upon the rights of men.  Our constitution was 
framed, not to declare and uphold the deity of Christ, but the sacredness of humanity.”22
Given Ingersoll’s belligerence, religious conservatives looked on in horror, when 
on October 30, 1880 a crowd gathered in the Academy of Music in Brooklyn to hear 
Henry Ward Beecher, Lyman Beecher’s son and the most famous preacher in the United 
States, introduce Ingersoll at a Republican party rally.  The upcoming election carried 
particular import for the Republican cause.  Four years earlier a backroom compromise 
had stopped a Democratic insurgency and allowed Rutherford B. Hayes to ascend to the 
Presidency—but only with the promise to end Reconstruction in the South.  Could the 
next election see the return of a Democratic President?  The atmosphere was electric as 
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Beecher took to the podium and began, “I am not accustomed to preside at meetings like 
this; only the exigency of the time could induce me to do it . . . . I stand not as a minister, 
but as a man among men, pleading the cause of fellowship and equal rights.”23  
The upcoming election alone, of course, did not produce the electricity of that 
night.  The sight of the most famous preacher in the nation introducing the most famous 
skeptic was without precedent, and many wondered, what would Beecher say?  As he 
rose to his point, he exclaimed, “the gentleman who will speak tonight is in no 
conventicle or church . . . and I take the liberty of saying that I respect him as the man 
that for a full score and more of years has worked . . . for the cause of human rights.  I 
consider it an honor to extend to him, as I do now, the warm, earnest, right hand of 
fellowship.”   Turning to face Ingersoll, the two effusively clasped hands near the podium 
as the house erupted in thunderous applause that only subsided when Beecher, indicating 
that he was not yet done, continued: “I now introduce to you a man who—and I say it not 
flatteringly—is the most brilliant speaker of the English tongue of all men of the globe.” 
The building “trembled and vibrated” from the roar of approval, and Ingersoll, basking in 
applause, stepped up to the podium.  For his part, Ingersoll exhilarated the crowd.  At the 
end of his speech and another clasping of hands, Ingersoll requested three cheers for 
Beecher that the crowd warmly gave.24   
Was this merely another case of strange bedfellows in politics or did the 
handshake between the infidel and the preacher signal a rapprochement between the two 
sides?  Or, as the New York Herald queried, “Is the keen logic and broad humanity of 
Ingersoll converting the brain and heart of Christendom?”  Although both would later 
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acknowledge continuing differences alongside their profound mutual admiration, to 
religious conservatives the furor surrounding their handshake represented the absolute 
nadir of their authority and the fulfillment of the threat to the moral establishment.  
Ingersoll’s complaint, growing louder and more eloquent as he got older, along with 
Beecher’s apparent endorsement of Ingersoll’s program, reinforced the urgency that 
religious partisans felt.  After fifty years the moral establishment that Lyman Beecher had 
outlined was definitely under attack, and proponents mobilized to restore their eroding 
authority and what they saw as the foundation of American culture.   
Conservative Religious Response: Between Persuasion and Coercion 
 Religious conservatives were not a uniform lot, and differences of temperament, 
doctrinal orientation, and degrees of toleration were evident throughout.  Yet they shared 
a common response to the social changes of the industrial revolution, the migration of 
legal opinion toward the rights of the individual, and increasing belligerency of 
freethinkers like Ingersoll.  They simply denied that the progress of history and the 
changing social order undercut their religious claims, responding that doctrine was not 
subject to the course of history, because Christian revelation in some sense existed 
outside of history, mediated by human beings to be sure, but without changing its divine, 
and therefore immutable, qualities.  As for the mutability of the species, Princeton 
theologian Charles Hodge spoke for many conservatives in his judgment on Darwinism: 
it was simply another word for atheism.  In short, although the social and intellectual 
changes of the nineteenth century alarmed many religious conservatives and revealed 
cracks in the foundation of the antebellum moral establishment, conservatives did not 
fundamentally alter their thought.  As the historian Grant Wacker has noted, “the 
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conservative world was filled with people and issues drawn from the past, but it was, in 
the last analysis, a world without a modern sense of history.”  What the social and 
intellectual changes caused them to do was to re-evaluate the way in which they 
maintained their cultural authority.  Their solutions fell along the continuum of a renewed 
attempt at persuasion to outright coercion.25
One of the first strategies was to silence or even defrock liberals within 
Protestantism.  No matter how much religious liberals claimed that their thought was a 
valid development of historic Christianity, both religious conservatives and freethinkers 
denied a middle ground in the agonist struggle between belief and unbelief, and could 
only regard religious liberals as either confused or guilty of bad faith.  Beecher came 
under attack even before the scandal with Tilton and the subsequent handshake with 
Ingersoll.  Jonathan Blanchard, a conservative Congregational minister who took part in 
Beecher’s ordination to ministry (and currently has a building named in his honor at the 
evangelical Wheaton College), charged Beecher with preaching Scripture “like Satan, 
and like Satan, defeating its practical intent.”  “When Henry Ward Beecher is about to 
assail some fundamental truth, held and suffered for by Puritans,” Blanchard complained, 
“he always begins by proclaiming himself their descendant.”  Although he snidely 
confessed that Beecher was not “an intentional, conscious hypocrite,” Blanchard could 
not shake his belief that Beecher had secretly joined the other side.  Likewise, freethinker 
James Parton, the author of a biography on Voltaire that Ingersoll called “one of the best 
biographies every written,” marveled at Beecher’s ability to move back and forth 
between ancient Christian thought and modern scientific terminology.  So comfortable 
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was Beecher in both worlds that Parton claimed, “nearly all that he says, when he is most 
himself, finds an approving response in the mind of every well-disposed person, whether 
orthodox or heterodox.”  It was Beecher’s “exquisite tact” that allowed him to “hover on 
the confines of truth” while leaving the more uninviting landscape “veiled in midst and 
unexplored.”  In essence, Parton saw Beecher as conservative Christians did, as “a 
bridge” between two unreconcilable positions, although unlike conservatives Parton 
thought Beecher was a bridge not between orthodoxy and heterodoxy but “the creed-
enslaved past [and] the perfect freedom of the future.”26
By 1880, Beecher’s handshake with Ingersoll offered confirmation of what many 
already thought, that Beecher had played the traitor, capitulating to the forces of science 
and secularism without fully acknowledging his unbelief.  Following the uproar, the New 
York Herald surveyed mainstream clergy’s response, and reported that many believed 
Beecher to be “in full sympathy and accord with Ingersoll’s teachings” but did not want 
to risk the loss of his pastoral position by acknowledging it.  Ingersoll’s consistent praise 
for Beecher did not help.  In one of his standard lectures, Ingersoll held up Beecher as the 
most enlightened of the clergy and an indication of the course of history, noting that, “the 
greatest man who to-day occupies the pulpit of one of the orthodox churches, Henry 
Ward Beecher, is a believer in the theories of Charles Darwin—a man of more genius 
than all the clergy of that entire church put together.”  In 1887, Ingersoll even presented a 
graveside oration at Beecher’s funeral, which he used to goad religious conservatives.  
Claiming that Beecher had been born “in a Puritan penitentiary, of which his father was 
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one of the wardens,” Ingersoll praised Beecher profusely while heaping scorn on 
Christianity, noting, for example, that Beecher’s soul was sensitive to “the pathos of all 
human life,” that he taught the church “to think and doubt,” and finally, simply, that “he 
was a brave and generous man.”27    
During life, Beecher somewhat wearily insisted that his agreement with Ingersoll 
only went so far, though it never really seemed to convince anyone. At the end of an 
interview in which he praised Ingersoll and defended the handshake, Beecher was clear to 
say, “I do not wish to be understood as indorsing [sic] skepticism in any form,” but he 
was never able to downplay what many saw as an unseemly, if not damning, connection 
to Ingersoll, even long after the fact.  In 1920, years after both were dead, the industrialist 
Andrew Carnegie (who was himself religiously heterodox) related a story that again 
affirmed the connection between the two.  He was traveling with the British literary 
critic, Matthew Arnold, on the latter’s American tour, when Arnold requested a meeting 
with Henry Beecher.  As it turned out, Ingersoll’s daughter happened to be traveling with 
Carnegie and Arnold on that leg of the journey, and after presenting Arnold to Beecher, 
Carnegie had the pleasure of introducing Eva Ingersoll, explaining as he did so, “Mr. 
Beecher, this is the first time Miss Ingersoll has ever been in a Christian church.”  
Without hesitation, Beecher took her proffered hand and replied, “Well, well, you are the 
most beautiful heathen I ever saw.”  Donning a tone of earnestness, Beecher inquired 
after Ingersoll, explaining as he did, “Many times he and I have stood together on the 
platform, and wasn’t it lucky for me we were on the same side!”  In the minds of 
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religious conservatives, that was exactly the problem.28
Given the suspicions surrounding Beecher’s relationship to Ingersoll, a mere two 
years after the handshake Beecher resigned from the New York and Brooklyn 
Congregational Association, in what could be viewed as either an act of intellectual 
independence or a preemptive move before he was forced out.  Complaining of the 
“spiritual barbarism” and “infantine conceptions” that many Congregationalists still held, 
Beecher gave a full report of his belief by offering commentary on the Westminster 
Confession of Faith, outlining his agreements and disagreements as he read the doctrinal 
provisions.  When he was done, he explained simply that he knew many 
Congregationalist ministers “would speak more than disapproval” of his credo, and that 
many would not want to “bear the burden of responsibility of being supposed to tolerate 
the views I have held and taught.”  Declaring himself “a man of honor and a Christian 
gentleman,” Beecher refused to allow anyone to feel responsible for his views and 
resigned his membership.29
Although he was insulated from any lasting harm because of the support of his 
church, Beecher’s situation was indicative of the ongoing power of religious 
conservatives in the last half of the nineteenth century, a power that extended beyond 
their denominations and into the wider cultural and political realms.  Accordingly, 
conservatives sought to parlay their power to curb dissenters outside their denominations 
as well.  At the more benign end of the spectrum, they followed the tradition of voluntary 
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associations and formed the Evangelical Alliance in 1867.  As one part of the worldwide 
evangelical movement, the Alliance sought to expand evangelicalism’s cultural influence 
in United States in order to make it, and ultimately the world, fully Christian.  But as the 
century progressed the Alliance began taking a hard look at the moral state of the nation 
and the place of Protestant cultural authority within it.  Given the many non-Christian 
threats that assailed the nation, the Alliance’s mood necessarily became more defensive 
as it pooled evangelical resources to shore up what its members saw as the eroding 
Christian foundation of the United States.30
Part of the defensive mood meant renewing the appeal to coercive power in 
defending what they considered American Christian character.  In 1874 at the sixth 
General Conference, the Alliance devoted an entire day’s discussion to the subject of 
evangelical advancement through governmental structures, trying to clarify the issues and 
perhaps arrive at a statement of principles, but confusion and difference of opinion 
prevailed throughout.  On one end of the spectrum was Theodore Dwight Woolsey, then 
President of Yale, who conceded that the government was generally separate from 
religion.  Because the federal Constitution limited the powers of the national government 
to support any form of religion, the federal state could hardly be called a Christian state.  
Nor could state-level government be considered Christian, though he acknowledged that 
several state constitutions withheld civil office from “atheists, from disbelievers in future 
rewards and punishments, and even from disbelievers in the Christian religion.”  Instead, 
a fuzzy but existent line separated the religion of the majority from legislative enactment, 
                                                 
30 On the Alliance’s mission and goals for a Christian America, see Robert T. Handy, A Christian America: 
Protestant Hopes and Historical Realities, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 60-69; 
Philip D. Jordan, The Evangelical Alliance for the United States of America, 1847-1900: Ecumenicism, 
Identity and the Religion of the Republic (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1982), 99-142. 
 243
though Woolsey thought some interaction was both desirable and necessary, citing 
divorce law in particular.  Likewise, J.L.M. Curry argued for a separation of church and 
state, but with the usual moral establishmentarian caveats: that liberty should not be a 
premise for “unrestrained license, nor social anarchy, nor to be used for a veil of 
wickedness.”  Farther along the spectrum toward forthright coercion was Mark Hopkins, 
President of Williams College, who argued using the language of moral science that 
“man has a right to whatever may be necessary to the attainment of his end as that end is 
indicated by his whole nature.”  Because the intellectual, physical, moral, and spiritual 
parts of humans were mutually complementary and mutually reinforcing, Hopkins 
assured his listeners that it was part of man’s fundamental right to legislate toward 
physical, moral, and intellectual ends in order to benefit the spiritual needs of those who 
wish it.  In other words, religious motivations could promote civil legislation for non-
religious ends because the “whole nature” of man (including the religious nature) would 
benefit, even if it were not specifically acknowledged in law.31    
As the Alliance discussed strategies that seemed to stop short of forthrightly 
acknowledged coercion, many conservatives grew concerned that perhaps persuasion 
alone would fail to maintain their level of cultural influence.  Nothing better 
demonstrated the mood than the 1885 bestseller, Our Country, by Josiah Strong.  Strong 
was the secretary of the Evangelical Alliance, and the book was published by the 
American Missionary Association.  Warning of the multiple perils facing the nation, his 
book demonstrated the genuine fear that many religious partisans felt about the broad 
social changes challenging moral reproduction.  The upshot, which resonated with the 
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millions who bought his book, was a dire warning that sinister forces held the moral 
character of the nation under siege.  The question for conservatives was how to inculcate 
individuals with necessary moral character when urbanization and immigration made the 
socializing mechanisms that had worked so well in small towns obsolete.32   
To answer that question, many looked to Anthony Comstock, who had sealed his 
fame by jailing Victoria Woodhull during the Beecher-Tilton affair.  The passage of the 
Comstock law in 1873 increased his power, not merely to control obscenity but also 
freethought, because although the law’s original intent was to combat indecency 
Comstock successfully expanded its application to include the dissemination (through the 
federal mail) of freethought literature as well.  As his thinking went, freethought almost 
always went hand-in-hand with the degradation of morals.  In 1876, Ingersoll gathered 
50,000 signatures on a petition to Congress to repeal the law, claiming that it threatened 
free speech, freedom of the press, and individual and religious liberty.  When Congress 
ignored the petition, other freethought groups went ahead with a court challenge in 1877, 
which they thoroughly lost.  Writing for the U.S. Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion 
was none other than Stephen J. Field, the former California Supreme Court justice whose 
civil justification for Sunday laws was to become the norm.  Against the claims of 
freethought groups that the law infringed upon their freedom of religion and their 
freedom of the press (since Comstock used the law to ban many freethought 
publications), Field simply denied that it had been the object of Congress to deny any 
“rights of the people.”  Rather, adopting Comstock’s view completely, Field explained 
that the law’s sole object, which was within legislative authority, was merely to limit “the 
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distribution of matter deemed injurious to public morals.”33
 In 1883 Comstock elaborated his philosophy in his widely admired book, Traps 
for the Young, which decried the myriad of influences that seek to capture the hearts of 
children, turning them away from decency and righteousness and toward “all the foul 
doings of corrupt men and women.”  Among the many traps were free love traps, infidel 
traps, liberal traps, and so on, all designed to undermine parental authority.  The worst, by 
far, were the liberals and infidels, who “come after the criminal and obscene, and in some 
respects are worse, in that while they pretend to be far above religion and laws, they 
undertake the defence of all the foregoing evils.”  Ingersoll, of course, “the great 
American blasphemer,” led the way in destroying “the fastenings which are the only 
restraints of vice” by calling into question divine existence and, by extension, divine 
retribution.34   
 Although Comstock himself had no luck in catching Ingersoll using the Comstock 
law, the same coercive impulse prompted other conservatives to renew the enforcement 
of blasphemy laws.  In that arena, Ingersoll came in for his share of legal intimidation, 
receiving fines for lecturing on Sunday, the last-minute closing of venues in accordance 
with a Sabbath law (though they were open other Sundays for other purposes), and the 
like.  In 1881, not long after the handshake furor with Henry Beecher, moral 
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establishmentarians in Delaware enlisted the support of Joseph P. Comegys, the Chief 
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, to shut down one of Ingersoll’s planned lectures.  
Prior to Ingersoll’s lecture a grand jury was convened and the Chief Justice urged it to 
indict Ingersoll under a 1740 blasphemy law, because his lectures, in Comegys’s claim, 
“tended to breach the peace, to riot and bloodshed” by promoting a social philosophy that 
undermined public morals.  The entire proceeding smacked of legal showmanship, 
especially after the grand jury declined to indict Ingersoll before he had even given his 
lecture.  It did offer him the warning that if he carried out his proposed lecture, he would 
“be taught that in Delaware blasphemy is a crime, and as such will be punished by fine 
and imprisonment.”  When many liberal papers around that nation criticized the action, 
Ingersoll cancelled the lecture with the consolation that the press made his point for him.  
The threat of prosecution lingered again in 1884 in Philadelphia, this time from an 1860 
law passed by the Pennsylvania Legislature promising fines and imprisonment for anyone 
who would “willfully, premeditatedly, and despitefully blaspheme or speak loosely and 
profanely of Almighty God, Christ Jesus, the Holy Spirit, or the Scriptures of Truth.”  
Ingersoll had apparently had enough and went ahead with his lecture, labeling attempts to 
censor speech “in this day and generation” as “exceedingly foolish” and “idiotic.”  When 
asked what he would do if they attempted to arrest him, he replied, “Nothing, except to 
defend myself in court.”  The prospect of a court battle with Ingersoll, even if the law 
was on their side, dissuaded clergy, and nothing came of it.35    
 But smaller bucks were still fair game.  It was in this context that Charles B. 
Reynolds was brought up on blasphemy charges after spreading freethought pamphlets in 
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Boonton and Morristown, New Jersey.  Hearing of the controversy, Ingersoll 
immediately traveled to Morristown, posted bail for Reynolds, and decided to argue the 
case.  In what turned out to be a several-hour speech before the jury, Ingersoll ranged 
widely over the rationale of the founding fathers, the hope of the American founding, and 
the recent intolerance that the present case seemed to betray.  Pouring contempt upon the 
indictment, he tried to appeal to the jurors’ own desire for freedom of speech and, rather 
uncharacteristically, plead for an acquittal in the name Christianity, which would “never 
reap any honor, will never reap any profit, from persecution.”  Although witnesses found 
Ingersoll’s defense deeply moving, the jury found Reynolds guilty and levied a fine that 
Ingersoll paid.36   
 The appeal to law and coercion became formalized in a growing organization 
called the National Reform Association (NRA).  The most conscious and coherent 
position on the conservative Christian side of the church-state debate, the NRA held 
simply that, because the United States was a Christian nation based on Christian ideals, 
the omission of an explicit Christian affirmation in the federal Constitution rendered the 
American union vulnerable to secular threat.  Warning darkly that “the enemies of our 
national Christianity” were active and that the “Christian institutions of government” 
were at stake, the NRA called all patriots to soldier on “the field of moral conflict.”  It 
explicitly rejected what it called “the secular theory of government” or the idea that “civil 
government has nothing to do with religion but to let it alone,” referencing both the Ohio 
and California Supreme Court decisions that had both argued the idea.  Instead, the NRA 
claimed, somewhat opaquely, that it opposed “both secularism and the union of Church 
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and State,” but it supported “Christianity in the State.”  In other words, it supported the 
moral establishment, which it regarded as under attack.  To further buttress itself against 
the charge that it sought a union of church and state, it brandished the formula that 
Lyman Beecher had originally perfected.  It was “a movement of citizens,” not a 
movement of churches or sects, so its composition and purpose was merely to advance 
the nonsectarian Christian civil government that had been around since the early 
nineteenth century.37    
Tempting though it is to dismiss the organization as a fringe movement on the 
extreme edge of evangelicalism, it actually brought together many prominent themes in 
evangelical political thought into a coherent and clear political philosophy. It elaborated, 
for example, the complex set of ideas that went into the claim that the nation had a moral 
character.  The idea entailed that the nation was a “jural society,” not merely a union of 
economic convenience.  A jural society could be measured against moral standards, 
because law was an application of morals.  If law was an application of morals, then the 
nation must have a corporate personality with a measurable corporate character, 
depending on the kind of laws that were enacted and enforced.  Finally, because the 
nation had a corporate personality and a corporate character, it was accountable to God 
for its actions, and God could bring it down if its character was lacking.  To support their 
assertions, proponents drew upon the jurisprudence of Justices Kent and Story, who both 
agreed that “the binding law of morality and community” imposed itself on the corporate 
as well as individual person.  Because the nation was a moral person subject to the 
binding moral law, neutrality in religion and an absolute separation of religious influence 
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from the state was impossible.  The moral imperatives by which the state was to be 
judged took their meaning from religion itself.38   
The question then was not whether religion and civil government should be 
connected but how.  The NRA understood the connection to be a delicate balance 
between what it called the written and the unwritten constitutions.  The written 
constitution established the essential principles and offered “authoritative sanction to the 
fundamental features of national life.”  The essential principles and authoritative sanction 
of the written constitution were drawn, so the reasoning went, from the unwritten or vital 
constitution of a people.  In the American republic, the vital constitution “in reference to 
morals and religion” was always “unquestionably Christian.”   According the NRA, the 
constitution was not responsible for constituting the American people.  Instead, it was but 
the written expression of the nation’s vital constitution or character, buttressing it and 
providing legal sanction for its enforcement.  For various reasons that the NRA declined 
to specify, the constitutional framers had decided to exclude an explicit affirmation of 
Christianity in the Constitution, which resulted in the unstable relationship of  “a non-
Christian written Constitution and an unwritten Christian Constitution.”  Only an 
amendment that acknowledged the vital Christian constitution of the nation would ensure 
that secularists did not exploit the instability in order to overturn the Christian character 
of American government and laws.  To those who misguidedly touted the freedom of the 
individual, the Association responded in unapologetically majoritarian terms, pointing to 
“the right of society as against the so-called rights of the individual.”39   
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 Although the association never mustered enough support to modify the 
Constitution, it articulated the belief of moral establishment proponents that there needed 
to be a firm connection between religion, law, and civil government.  From that 
standpoint, its greatest accomplishment was its codification of variously articulated 
strands of evangelical thought, which in turn influenced legislators and jurists.  Perhaps 
its most important devotee was David Josiah Brewer, the nephew of Stephen Field who 
joined him on the U.S. Supreme Court in 1889.  Justice Brewer, the son of 
Congregational missionary parents, was the celebrity of the Court from the very 
beginning of his appointment, as bar associations and religious groups actively courted 
him for speaking engagements around the nation.  When he arrived on bench, he assumed 
the intellectual leadership of a voting bloc of justices that controlled the court in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century.  Though he spoke and wrote on a wide variety of themes, 
the subject that occupied almost all of his utterances, whether explicitly or not, was the 
role of religion, and specifically Christianity, in the formation of the nation and its 
subsequent greatness.40
 In an echo of Lyman Beecher, Brewer worried that the high calling of American 
citizenship, which recognized no restraint upon popular acts except what the people 
themselves imposed, would result in licentiousness and anarchy should the people as a 
whole decide to throw off that restraint.  That danger, according to Brewer, was the 
reason for law, “to control the actions of individuals” without which “a state of anarchy 
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would exist, each man being a law unto himself.”  Therefore, obedience to law “ensures 
peace and order,” and, indeed, honor itself required deference to “the decision of such 
majority” that enacted the law. What particularly worried Brewer and so many that 
sympathized with the National Reform Association, was that the licentiousness of the 
people, their loss of moral fiber, would undercut the real basis for American union.  
Echoing the NRA and Justices Kent and Story, Brewer held that the nation itself had a 
personality “standing over against the individual, an artificial entity separate and distinct 
from its citizens.”  The corporate aspect of national identity and national character 
obliged an individual citizen with “the duty of maintaining . . . a high, clean, moral 
character.”  Citizenship, in other words, relied upon and required an internalized moral 
standard that subsumed the autonomy of the individual to the good of the whole.  Brewer 
even considered “the maintenance of good moral character” as “a primary obligation of 
every citizen.”  The nation itself could and should enact laws in order to protect its 
corporate character from individuals who would not voluntarily maintain the moral ideal.  
Although Brewer was quick to reject the idea “reforming men by statute,” he nevertheless 
insisted that “society” might use statutes and ordinances to “guard itself against the 
temptations and evil influences” that might cause individuals to stumble. 41  
 Christianity, then, was essential to the maintenance of a national moral character, 
not only because those who had internalized Christian ideals were more likely to 
maintain individual morality, but also because Christianity itself provided the moral 
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standard that measured actions.  Although Brewer conceded, “This is an iconoclastic and 
scientific age,” he was quick to insist that “Christianity has been so wrought into the 
history of this republic, so identified with its growth and prosperity, has been and is so 
dear to the hearts of the great body of our citizens, that it ought not to be spoken of 
contemptuously or treated with ridicule.”  Having laid the foundation for blasphemy law, 
Brewer elaborated the positive duties of American citizens toward Christianity.  
Respecting Christianity implied respecting “its institutions and ordinances.”  Taking up 
the Sabbath in particular, he was explicit: “The American Christian is entitled to his quiet 
hour.”  Most broadly, reiterating the view of Story, Kent, Lyman Beecher, and the NRA, 
Brewer held that because Christianity had been “a potent and healthful factor in the 
development of our civilization,” it was a positive duty of every citizen “to uphold it and 
extend its influence.”  Following his own principle, it was Brewer who wrote in 1892 for 
a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court that the wide variety of historical sources and the 
common law “add a volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic [state 
constitutional] utterances that this is a Christian nation.”42      
The Meaning of Robert Ingersoll 
 Proponents of the moral establishment desperately sought to check what they saw 
as the liberalizing movements of the nineteenth century by mobilizing against religious 
liberals, organizing to consolidate conservative religious authority, and utilizing the full 
possibilities of legal coercion through the Comstock law, blasphemy laws, a 
constitutional amendment, and the maintenance and rehabilitation of Justice Kent’s 
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jurisprudence.  Though they were ambivalent about the most effective or appropriate 
method of maintaining their cultural authority, they were united in their belief that the 
religious claims of what they considered orthodox (evangelical) Christianity were 
absolutely necessary for the preservation of the United States.  That belief took on a 
razor’s edge when confronted with Robert Ingersoll.  Moral establishmentarians saw in 
Ingersoll the specter of complete moral dissolution, so that—quite apart from his 
secularism, his championing of science, and his attacks on religious leaders—he served 
as a symbol for a society that no longer acknowledged the mutual accountability and tacit 
submission to religious authority that the moral establishment sought to perpetuate.   
Ingersoll’s symbolic importance was perhaps most apparent in the furor over the 
Beecher-Ingersoll handshake.  Responding to the criticism of his gesture, Beecher stated 
simply, “on the broad platform of human liberty and progress I was bound to give him 
the right hand of fellowship.  I would do it a thousand times over.”  Similarly, Ingersoll 
cited their broad agreement, though he was careful to acknowledge their divergence..  
“The difference between us,” he explained, “is—he says God, I say Nature.  The real 
agreement between us is—we both say—Liberty.”  But what Beecher and Ingersoll 
called liberty, the proponents of the moral establishment called licentiousness or anarchy.  
Where did liberty stop, and mutual obligation and social solidarity begin?  If Ingersoll 
symbolized the breakdown of a mutually obligated social order sustained by the moral 
establishment, he also defined the limits of religious liberty by putting a fine point on an 
issue that religious partisans had, until that point, kept rather vague.  Ingersoll demanded 
that the moral establishment withdraw the restraints from the individual so that people 
could realize the promise of the age through individual self-reliance.  Religious 
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conservatives could not see how to do so without risking the dissolution of society into 
moral anarchy.  That disagreement constituted an unbridgeable gap.43
Nowhere was the issue of religious liberty—and Ingersoll’s importance as a 
symbol of moral dissolution—more evident than in the series of debates that swirled 
around him from 1881 to 1888.  In early 1881, Ingersoll submitted a paper to the North 
American Review entitled, “Is All of the Bible Inspired?”  The North American Review 
was one of the most respected monthly magazines in the nation, and it published a wide 
variety of highbrow articles on all the prevailing issues of the day.  Although the editors 
sympathized with Ingersoll’s position, the Review had received too much criticism for 
publishing skeptical articles about Christianity.  The editors asked Ingersoll if they could 
turn his paper into a debate format in which Ingersoll would have the last word.  After 
querying several potential respondents, they reeled in Judge Jeremiah S. Black, a former 
judge on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, past-U.S. Attorney General, and one-time 
Secretary of State in James Buchanan’s administration.  The stage was set for a raucous 
contest.44  
The initial exchange circled around several issues forming the touchstone of 
future discussion.  Ingersoll led off with familiar claims: that the United States was not 
and had never been a Christian nation, that the record of the Bible was barbarous and 
offensive to civilized sentiment, and that the human race had proceeded beyond the 
cruelties of the Christian religion with enlarged sympathies and an expanded mental 
perspective.  Black responded by rejecting the idea that the age had progressed past 
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orthodox Christianity, insisting that whatever progress had been made in the world came 
through the expansion of the Christian religion.  Having dispensed with Ingersoll’s 
argument, he went to the core of the issue as he saw it, complaining how difficult it was 
“reasoning about justice with a man who has no acknowledged standard of right and 
wrong.”  Because justice was that which accorded to law, and the basis of human law was 
the divine law, the will of God, Ingersoll could not logically hold to a standard of right 
and wrong if he denied God.  The threat of atheism, then, was clear.  “It is the misfortune 
of the atheistic theory,” Black concluded, “that it makes the moral world an anarchy; it 
refers all ethical question to the confused tribunal where chaos sits as umpire and ‘by 
decision more embroils the fray.’”  Grimly he explained that the atheistic experiment had 
already been tried during the French Revolution, when the nation “formally renounced 
Christianity, denied the existence of the Supreme Being, and so satisfied the hunger of 
the infidel heart for a time.  What followed?  Universal depravity, garments rolled in 
blood, fantastic crimes unimagined before, which startled the earth with their sublime 
atrocity.”45
 Ingersoll, not surprisingly, was unimpressed, responding with characteristic 
contempt.  He repeated his claim that the moral code of the Bible was barbaric, pointing 
out that its toleration of polygamy, slavery, and wars of exterminations was no longer in 
step with contemporary moral thought.  Gaining steam as he wrote, Ingersoll vented, 
“Mr. Black, the Christian, the believer in God, upholds wars of extermination. . . . Yet I 
am told that I have no standard of right and wrong.”  Instead, the only true standard of 
right and wrong was the “happiness of mankind.”  Ingersoll’s ethical claims were 
universalist and absolute, but rooted in a utilitarian standard: consequences determined 
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the ethical import of an action.  He claimed, “The man who puts himself in the place of 
another, whose imagination has been cultivated to the point of feeling the agonies 
suffered by another, is the man of conscience.”  Conscience, in Ingersoll’s estimation, 
was not a product of religion but the natural outgrowth of human sympathy, so “every 
human being necessarily has a standard of right and wrong; and where that standard has 
not been polluted by superstition, man abhors slavery, regards a war of extermination as 
murder, and looks upon religious persecution as a hideous crime.”  Advocating an almost 
Rousseau-like sense of natural goodness, Ingersoll imagined that if only the obfuscations 
and coercions of religion were removed, the moral conscience of humanity would 
emerge, guided by reason and an enlightened sentiment.  But the issue of religious liberty 
was somehow lost in the fray.46    
The conflict lay dormant for a few years until Dr. Henry W. Field, a Presbyterian 
minister and brother of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field, published “An Open 
Letter to Robert G. Ingersoll” in an 1887 issue of the North American Review.  Field 
returned directly to the issue of morality, asserting that by “let[ting] go the idea of God . . 
. you have let go the highest moral restraint.  There is no Ruler above man; he is a law 
unto himself, a law which is as impotent to produce order, and to hold society together, as 
man is with his little hands to hold the stars together.”  Disagreeing with Ingersoll’s sense 
of human nature, Field suggested that humans were weak, and that “virtue is not the 
spontaneous growth of childish innocence.  Men do not become pure and good by 
instinct. . . . To let go of these restraints is a peril to public morality.”  Because humans 
were inclined towards mischief, not goodness, according to Field, morality and 
government provided the restraint to individuals as necessary means for the cohesion of 
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society.47
 But Ingersoll was interested in arguing about the basis of morality only for so 
long, and in his response he turned the issue back toward the subject of religious liberty 
and freedom of speech.  He took issue immediately with the idea that Christianity offered 
moral restraint to society, because, as he reasoned, “Christianity has sold, and continues 
to sell, crime on a credit.  It has taught, and still teaches, that there is forgiveness for all.”  
To Ingersoll, the Christian doctrine of forgiveness encouraged not restraint but vice with 
the promise of exoneration.  More importantly, contrary to the Christian claim that belief 
or non-belief has eternal consequences Ingersoll could not see how anyone could be held 
responsible for one’s thoughts.  The mind “thinks without asking our consent.  We 
believe, or we disbelieve, without an effort of the will.  Belief is the result.”  Since 
thought merely occurs, the question according to Ingersoll was not whether individuals 
have the right to think, but whether they have the right to act on their beliefs and to 
express their opinions freely.  Coming to the heart of the question, he noted that Field had 
expressed his opinion—as was his right—but the key issue was, “have I the right to 
express mine?”  Field’s reply was somewhat unsatisfying, sliding around the issue of 
religious liberty while never directly addressing it, and the debate seemed to be coming to 
a close.48   
While they traded a few final blows, though, William E. Gladstone, the four-time 
prime minister of England, followed the exchange across the Atlantic.  Upon seeing 
Ingersoll’s second reply to Field, Gladstone weighed in with his contribution, charging 
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Ingersoll with focusing on matters of trivial import and ignoring the ethics of Jesus while 
picking at the morality of the Old Testament.  Gladstone challenged Ingersoll’s claim that 
the mind thinks without asking consent, though not to address the issue of religious 
liberty and free speech.  He refused to concede that a person was not responsible for his 
religious belief because, he argued, “the enormous majority of human judgments are 
those into which the biassing [sic] power of likes and dislikes more or less largely 
enters.”  Even decisions between “conflicting [religious and ethical] systems” contained 
an element of morality, since moral and immoral causes go into the acceptance or 
rejection of belief.  If a belief can be moral and immoral, Gladstone maintained, by 
implication so surely could a public statement of belief or unbelief.  Again Ingersoll’s 
contention about religious liberty remained unanswered.49
The central issues of these debates—religion and the basis of society, the source 
of moral restraint, the place and possibility of religious and intellectual liberty—were 
clear, but in spite of the high quality of the debaters, they seemed consistently to sail past 
one another.  The religious defenders could not see how a nation, founded on Christian 
principles and sustained by its moral imperatives, could survive and maintain its 
greatness should those principles be eroded.  Ingersoll, for his part, saw the nation as 
great precisely because religion was left out and argued for a system of radical 
individualism.  The intractability of their debate formed the basis for one final attempt to 
find common ground.  If they could agree on nothing else, could they agree that each had 
the right to disagree?  In other words, in their deep differences, could they honor the right 
of difference itself?  That implicit problem became explicit a year later, when Ingersoll 
proposed a roundtable discussion before the Nineteenth Century Club at the Metropolitan 
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Opera House in New York.   
The subject of the discussion, “The Limitations of Toleration,” raised the issue of 
religious liberty directly.  Ingersoll was the gadfly of the night, and he codified his many 
arguments into one succinct statement, claiming in his opening sentence, “I am here to-
night for the purpose of defending your right to differ with me.”  Although he 
acknowledged that many among the religious community supported toleration, Ingersoll 
claimed that this attitude contained the seeds of persecution because, “when you say ‘I 
tolerate,’ you do not say you have no right to punish, no right to persecute.  It is only a 
disclaimer for a few moments and for a few years, but you retain the right.  I deny it.”  
The cultural hegemony of the church allowed them to take a tolerant attitude, Ingersoll 
claimed, a form of condescension more than the recognition of individual right.  
Ingersoll, aware that his position was unpopular and in the minority, argued instead that 
his rights were written into the Constitution.  The power of the individual to think for 
himself was an absolute right as well as a mere declaration of fact, the mind being “a 
country of one inhabitant,” and Ingersoll insisted that because all can think on their own, 
the freedom of belief entailed the freedom of speech, a freedom that was absolute 
because all possessed the right equally.50  
In response, his two interlocutors each conceded that Ingersoll possessed 
intellectual freedom, but neither could accept that this freedom allowed him to speak 
whatever he wanted.  Frederic Rene Coudert, the Catholic representative in the 
discussion, was a prominent lawyer in New York City whose law firm represented, 
among its many important clients, several European governments, making it a significant 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 6:217-324 (first and second quotations on p. 217, third quotation on p. 230, fourth quotation on p. 
225). 
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player in the early development of international law.  Coudert maintained that contrary to 
the elegant profanity uttered by Ingersoll, “who would undertake to say that our society 
could live with liberty of speech?”  Speech, he claimed, was not merely a string of 
innocent words but an act with consequences upon society just as burglary or murder, and 
the reality underlying Ingersoll’s call for free speech was “an eloquent apology for 
blasphemy.”  Citing the recent New Jersey blasphemy case in which Ingersoll had been 
involved, Coudert pressed the point that many states had such laws for good reason.  
“Our best men,” he explained, “have insisted and maintained that the Christian faith was 
the ligament that kept our modern society together, and our laws have said, and the laws 
of most of our States say, to this day, ‘Think what you like, but do not, like Samson, pull 
the pillars down upon us all.’”  Because Christianity formed the ligament of the modern 
society, cutting it meant the dissolution and destruction of the state, in Coudert’s 
estimation.  “Wherever, and wheresoever, and whenever, liberty of speech is 
incompatible with the safety of the State,” he emphatically concluded, “liberty of speech 
must fall back and give way, in order that the State may be preserved.”51
His Protestant comrade in arms was only slightly less emphatic.  Stewart Lynson 
Woodford was a one-time lieutenant governor of New York, congressman, federal 
district attorney, and, at the time of the discussion, minister of the United States to Spain.  
Awkwardly trying to find some separation from his Catholic counterpart, Woodford took 
issue with Ingersoll’s claim that he was not responsible for belief, returning again to a 
central issue of the North American Review debates, but showing exactly why the point 
was important to denying the right of free speech.  The moral responsibility of belief was 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 6:235-246 (first quotation on p. 242, second quotation on p. 243, third quotation on p. 245, fourth 
quotation on p. 246). 
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supreme, according to Woodford, and not limited to the individual alone.  The 
individual’s responsibility extended out to others because, “I know that I am my 
neighbor’s keeper, I know that as I touch your life, as you touch mine, I am responsible 
every moment, every hour, every day, for my influence upon you.  I am either helping 
you up, or I am dragging you down.”  Backing away from Coudert’s claims about the 
state, Woodford contended that the responsibility of individuals to one another granted 
freedom of thought but limited freedom of expression “by the condition that he shall not 
use that liberty so as to injure [his fellows].”  Woodford left vague the mechanism that 
enforced his principle, but the fact remained that he could not conceive of a society in 
which people could openly disagree without injury to the society as a whole.52
All parties acknowledged that Ingersoll’s provocations touched on core conflicts 
in American cultural and political life:  the rights of the individual versus the prerogative 
of majorities, the basis of law and ethics, and the relationship between religion, morals 
and public life.  But because disagreement was so entrenched, the core issues quickly 
expanded beyond the specific conflicts (substantive though they were) to whether or not a 
culture could remain cohesive with such profound disparity of opinion.  The impasse 
could not be solved in an evening of conversation, but the issues were laid out directly.  
All three men thought the stakes of the conflict of utmost importance.  Coudert foresaw 
the dissolution of society, should religion cease to function as its connective tissue.  
Woodford saw the breakdown of mutual responsibility and, by implication, the 
subsequent devolution of social cohesion should individuals forget their responsibility to 
one another and to God with their speech.  Ingersoll, lastly, placed freedom of thought 
and speech above all other issues not only because it was necessary for the progress of 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 6:247-252 (first quotation on pp. 249-50, second quotation on p. 252). 
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the human race, but also because “the enemies of free thought and free speech have 
covered this world with blood.”53
  Proponents of the moral establishment showed remarkable consistency in their 
arguments.  They viewed the health of society delicately poised between two extremes.  
Pursuing only individual freedom would lead to anarchy; seeking only the maintenance 
of society would lead to despotism.  Liberty could exist precisely because individuals had 
internalized moral restraint that held in check the centrifugal forces of individualism.  
Steering a course between the two meant allowing individuals freedom to believe, while 
providing checks on licentiousness and freedom of speech when it disturbed the public 
peace or promoted the degradation of morality.  The church was an absolutely necessary 
influence both upon the government and individuals, mediating between them to preserve 
the moral fabric of the nation. 
By contrast, Ingersoll (and other freethinkers) abhorred the continued influence of 
religion on the political and cultural life of the nation.  He celebrated the breakdown of 
traditional mechanisms for inculcating internal restraint, arguing that religious partisans 
who sought to maintain them were working against the direction of history.  To Ingersoll, 
the appeal to divine authority simply renounced individual responsibility and led the 
individual into intellectual slavery.  Science had opened up the possibility for a world 
made by and for human beings, with God left out.  Because science liberated humans 
from the dominion of God, the religious attempt to maintain cultural authority was 
merely a crass grab at cultural and social power, inadequately masked by the language of 
morality and national character.  In place of the moral establishment maintained by 
                                                 
 
53 Ibid., 234.  
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religious partisans, Ingersoll suggested an alternative moral code based on individual 
liberty, mutual toleration, and enlightened moral sentiment.   
Clarified though the issues were, the divide remained.  What would absolute 
religious freedom entail?  How could the principle of religious freedom be reconciled 
with the need, affirmed in many state constitutions, for a common religious identity to 
uphold public morals and to preserve the state?  How were individual rights to be related 
to mutual responsibility?  Those questions betrayed the disarray of liberal individualism 
at the beginning of the twentieth century.  The appeal to the rights-bearing individual was 
never strong enough to insure civil rights, because the proponents of the moral 
establishment could always gesture to the imperatives of social maintenance, arguing that 
individuals could never be detached from, and indeed, to some extent assumed their 
individual meaning from, the larger collectives to which they belonged.  To the claim of 
radical woman’s rights proponents that the woman was primarily an individual, not a 
matron or a mother, religious partisans argued that the American moral regime was based 
on the structure of the family with the woman as its guardian, and that the so-called 
emancipation of woman would entail social degradation and moral dissolution.  To those 
who argued for black civil rights, proponents of the southern moral establishment argued 
that the ostensible black moral degeneracy, partly the result of racial imperfection and 
partly the cultural legacy of their time in slavery, threatened the nation with corruption 
should they become full members in its body politic.  In the place of civil rights, they 
claimed what was needed was a civilizing mission to teach Afro-Americans the virtues of 
work and the necessity of Christian, bourgeois character so that they could more easily 
live within the strictures of the moral establishment.  When that civilizing mission failed 
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to live up to the hopes of its proponents, the way became clear for southern partisans to 
institute a regime of Jim Crow segregation as the central component of the early-
twentieth century southern moral establishment.  In the case of religious liberty and the 
freedom of speech, religious partisans pointed to the maintenance of an effective moral 
regime, which they thought provided an organizational center for American culture and 
provided the foundation for its greatness, in order to deny free speech and absolute 
religious liberty.  Free speech ostensibly imperiled the maintenance of the American 
morality by eroding the religious foundation of American culture and society, sending 
individuals out into the world without an internalized moral compass necessary for the 
maintenance of American democracy.  Ultimately religious rhetoric about the decline of 
the moral establishment provided a justification to further buttress its strength.  The 
century closed not with an expansive sense of individual freedom, or the inevitable 
inclusion of individuals as full citizens, but with the moral establishment, which 
opponents regarded as an oppressive and individually stultifying regime, still firmly in 
place.
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APPENDIX: STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND RELIGION 
State constitutions offer a virtual palimpsest of American political thought.  State 
constitutions, unlike the federal constitution, changed often, as new political ideals and 
different demographic and economic situations arose.  To read chronologically through 
the constitutions of the various states is to watch American political thought change and 
develop. Yet scholars have not been attracted to state constitutionalism, in part because 
after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and centralizing of jurisprudence of the 
U.S. Supreme Court following the Civil War, federal constitutionalism seemed the more 
promising field of inquiry.  That promise may hold true for many issues, particularly after 
1920, but when it comes to the history of religious liberty an exclusive or even primary 
focus on the federal constitution and its interpretation misleads.  John Marshall, writing 
for a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court, ruled in 1833 in Barron v. Baltimore that the Bill 
of Rights (including the First Amendment) did not apply to the states.  For most of the 
history of the United States, religious liberty was defined, contested, and elaborated on 
the state level.1   
  Unfortunately, very few resources exist for those who wish to study state-level 
legal history when it comes to religion.  The following chart offers an at-a-glance 
resource to see how state-level constitutional thought developed over time.  The process 
of condensing over 200 years of state-level constitutionalism to a single chart is not 
without risk of over-simplification, yet states consulted one another’s organic documents 
regularly so that recurrent patterns emerge with enough consistency that the chart-based 
summary remains useful.  Sometimes the categories may overlap, and different principles 
of law may have different applicability in different situations.  Because the courts can 
                                                 
1 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833) 
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apply constitutional provisions in very different ways, the topics and subdivisions, though 
not arbitrary, reflect my sense of the best way to account for the complexity of the 
provisions, as well as to monitor the change over time.  But for an in-depth study, nothing 
will replace looking at the documents themselves.   
A few more words of explanation may be helpful.   Because of constitutional 
revisions, many of the original section numbers have changed.  For obsolete 
constitutions, I followed the original sections numbers in William F. Swindler, ed., 
Sources and Documents, while providing a note that lists the Article of Amendment and 
its date of adoption.  For current constitutions, I have followed the section numbers in 
Constitutions, National and State, which lists the section numbers as they currently stand.  
The three exceptions to this rule are the still current constitutions of Massachusetts 
(1780), New Hampshire (1784), Vermont (1793), where I have used the original section 
numbering and noted the current section numbers and the intervening amendments in 
notes at the bottom of the chart.  Sometimes there is a gap between the year of the 
Constitutional Convention and the year of the Constitution’s ratification, and different 
authorities sometimes cite the same constitution using different years. I have followed the 
years listed in Sources and Documents and Constitutions, National and State.  I have 
likewise followed Swindler in omitting some constitutions whose change from the 
previous constitution is so slight as to be not to be worth noting.  The great majority of 
these are southern constitutions drafted as part of the secession movement preceding the 
Civil War, whose major change was to declare allegiance to the Confederate States of 
America.2
                                                 
2 William F. Swindler, ed., Sources and Documents of United States Constitutions. 11 vols. (Dobbs Ferry: 
Oceana, 1973-1988); Constitutions, National and State. 6 vols. (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana, 1985-).  
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In terms of the different categories, I followed a consistent set of rules.  I noted 
the presence of a free exercise clause, a free speech clause, or a freedom of conscience 
clause only when the phrase or a very close cognate was used.  In the no preference 
category, I noted when constitutions used the phrase “no preference,” as well as when, as 
occurs in several early state constitutions, they used the more specific prohibition against 
the “subordination of any sect or denomination to one another.”  Under the category “acts 
of licentiousness proviso,” I noted limitations on religious liberty that used the phrase 
“acts of licentiousness,” referenced deviations from established “morality,” or, in five 
cases (Idaho 1889, Montana 1889, Oklahoma 1907, Arizona 1910, and New Mexico 
1910), specifically prohibited bigamy and polygamy, which I have also listed separately.  
The loosest category is the “prohibition against civil disability” because of religious 
belief.  A prohibition could include specific language against all civil disability for 
religious belief, or it could guarantee a specific civic right like acting as a witness in 
court, acting as a juror, and voting.  It might also do all the above.  In general, if it gave 
any kind of guarantee of protection against civil disability, I listed under that category 
heading.  The ban on religious test for office, though conceptually related to the ban on 
civil disability, was often listed as a separate article in the state constitutions, so I have 
listed it separately as well.  Under the “disestablishment clause” category, I included 
those provisions that require that no person could “be compelled to attend, erect, or 
support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry against his consent,” as well as 
those that explicitly excluded an “establishment.”  Under the category “exemption from 
taxation,” I have listed all the provisions that exempt churches from taxation.  Sometimes 
that exemption is implied, guaranteeing “privileges and immunities.”  Other times it 
 268
explicitly exempts churches from taxation.  There are also two kinds of provisions for tax 
exemption: a self-executing provision, meaning that the exemption is enacted by the 
constitutional provision itself, and an authorizing provision, meaning that an exemption is 
permitted within certain parameters but requires an act of the legislature to fully enact the 
exemption.  Because all of the states with authorizing provisions have corresponding 
legislative enactments, I have not drawn any distinction between self-executing and 
authorizing provisions in the chart.  Finally, one last caveat.  Just because no 
constitutional provision is listed does not mean that there was not a statutory provision to 
accomplish the same thing, or that courts have not found support for one category in 
another.  This chart, in other words, does not show how courts subsequently applied the 
clauses.  Yet the impulse to place a provision in the organic law can be suggestive of a 
change in the church-state arrangement, though the exact meaning and reason for the 
change would require more in-depth study into the constitutional history of each state.3   
In the end, this chart makes visible the many and multifarious limitations on 
religious liberty, as states regulated religion in a variety of ways that changed over time.  
The change over time, and the ability to track that change over time in this chart, shows 
the shifting boundaries of dissent, the unstable meaning of religious liberty, and the 
implied and subtle forms of religious control that have been a hallmark of the American 
church-state arrangement.  
                                                 
3 For the best one-volume treatment of religion and the various state laws, though it is now badly dated, see 
Antieau, Carroll, and Burke, Religion Under State Constitutions. 
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